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Abstract 
Fictional names such as Sherlock Holmes, Tom Sawyer or Superman originate 
in fiction. We also employ them in ordinary conversations. However, when we 
ask what these terms refer to and what speakers think when they employ them, 
a host of problems arise. Whilst an anti-realist perspective will assimilate them 
to the broader category of empty-names; a realistic perspective, articulable in 
different ways, argues for the existence of fictional entities as their referents. 
Each stance faces puzzles which are difficult to resolve.  
Generally speaking, if we think or talk about something when we use fictional 
names, what is it we are thinking or talking about? How do referential relations 
work in this context? If, on the other hand, we speak about nothing when we 
use a fictional name, how do we understand the linguistic processes which go 
on and which give us the impression of speaking about something? 
I will provide an overview of both theoretical stances and the different 
problems they face; however, my focus will be on the anti-realistic perspective. 
Specifically, I will discuss two main ways of treating the supposed emptiness 
RIILFWLRQDOQDPHV,ZLOODUJXHDJDLQVWWKHHPSOR\PHQWRIWKHQRWLRQRIµJDSS\
propositions¶DQG LQ IDYRXURI*DUHWK(YDQV¶ DQG.HQGDOO:DOWRQ¶V idea that 
VSHDNHUV¶XWWHUDQFHVZKLFKDSSHDUWRPDNHUHIHUHQFHWRILFWLRQDOHQWLWLHVFDQEH
understood as acts of pretence of a certain sort. 
I will in particular discuss the many objections to David Braun¶V anti-realist 
proposal. I will consider the weaknesses of the pragmatic account built by Fred 
$GDPV *DU\ )XOOHU DQG 5REHUW 6WHFNHU DURXQG WKH NH\ QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\
propositions¶ )LQDOO\ , ZLOO SUHVHQW Kendall :DOWRQ¶V YLHZ DQG answer the 
objection of implausibility which is often aimed at it, providing an 
understanding of acts of pretence in terms of acts of communication. 
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Introduction 
The study of the connection between language and reality provides an insight 
into our ability to express thoughts about the world. Words, terms and other 
expressions contribute to the building of such a connection. Through their 
analysis and through the study of the patterns of sentence structures we have 
reached a deeper insight into the relation between language and reality. Within 
this field of research my interest will be focused on some terms that look like 
names but seem to lack any referential connection with the world. I will call 
them fictional names and I will define them as a class of terms included in the 
broader class of empty names. The problem of empty names is a long standing 
one in the history of philosophy in general and in philosophy of language in 
particular. 
At times, the study of the reference of fictional names has benefited from the 
light shed on it by investigations carried out within the field of theories of 
fiction and the nature of fictional characters. At other times it has been of 
interest to the ontological debate on the existence of abstract objects and the 
nature of quantifiers. Moreover, a related debate has been developed in 
philosophy of language. If we think or talk about something when we use 
fictional names, what is it we are addressing and how do the referential 
relations work? Contrariwise, if we speak about nothing when we use a 
fictional name, how do we understand the linguistic process which gives us the 
impression of speaking about something? While all these areas of study are of 
interest to me, the emphasis will be placed on the semantics of fictional names: 
what do fictional names refer to if they refer to anything? Which problems do 
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fictional names pose to the theories of reference? Which solutions have been 
elaborated? Which problems do they still face? 
In the next section I will explain what a fictional name is and identify the 
peculiarities of these terms.    
 
0.1 Empty Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names 
What are empty names? The labHO³HPSW\QDPHV´ LVVRPHWLPHVFRQVLGHUHGD
tendentious way to talk about the problem of terms that seem to lack a referent; 
it seems tendentious because it implies that these terms do not pick out any 
referent.  
It is likely that this approach has been inherited by the debates that in the 
course of history have been developed regarding the problem of terms which 
allegedly lack a referent. A first version of a paradox related to non-referring 
terms dates back to Greek philosophy. The following is Bertrand Russell¶V 
illustUDWLRQRIZKDWKDVEHFRPHNQRZQDV3DUPHQLGHV¶SDUDGR[ 
³:KHQ\RXWKLQN\RXWKLQNof something; when you use a name, it must be the 
name of something. Therefore both thought and language require objects 
outside themselves. And since you can think of a thing or speak of it at one 
time as well as another, whatever can be thought of or spoken of must exist at 
DOOWLPHV´1 
However, we predicate the non-existence of something, for example uttering 
³3HJDVXVGRHVQRWH[LVW´, when the use of a name requires the existence of an 
                                                          
1
 Russell, B., (1956), A History of Western Philosophy, edited by Marsh, R.C., ed. New York: 
The Macmillian Company, p. 49. In this study I will not discuss the problem of eternal 
existence, mentioned by Russell in this paragraph. 
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object. This puzzle, known nowadays as the puzzle of non-existential 
statements, is still today the object of debate in ontological, linguistic and 
cognitive investigation.  
In the early sixteenth century the debate on the reference of terms that 
allegedly lack a reference found new life thanks to the contribution by a group 
of logicians at the University of Paris.2 
The epistemological supposition in post-medieval semantics was that the 
ability to speak a language depended on the possession of concepts derived by 
the appropriate experience of objects external to speakers. The reference of the 
WHUP ³&KLPHUD´ LV DVVXPHG WR EH DQ LPSRVVLEOH REMHFW DQG LI D VSHDNHU¶V
ability to use language relies on the possession of concepts derived by the 
experience of external objects, given that a speaker cannot have experience of a 
chimera nor can they have a concept of it, ultimatelyWKH\VKRXOGQ¶WEHDEOHWR
XQGHUVWDQGRUXVHWKHWHUP³&KLPHUD´+RZHYHUVHQWHQFHVVXFKDV³,LPDJLQH
a chimerD´ VHHP WR EH PHDQLQJIXO DQG QR Gifficulties seem to arise in 
understanding it.   
At the beginning of last century the work of Gottlob Frege and Bertrand 
Russell posed the basis for the contemporary debate in analytical philosophy. 
They inherited the puzzle as concerning terms which lack a referent or 
bearerless names and this was of particular interest both within the study of the 
reference of proper names, and in the metaphysical debate. In the former 
debate, these logicians elaborated different proposals; in the latter debate 
                                                          
2
 For appreciating the shape and the main lines of the arguments available at the time see 
Ashworth, E. Jennifer, (1985) Chimeras and Imaginary Objects: A Study in the Post-Medieval 
Theory of Signification. Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics, ed. London: Variorum. The main 
references were medieval authors (Robert Holkot, John Buridan and Marsilius of Inghen) and 
the discussion was centred on their proposals.  
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Russell rejected the Meinongian thesis of an ontology comprising non-existent 
objects, as did Frege, though Frege did not explicitly refer to Meinong. 
Although Frege¶V and Russell¶V analyses of the reference of proper names led 
to two very different proposals, they both endorsed the view that terms which 
allegedly lack reference are empty names, i.e. names without a referent. 
However, nowadays, the fact that these terms are bearerless is not taken for 
granted any longer. In fact, in the contemporary debate it is possible to 
recognise two main standpoints: those theories which state the emptiness of 
terms which seem to lack a referent in contrast to those theories which state 
that empty names are not empty, but rather refer to something. Therefore, 
before taking one or the other stance it seems appropriate to avoid any bias by 
starting with the question: are there any such things as empty names?   
When thinking about which individuals QDPHV VXFK DV µ9XOFDQ¶ µ6KHUORFN
HoOPHV¶µ3DSD*RULRW¶µ3HJDVXV¶ etc., would pick out, we may not find any. 
Consequently we would legitimately conclude that they are all empty, i.e. they 
do not refer to anything. This conclusion is well supported by common sense, 
for example, if I were in the unfortunate circumstance of needing to go to the 
police to ask for a detective, I would not ask for Sherlock Holmes because 
there is no Sherlock Holmes. Although these terms are empty, they seem to 
cover the same syntactic role as proper names but rather than semantically 
contributing an individual they would not contribute anything to the 
proposition expressed. 
Notwithstanding the apparent conclusiveness of such arguments, the study of 
how and in which context these terms originated have provided, according to 
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some philosophers, more elements for the understanding of their semantics3 
and for answering the question about their alleged emptiness. For example, 
Nathan Salmon puts forward the distinction between terms that have been 
introduced within a fiction, rather than names that derive from a mythological 
story or names that allegedly refer on the basis of an erroneous theory or an act 
of misperception. I will adopt this distinction which seems to me to be a more 
detailed systematisation of the problem in contrast to an underspecified 
category such as empty names.   
It is possible to distinguish between fictional names, names that originate in 
works of fiction; mythical names, names that originate within a story such as a 
myth or an erroneous theory; and merely non-referring names, terms 
introduced by stipulation with awareness that they are lacking a referent. For 
H[DPSOH µ6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ DQG µ3DSD *RULRW¶ DUH QDPHV ZKLFK RULJLQDWHG
from works of fiction. Doyle and Balzac introduced these terms in their novels 
and they are employed as proper names in the fiction. By reading the relevant 
books and talking or writing about them, the use of these terms might have 
spread outside of the fiction in assertive utterances about the novels or in 
JHQHUDO VWDWHPHQWV VXFK DV µ6KHUORck Holmes is more famous than any real 
GHWHFWLYH¶ %HFDXVH RI WKHLU RULJLQ ZH PD\ FDOO WKLV W\SH RI WHUP fictional 
names.  
µ9XOFDQ¶KDVEHHQEURXJKWLQWRXVHLQFRVPRORJ\ZLWKWKHSXUSRVHRIQDPLQJD
planet between Mercury and the Sun whose existence has been later denied by 
                                                          
3
 See Kripke, S. (1973) -RKQ/RFNH¶V/HFWXUHV, unpublished; Thomasson, A. (1999) Fiction 
and Metaphysics, ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Salmon, N. (1998) 
Nonexistence. Noûs, Vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 277-319; Braun D. (2002) Cognitive Significance, 
Attitude Ascriptions and way of believing propositions. Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 108, no. 1/2, pp.65-81. 
6 
 
further studies. The name has come into use through a false story about the 
universe. These types of story are myths, and we may call these names 
mythological names4. A myth may also have been the origin of the use of 
µ3HJDVXV¶DQGWKHrefore it may be considered a mythological name as well. 
A different case of non-referring names may be provided by the following 
example. Consider that Claire, walking back from the library one wintery 
evening, wonders whether someone is waiting at the campus bus stop that is 
currently out-of-use. Though she does not think that there is a person who is 
ZDLWLQJ VKH VWLSXODWHV WKHQDPH µ0ROO\¶ IRU WKHSHUVRQ WKDW LVZDLWLQJ DW WKH
out-of-use bus stop. According to some philosophers5 WKH QDPH µ0ROO\¶ Ls 
genuinely a non-referring name but is also neither fictional nor mythical. Claire 
does not believe that there was someone at the bus stop (unlike Le Verrier who 
believed in the existence of Vulcan) and she does not pretend to use the name 
for a person (unlike 'R\OH ZLWK µ+ROPHV¶ $FFRUGLQJ WR 6DOPRQ ZKR
considers cases similar to this one, this would be a case of a genuine non-
referring name.  
Make no mistake though; I am not stating that genuine non-referring names are 
the only example of empty names ± as some philosophers propose6. We may 
come to the conclusion that fictional, mythical and genuine non-referring 
names all lack a referent or contrariwise they do not. I am only pointing out 
that for each one of these types of terms we can recognise its own specificity. 
                                                          
4
 I adopt here for myths and mythical names the terminology introduced in Salmon N. (1998) 
Nonexistence. Noûs, Vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 277-319. Adopted also in Braun, D. (2005) Empty 
Names, Fictional Names, Mythical Names. Noûs, Vol. 39, pp. 596-631. 
5
  6DOPRQ1GLVFXVVHVWKHH[DPSOHRIWKHWHUP³1DSS\´SS-307. 
6
 This view is suggested in Salmon, N. (1988) in Nonexistence. Noûs, Vol. 32, no. 3, pp. 277-
319. 
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Whichever will be our conclusion, taking into account the different context in 
which these terms originate and are employed provides elements for a better 
understanding of their semantic role.   
A new systematisation of the problem does not mean that we have found an 
answer to it. The problem of the alleged reference without referents is still to 
be faced. The focus of this study will be on fictional names. I will discuss 
different theoretical views selecting and applying their proposals to the 
problem of the reference of these terms and, addressing the specificity of 
fictional names, I will provide an insight into what is fiction, what is a fictional 
context and how it works. 
 
0.2 Let Us Start From Frege and Russell  
At the origin of the contemporary debate on terms that allegedly lack a 
referent, FregH¶V DQG 5XVVHOO¶V SURSRVDOV VWDQG out as our starting points. 
Despite the fact that their contributions on the theory of reference of proper 
names are only a small part of their own work as philosophers and logicians, 
these proposals have become part of the common background in this domain.  
According to Frege, a proper name refers to an object7 and conveys a sense 
that, at least partly, can be associated to a descriptive mode of presentation of 
the object. For Frege, the meaning of a name cannot be reduced to its referent, 
but instead it consists of a layered notion of meaning, one which involves 
UHFRJQLWLRQ RI LWV µUHIHUHQFH¶ DQG µVHQVH¶ (PSOR\LQJ WKH QRWLRQ RI VHQVH D
descriptive mode of presentation of the object designated, Frege provided an 
                                                          
7
 µ2EMHFW¶LVKHUHLQWHQGHGLQits most comprehensive use, comprising individual as well.  
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answer to many of the 0LOOLDQLVW¶VSUREOHPV0LOO¶VWKHRU\RIthe reference of 
proper names was at the time the leading one. It states that proper names 
function as tags; their meaning is the object to which names are allocated. As 
Frege pointed out, this theory was encountering various difficulties, for 
example in the case of the problem of bearerless or empty names, the problem 
of informativeness or cognitive significance and the problem of substitution 
into belief contexts. 
For example, many people may not know that QDPHV VXFK DV µ0DUN 7ZDLQ¶
DQGµ6DPXHO&OHPHQV¶have the same referent, however they may still be able 
WRXQGHUVWDQG WKH LGHQWLW\ VWDWHPHQW µ0DUN7ZDLQ LV6DPXHO&OHPHQV¶ ,I WKH
only contribution of a proper name were to be its referent, to understand the 
above identity statement one should already know the reference of the names 
DQG DW WKDW SRLQW µ0DUN 7ZDLQ LV 6DPXHO &OHPHQV¶ ZRXOG EH WDQWDPRXQW WR
µ0DUN7ZDLQ LV0DUN7ZDLQ¶+RZHYHUZKLOVW the former is informative the 
second is not and we can understand the former one even without being aware 
that the two names designate the same individual.  
Furthermore, let us consider the case in which Claire, a young literature 
student, does not know anything about Mark Twain apart from the fact that he 
is the author of Huckleberry Finn. ,WZRXOGQRWEHGLIILFXOWWRVWDWHWKDWµ&ODLUH
EHOLHYHVWKDW0DUN7ZDLQLV0DUN7ZDLQ¶LVWUXHJLYHQWKDWWKHWKDW-clause is a 
WDXWRORJ\+RZHYHU WKH WUXWKRI µ&ODLUHEHOLHYes that Mark Twain is Samuel 
&OHPHQV¶FDQQRWEHWDNHQIRUJUDQWHGLQWKHVDPHZD\LQIDFWLWLVIDOVHJLYHQ
that Claire does not know that Mark Twain is Samuel Clemens. The 
assumption that the meaning of a proper name is constituted only by its 
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designatum would lead us to the wrong conclusion, namely that the sentences 
µ&ODLUH EHOLHYHV WKDW 0DUN 7ZDLQ LV 0DUN 7ZDLQ¶ DQG  µ&ODLUH EHOLHYHV WKDW
0DUN7ZDLQLV6DPXHO&OHPHQV¶KDYHWKHVDPHWUXWK-value conditions. 
Finally consider the following example as an illustration of the problem of 
bearerless names. For Mill the H[SODQDWLRQ RI D VHQWHQFH VXFK DV µ2G\VVHXV
ZDVVHWDVKRUHDW,WKDFDZKLOHVRXQGDVOHHS¶ would have been problematic. To 
ZKDWGRHVµ2G\VVHXV¶UHIHU"$OOHJHGO\ WRQRWKLQJDWDOOEXW LI WKHUHIHUent is 
the only semantic property that the proper name contributes to the proposition 
then that sentence does not express any proposition and is thus, meaningless. 
However, this does not seem to be the correct conclusion, given that everyone 
can grasp the meaning expressed by that sentence. For Frege, given that he 
introduced a two-layered notion of meaning distinguishing between reference 
%HGHXWXQJDQGVHQVH6LQQDVHQWHQFHVXFKDVµ2G\VVHXVZDVVHWDVKRUHDW
,WKDFDZKLOH VRXQGDVOHHS¶ZRXOGKDYHH[SUessed a thought while it lacked a 
truth-value. For thoughts have components that are senses, but there is no 
referent of which the predication is true or false.   
The problem of bearerless or empty names, the problem of informativeness and 
the problem of substitution into belief contexts all seemed to find a resolution 
WKURXJK)UHJH¶VPRYH 
According to Bertrand Russell, ordinar\ SURSHU QDPHV VXFK DV ³6RFUDWHV´
³%HUWUDQG´ but also including fictional QDPHV VXFK DV ³2G\VVHXV´ RU
³6KHUORFN +ROPHV´ DQG VR Rn, are not genuine names. Proper names are 
GLVJXLVHG GHILQLWH GHVFULSWLRQV IRU H[DPSOH µ6RFUDWHV¶ RU µ2G\VVHXV¶ DUH
GLVJXLVHGGHVFULSWLRQVVXFKDVUHVSHFWLYHO\µWKHWHDFKHURI3ODWRDQGKXVEDQGRI
10 
 
;DQWKLSSH¶µWKH7KHEDQNLQJZKRVHWRXWWR FRQTXHU7UR\¶ In contrast with a 
Fregean view that would assume that they contribute a sense to the thought 
expressed, Russell said they are on a par with definite descriptions; incomplete 
symbols that are eliminable under analysis.   
They are incomplete symbols whose semantic contribution to the proposition 
expressed may be understood only by virtue of a deeper analysis of the 
sentence beyond its grammatical surface into its logical form. According to this 
view, they semantically behave as quantificational expressions and sentences 
involving fictional names express a proposition that can be caught analysing 
the logical form of the sentence. Consider the following analysis: 
(a) Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep. 
µ2G\VVHXV¶EHLQJDGLVJXLVHGGHILQLWHGHVFULption may be substituted in (a) for 
H[DPSOHZLWKµWKHKHURRI+RPHU¶V2G\VVH\¶LQE 
(b) 7KHKHURRI+RPHU¶V2G\VVH\ZDVVHWDVKRUHDW,WKDFDZKLOHVRXQG
asleep. 
$Q DQDO\VLV RI E PD\ EH SURYLGHG DFFRUGLQJO\ ZLWK 5XVVHOO¶V DQDO\VLV RI
definite descriptions. /HWXVHPSOR\µ1¶WRWUDQVODWHWKHSUHGLFDWHµLVDKHUR
RI+RPHU¶VOdyssey¶ DQG µ0¶ WR WUDQVODWH WKHSUHGLFDWH µZDV VHW DVKRUH DW
,WKDFDZKLOHVRXQGDVOHHS¶LQUHSUHVHQWLQJWKHSURSRVLWLRQH[SUHVVHGE\ELQ
LWVORJLFDOIRUPE¶ 
E¶ x) (Nx  (y) (Ny { x=y)  Mx) 
As displayed in (b¶5XVVHOOassimilates definite descriptions to quantificational 
expressions, which can be understood, roughly speaking, as an existential 
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statement (where existence is thought of as a second order property of 
properties) which state the existence of a certain x, the uniqueness of x and the 
fact that x EHDUVWKHSURSHUWLHVH[SUHVVHGLQWKHVHQWHQFH*LYHQWKDWµ7KHKHUR
RI+RPHU¶V2G\VVH\¶GRHVQRWVDWLVI\WKHILUVWUHTXLUHPHQWRIWKHFRQMXQFWLRQ
H[SUHVVHGLQE¶ E¶LVIDOVH  
Frege¶V and Russell¶V DQDO\VHs of the problem of empty names were very 
different, yet notwithstanding those differences, for both of them the problem 
was a problem of HPSWLQHVV 7HUPV VXFK DV µ2G\VVHXV¶ ZHUH for both 
logicians, names which lack a referent.  
The idea of a descriptive content that names were to contribute to the 
proposition expressed was taken up by logicians and philosophers in the first 
half of the last century, and was developed into different versions of what has 
been called Descriptivism. Proper names have come to be understood as 
clusters of descriptions attributable to an individual8. As a result of this move, 
philosophers have included within the view that part of the meaning of a proper 
name corresponds to a descriptive content, the idea that the reference of proper 
names is also fixed by the description associated with the name. This has made 
the theory vulnerable to strong objections and therefore far from conclusive. In 
fact, since the 1970s the descriptivist stance has been effectively rejected. 
Different versions of the direct reference theory have been elaborated by 
logicians and philosophers within their area of research9. The so-FDOOHG ³QHZ
                                                          
8
 See Searle, J. (1958) Proper Names. Mind, Vol. 67, pp. 166-173. 
9
 See Kripke, S. (1980) Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press; 
Donnellan, K. (1972) Proper Names and Identifying Descriptions, in D. Davidson and G. 
Harman, eds., Semantics of Natural Language, Dordrecht: D. Reidel, pp. 356±79; Kaplan, D. 
(1989) Demonstratives/Afterthoughts, in J. Almog, J. Perry and H. Wettstein, eds., Themes 
from Kaplan, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 481±614. 
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WKHRU\RIUHIHUHQFH´GHSRVHGWKHGHVFULSWLYLVWYLHZRQWKHEDVLVRIYHUy strong 
arguments, often referred to as the semantic, epistemic and modal arguments. 
The crux of the semantic argument is that there is a semantic aspect of 
descriptions that seems not to fit with the semantic function of proper names. 
Descriptions do not uniquely designate a referent10 since more than one object 
may have the same attribute, therefore if the reference of a proper name were 
fixed via the description associated with it, the proper name might fail to 
designate a specific individual. Moreover, the argument has been further 
developed in light of the case of descriptions that are erroneously associated 
with a certain individual. For example, someone may think that Albert Einstein 
is the inventor of the atomic bomb and she may associate this description with 
that name. However, that use of the name would not designate the individual 
picked out through the description, the actual inventor of the atomic bomb 
being Oppenheimer. But surely the person still refers to Einstein when she uses 
WKHQDPH³(LQVWHLQ´ 
The core of the epistemic argument is the following: if the meaning of a proper 
name is given by its associated description, the proposition expressed by a 
sentence that contains a proper name would have the same epistemic profile as 
the sentence where that proper name is replaced with its associated description. 
However, this is not the case. Consider the two following sentences: (i) if the 
mentor of Alexander the Great exists, then Aristotle is the mentor of Alexander 
the Great; (ii) if the mentor of Alexander the Great exists, then the mentor of 
Alexander the Great is the mentor of Alexander the Great. It is possible to 
                                                          
10
 There are some exceptions for example in descriptions VXFKDV³WKHVXFFHVVRURI´EXWIRU
the moment I do not consider these particular cases. 
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DVVRFLDWH WKH GHVFULSWLRQ µWKH PHQWRU RI $OH[DQGHU WKH *UHDW¶ ZLWK WKH QDPH
µ$ULVWRWOH¶LWEHLQJWKHFDVHWKDWWKH*UHHNSKLORVRSKHUZDVLQGHHG$OH[DQGHU¶V
mentor. However, if the description associated with the proper name were the 
PHDQLQJRIWKHQDPHZHPD\UHSODFHWKHQDPHµ$ULVWRWOH¶ZLWKWKHGHVFULSWLRQ
µWKHPHQWRURI$OH[DQGHUWKH*UHDW¶ZLWKRXWDOWHULQJWKHHSLVWHPLFSURILOH from 
(i) to (ii).  Therefore,  given that it is knowable a priori that if the mentor of 
Alexander the Great exists, then the mentor of Alexander the Great is the 
mentor of Alexander the Great; it would be knowable a priori that if the mentor 
of Alexander the Great exists, then Aristotle is the mentor of Alexander the 
Great. However, the truth of (i) is a posteriori not a priori, in fact one may gain 
WKDWNQRZOHGJHVWXG\LQJ$OH[DQGHURU$ULVWRWOH¶VOLIHEXWQRWDVDVHOI-evident 
truth.   
The modal argument has a similar structure to the epistemic argument. If the 
PHDQLQJ RI µ$ULVWRWOH¶ LV JLYHQ E\ WKH DVVRFLDWHG GHVFULSWLRQ µWKH PHQWRU RI
$OH[DQGHUWKH*UHDW¶UHSODFLQJWKHIRUPHULQLZLWKLWVDVVRFLDWHGGHVFULSWLRQ
in (ii), (i) should have the same modal profile as (ii). However, this is not the 
case. In fact, (ii) is necessarily true, namely it is true in every possible world; 
while (i) is not. There may well be some possible world in which Aristotle is 
not the mentor of Alexander the Great.  
On the basis of these arguments, there has been a radical turn back towards the 
idea that the meaning of a proper name is its referent. One of the core features 
of Descriptivism, the idea that the reference of a name may be fixed through a 
description, has been overWXUQHGE\ZKDWKDVEHHQFDOOHG WKH³QHZ WKHRU\RI
UHIHUHQFH´7KLVFROODWHVGLIIHUHQWYHUVLRQVRI WKHGLUHFW UHIHUHQFH WKHRU\DQG, 
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notwithstanding the popularity it gained since the 1970s, still faces some old 
problems: the same ones Frege tried to solve by introducing the notion of 
µVHQVH¶ 
In conclusion, on the one hand, if fictional names contribute a descriptive 
content to the proposition expressed they do not behave as proper names, e.g. 
rigid designators, although they cover the same syntactic role. We would need 
then to explain on which grounds fictional names are an autonomous syntactic 
category assimilated to quantified expressions11. On the other hand, it may be 
held that fictional names behave exactly as proper names. One of the main 
challenges in the contemporary debate consists in reconciling the idea that 
fictional names are proper names with either the idea that they refer to 
something or that, although they are names, they lack a referent.   
 
0.3 Realism vs. Anti-Realism  
Anti-realism or Irrealism, in this context, is the theoretical stance that does not 
recognise fictional characters as having any ontological status; according to 
this view, fictional names are genuine non-referring terms. In contrast, a 
realistic perspective on fictional objects will endorse the general view that 
there is something designated by fictional names. 
Philosophers such as D. Braun, R. Stecker, F. Adams and G. Fuller try to 
reconcile the role of fictional names as proper names with their supposed 
emptiness. All these philoVRSKHUV DFFHSW DQG HPSOR\ WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\
SURSRVLWLRQV¶DVXEVWLWXWHIRUD³IXOO-IOHGJHG´SURSRVLWLRQZKLFKFRUUHVSRQGV
                                                          
11
 G. Currie puts forward a proposal on these lines in The Nature of Fiction, 1990. 
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to the content expressed by sentences containing fictional names, where those 
names are considered to be empty 12. A different proposal which endorses the 
emptiness of fictional names has been developed within theories of fiction. The 
idea, sketched by G. Evans and developed by K. Walton13,  consists in 
understanding fictional names within a broader understanding of our 
participation in the pretence;  a pretence in which we for the first time engage 
with these terms and with their use. 
Both realistic and anti-realistic views will face problems concerning the 
relation between language and thought and language and reality. In fact, if 
when we think we think of something and when we use a name, it must be the 
name of something, fictional names become an interesting case to investigate 
from both perspectives. What is it we think about and what do we name ± if we 
name anything ± when employing fictional names? A realistic and an anti-
realistic perspective will face different difficulties in providing coherent 
answers to these fundamental questions. 
Let us start from the problems met endorsing an anti-realist perspective; we can 
then see which are the answers provided by different realistic proposals and 
consider which questions are in need of an answer assuming this latter point of 
view. 
  
                                                          
12
 K. Taylor endorses a solution which supposes the emptiness of empty-names in a proposal 
which resembles the one developed by Adams, Stecker and Fuller. See Taylor, K. (2000) 
Emptiness without compromise. Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence 
edited by Everett, A. & Hofweber, T., ed. Stanford: CSLI Publications. See also Taylor, K. 
(2009) The Things We Do With Empty Names. Presented at the BW6 conference in Barcelona 
on Reference and Non-Existence.  
13
 See Evans, G. (1982) The Varieties of Reference. ed. Oxford: Blackwell. For a semantics of 
fictional names developed on these lines see Walton, K. (1990) Mimesis and Make-Believe. 
Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, part 4.  
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0.4  Language and Thought, Language and Reality 
The proposal according to which fictional names are empty names and have the 
same semantic role as proper names gives rise to a variety of problems. One 
problematic conclusion is that fictional names do not contribute anything to the 
proposition and therefore no proposition is expressed by sentences containing 
fLFWLRQDO QDPHV /HW XV ODEHO WKLV ³WKH SUREOHP RI QRQVHQVH´ *LYHQ WKDW D
sentence containing fictional names does not express any proposition, that 
sentence would not have propositional sense. Formulated in this way the 
problem concerns the connection between language and thought, as in order for 
a sentence to be understood one grasps the thought expressed. If no proposition 
is expressed no thought is expressed either, therefore that sentence is not 
XQGHUVWDQGDEOH<HWDVHQWHQFHVXFKDVµ6KHUORFN+ROPHVLVDGHWHFWLYH¶LV, or 
seems to be, completely understandable.  
$VHFRQGSUREOHPLV³WKHSUREOHP RIGLIIHUHQWFRJQLWLYHYDOXHV´ this concerns 
WKH GLIIHUHQFH LQ ZKDW )UHJH FDOOHG ³FRJQLWLYH YDOXH´14, between sentences 
containing different fictional names. Since these types of sentences would fail 
in expressing any proposition, we would not notice any difference in the 
FRQWHQW H[SUHVVHG E\ VHQWHQFHV VXFK DV µ0DFEHWK ORYHV 'HVGHPRQD¶ UDWKHU
WKDQ µ'HVGHPRQD ORYHV ,DJR¶ +RZHYHU not only do these sentences have 
meaning and if meaning is the proposition expressed, then they express a 
proposition, but the propositions expressed also seem to differ in cognitive 
value, as regards to who loves whom. This problem ultimately seems to pertain 
                                                          
14
 Frege, G. (1952) On Sense and Reference. Translations from the Philosophical Writings of 
Gottlob Frege edited by P. Geach and M. Black, ed. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 56±79. 
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to the connection between language and thoughts, for two sentences which 
differ in cognitive value seem to be related, at least in part, to the thoughts one 
grasps in using them.  
$WKLUGSUREOHPLVWKH³SUREOHPRIWKHSURSRVLWLRQEHOLHYHG´7KLVFRQFHUQVWKH
belief one may state when uttering a sentence containing a fictional name. For 
H[DPSOHLIQRSURSRVLWLRQLVH[SUHVVHGE\DVHQWHQFHVXFKDVµ,WLVQRWWKHFDVH
WKDW6KHUORFN+ROPHVH[LVWV¶QRRQHFRXOGXVH WKLVVHQWHQFH WRFRPPXQLFDWH
something that she believes. In fact, one may indeed believe that it is not the 
case that Sherlock Holmes exists. Thus, this problem ultimately concerns the 
relation between language and thought, for the proposition one believes and 
expresses using a sentence is the thought that one grasps. 
A fiQDOSUREOHPLV³WKHSUREOHPRIWUXWK´7KLVFRQFHUQVWKHWUXWKYDOXHVRIWKH
sentence containing fictional names. In fact, it being the case that the truth 
value of a sentence derives from the proposition that it expresses, if no 
proposition is expressed then no truth value can be assigned to the sentence. 
+RZHYHULWVHHPVWKDWIRUDVHQWHQFHVXFKDVµ6KHUORFN+ROPHVLVDGHWHFWLYH¶
it is possible to assign a truth value. The assignment of truth values to 
sentences institutes the connection between languagHDQGUHDOLW\WKHUHIRUHµWKH
SUREOHPRIWUXWK¶XOWLPDWHO\FRQFHUQVWKLVFRQQHFWLRQ 
 
0.5  When Fictional Characters Do Exist... 
A realistic stance will be able to offer a straightforward solution to some of the 
foregoing problems. Firstly, if fictional characters do exist, sentences 
containing fictional names will express a proposition, namely the one in which 
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the fictional name names the appropriate fictional character. Secondly, the 
matter of who loves whom will be soon sorted out given that Macbeth, 
Desdemona and Iago are three different characters, therefore the problem of 
different cognitive values would not arise given that each fictional name would 
refer to a different fictional character. Thirdly, the problem of the proposition 
believed would not be a problem, in fact the belief that it is not the case that 
Sherlock Holmes exists is just a false belief. Finally, we would be able to 
assign a truth value to sentences containing fictional names, given that they 
express a proposition, even if it may not be what we expected it to be. For 
example we may think that it is true that Sherlock Holmes is a detective, but if 
we think that fictional characters are abstract artefacts we will conclude that 
Sherlock Holmes is not a detective, given that abstract artefacts are not 
detectives. 
New puzzles arise for a realistic stance with the same directness with which 
answers are provided to the problems faced by anti-realistic views. First of all, 
on which grounds can we justify the importation in the ontology of a new type 
of entity? Secondly, what sort of things are fictional characters? To what 
ontological category do they belong? Thirdly, whilst we may say that from a 
realLVWLFSRLQWRIYLHZ³,WLVQRWWKH case that Sherlock Holmes exists´LVIDOVH
the interpretatiRQRIDQHJDWLYHH[LVWHQWLDOVWDWHPHQWVXFKDV³6KHUORFN+ROPHV
GRHV QRW H[LVW´ LV SUREOHPDWLF )LQDOO\ GRHV D ILFWLRQDO FKDUacter bear 
SURSHUWLHVVXFKDVµEHLQJDGHWHFWLYH¶RUµEHLQJin ORYHZLWKVRPHRQH¶RUµEHLQJ
DSHUVRQ¶DWWKHVDPHWLPHDVµEHLQJDEVWUDFW¶RUµEHLQJQRQ-H[LVWHQW¶" 
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The variety of questions to ask the realistic scholar reveals in itself the variety 
of approaches in which a realistic stance can be articulated. A categorisation of 
a realistic stance will inevitably overlook important differences between 
different proposals and it can only be a temporary one, considering that the 
area of study concerning fictional characters seems to be in rapid development. 
However, to give a general outline, we can differentiate between four 
approaches: a creationist, a cognitive, a possibilistic and a Meinongian one. 
 
0.5.1  Creationistic Views 
Creationists are all those scholars who believe that fictional characters are 
abstract artefacts created by authors in the process of the creations of their 
stories15. The introduction into our ontology of such abstract cultural entities is 
based on the fact that characters are creatures of fiction bearing the same status 
as novels, plots or symphonies and so on. Moreover, Peter Van Inwagen offers 
an argument in which a statement VXFK DV ³7KHUH are fictional characters in 
some 19th century novels who are presented with a greater wealth of physical 
detail than is any character in any 18th FHQWXU\ QRYHO´16 translated into the 
idiom of formal logic shows that a quantification occurs over fictional 
characters and, according to Van Inwagen, in order for something to be bound 
to a quantification its existence is required.  
                                                          
15
 Philosophers such as S. Kripke, P. Van Inwhagen, S. Schiffer, A. Thomasson, N. Salmon 
would probably all agree with this very general statement, even though each account presents 
different tenets.  
16
 Van Inwagen, P. (1979) Creatures of Fiction. American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 14, no. 
4, pp. 299±308. 
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Once it is accepted that fictional characters are objects of our ontology, their 
nature may be then defined in terms of abstract entities, abstract cultural 
artefacts or roles, whose names are introduced by authors in the relative 
fictions and from the works of fiction the use of their name is exported to talk 
about the fictions, to compare different characters, to speculate in literary 
criticism about the moral or aesthetic values those works and those characters 
bring forward. A fictional character is then abstract, can be representative of a 
certain set of values or maybe a historical period or a way of thinking, is 
created by a certain author in a certain story, and yet often fictional characters 
are in love, live somewhere, seek something and sometimes they die - they can 
even die many times. In fact, for the existence of a character to cease once and 
for all, not one trace, be it written, oral or in anyone¶V memories about its story, 
needs to be found. The use of the impersoQDO SURQRXQ µLWV¶ LV \HW PRUH 
evidence of the shift from the reference to an abstract object and a fictional 
persona for whom we would use a SHUVRQDOSURQRXQVXFKDVµKH¶RUµVKH¶. For 
example:  ³2SKHOLD ORYHV +DPOHW EXW KHU ORYH LV XQUHTXLWHG´ it would not 
sound FRUUHFW WR VD\ ³2SKHOLD ORYHV +DPOHW EXW LWV ORYH LV XQUHTXLWHG´ 7R
make the point straightforwardly, the ascription of certain types of properties to 
fictional characters which the author ascribes to the fictional persona within 
the story can be problematic from a creationist point of view. If fictional names 
refer to abstract entities, how can we explain speakers¶ uses of these names to 
ascribe properties to fictional characters which they normally would predicate 
of people? To reformulate the point consider Reina Hayaki¶V H[DPSOH WKH
corpus RI 6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ VWRULHV LV SDUWO\ DERXW WKH IULHQdship between 
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Holmes and Watson and Holmes and Watson are actual abstract objects; but, 
the Canon is not about the friendship between two abstract objects.17 
A widespread strategy in answer to this problem consists in supposing that 
fictional names are ambiguous which requires us to distinguish between the 
way they work within the fiction or outside the fiction. Whilst fictional names 
within the fiction are non-referring terms, outside the fiction they name abstract 
objects. In the literature developed in this domain, it is quite common to find a 
threefold distinction between conniving, metafictional and nonfictional uses18. 
Fictional names are non-referring terms in their uses within the fiction, there is 
no intention to refer or commitment to the truth in writing fiction, thereby we 
talk here of conniving uses. Fictional names are employed in talk about fiction, 
hence metafictional uses in which the fictional name contributes a descriptive 
content to the proposition expressed and the proposition expressed is evaluated 
within the ficWLRQDO FRQWH[W 7KHUHIRUH ³6KHUORFN +ROPHV LV D GHWHFWLYH´ LV
LQWHUSUHWHG DV ³,Q 'R\OH¶V VWRULHV 6KHUORFN +ROPHV LV D GHWHFWLYH´, where 
µ6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ FDQ EH UHSODFHG E\ D VHW RI SURSHUWLHV SUHGLFDWHG RI WKH
fictional persona within the story19. Finally, fictional names are employed in 
non-fictional uses20 VHQWHQFHV VXFK DV ³6KHUORFN +ROPHV LV VPDUWHU WKDQ
3RLURW´RU³6KHUORFN+ROPHV LVVPDUWHU WKDQDQ\UHDOGHWHFWLYH´RU³6KHUORFN
                                                          
17
 I found this way of reformulating the problem very effective. See Hayaki, R. (2009) 
Fictional characters as abstract objects: some questions. American Philosophical Quarterly, 
vol.  46, no. 2, pp. 141-149.   
18
 I adopt here the classification developed in Everett A. (2000) Referentialism and Empty 
Names. Empty Names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-Existence edited by Everett, A. & 
Hofweber, T., ed. Stanford: CSLI Publications. The idea of a three-fold distinction is already 
presented in Currie G. (1990) ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
19
 This idea is developed in D. Lewis (1978). A more articulated account of metafictional uses 
of fictional names can be found in G. Currie (1990), where fictional names are associated to 
theoretical terms. See Currie, G. (1990), pp. 158-171. 
20
 I am borrowing here the terminology proposed by A. Everett (2000a). Different 
terminologies are available in the literature on fictional names, G. Currie distinguishes between 
fictive, metafictive and transfictive uses; see G. Currie (1990). 
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+ROPHVGRHVQRWH[LVW´,QWKHVHFDVHVILFWLRQDOQDPHVDUHVXSSRVHGWRrefer to 
fictional characters, these being different sorts of abstract entities; abstract 
cultural artefacts, roles or creatures of fiction. However, any creationist who 
supposes a reference to a fictional character will have to provide an explanation 
of hRZWRUHDGDQHJDWLYHH[LVWHQWLDOVWDWHPHQWVXFKDV³6KHUORFN+ROPHVGRHV
QRWH[LVW´21.    
Amie Thomasson22 DGRSWV'RQHOODQ¶V23 solution of a metalinguistic reading of 
the negative existential statement. Generally speaking, a fictional name N 
refers to a prior use of N that the speaker intends to be wrong. The speaker 
suspects that some mistake has been made, e.g. where past speakers have 
intended to use the name to refer to a person, as when a child has exclaimed 
³6DQWD&ODXV LVFRPLQJ WRQLJKW´DQGZHFRUUHFWKLPE\VD\LQJ³6DQWD&ODXV
GRHVQ¶W H[LVW´ ,Q PDNLQJ D QRQH[LVWHQFH FODLP WKH VSHDNHU GRHV QRW KHUVHOI
LQWHQG WRXVH WKHQDPH³6DQWD&ODXV´ WR UHIHU to a person; rather she exploits 
prior uses of it that (she thinks) were made with that intention. 
Nathan Salmon suggests that in a negative existential statement the use of the 
fictional name is not literal, and although in his view fictional names are non-
ambiguous names for fictional characters, in this case speakers use the name as 
they sometimes use ordinary names in various descriptive ways so as to 
                                                          
21
 A broad literature has been produced about the puzzle of negative existential statements, I 
report only two representative strategies of answering the problem from a creationistic point of 
view. A more complete account of the different approaches to this puzzle is provided in 
Sainsbury, R. M. (2010), Fiction and Fictionalism. ed. London: Routledge.  
22
 The work of A. Thomasson is a crucial reading for the understanding of the idea of fictional 
characters as abstract cultural artefacts. See Thomasson, A. (1999) Fiction and Metaphysics. 
ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
23
 Donnellan, K. S. (1974) Speaking of Nothing. The Philosophical Review, Vol. 83, no. 1, pp. 
3-31. 
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H[SUHVV D SURSRVLWLRQ ³DV ZKHQ LW LV VDLG WKDW VR-and so is a Napoleon, or a 
1L[RQ >@ RU HYHQ D 5RPHR DQ XQFOH 7RP HWF >@ ZH PD\ XVH µ6KHUORFN
+ROPHV¶ IRUH[DPSOH WRPHDQVRPHWKLQJ OLNHHolmes more or less as he is 
actually depicted in the stories>@´24 It is then completely acceptable to state 
that Holmes as he is actually depicted does not exist.  
In contrast to the wider approach, according to which fictional names are 
ambiguous, Salmon argues for the non-ambiguity of these names. According to 
his view, fictional names name fictional characters and this is true regardless of 
whether they are employed within or outside the fiction. One main objection to 
this view is that it misunderstands the nature of fiction which is not a collection 
of untrue propositions about abstract entities. Salmon recognises WKDW'R\OH¶V
writing does not consist in asserting false propositions about fictional objects, 
but rather he is writing with the intention that his readers pretend that what he 
has written is true. However, according to Salmon, within this process the 
author builds a fictional character which is a constitutive part of the fiction and 
what is said to happen in the fiction is a constitutive part of the fictional 
character. On this basis, according to Salmon, we can explain the apparent 
WUXWK RI VHQWHQFHV RI WKH 6KHUORFN +ROPHV VWRULHV ZKHQ ³WKH\ OLWHUDOO\ PDNH
reference (although the author may not) to the fictional character, and literally 
express things DERXWWKDWFKDUDFWHUPRVWO\IDOVH>@´25. 
 
 
 
                                                          
24
 See Salmon N. (1998). 
25
 See Salmon N. (1998), pg. 302 
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0.5.2  A Cognitive Approach 
)LQDOO\ , ZRXOG FRQVLGHU $QWKRQ\ (YHUHWW¶V SURSRVDO DV UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI D
cognitive approach to the reference of fictional names. This proposal collates 
different elements and it is a starting point for a cognitive approach to fictional 
characters in terms of mental representations. Everett, adopting a cognitive 
background theory developed by Perry and Crimmins, develops a referential 
framework where the use of fictional names is meaningful given that it harks 
back not to an object but to an object-type, what technically is called an o-
notion, derivable by the participation in the pretence, in which the name is used 
to refer to that object.  
Consider for example the fictional name µ6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ 7he referential 
IUDPHZRUN SURYLGHG IRU µ6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ ODFNV D UHIHUHQWLDO VRXUFH but it 
supplies a reference-fixing source. Consider how the Sherlock Holmes-notion 
has been introduced. Readers, engaging with the fiction, imagine that someone 
is telling them a story about a certain individual called Sherlock Holmes in 
UHODWLRQ WR ZKRP WKH\ LQWURGXFH D QRWLRQ 5HDGLQJ WKH QDPH µ6KHUORFN
HolPHV¶ WKH\ LQWURGXFH D QRWLRQ RI DQ LQGLYLGXDO WKDW ZLOO EH GHYHORSHG
according to the set of descriptive conditions provided by the story. Therefore, 
SH-notion will be a mediated notion introduced on the basis of a set of 
descriptive conditions that will count as a reference-fixing source. Mediators, 
these descriptive conditions, will take the place of the reference source in 
fixing the reference of the fictional name.  
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- µ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶UHIHUHQFH-fixing source26:  
                                     µ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶ 
                                                                
                                                                o-notion 
 
reference-IL[LQJ VRXUFH   PHGLDWRUV WKH VWRU\ WKH GHVFULSWLRQV VXFK DV ³WKH
detective who lives in Baker street, and smokes a pipe, ´ etc..)  
 
?? Sherlock Holmes as an actual individual (source of reference)  
 
This set of descriptive conditions provides an object-type, which may be called 
the concept of Sherlock Holmes. Could this concept of Sherlock Holmes be 
associated with the idea of a fictional character? 
 
0.5.3  Possibilism 
Possibilism is the view according to which fictional characters are not actual 
objects but possible objects. Sherlock Holmes is not an actual individual or 
entity but is rather a possible individual. This view is based on a possible-
worlds metaphysics in which we can contemplate the existence of infinite 
possible worlds along with the actual one27. Some of these worlds are story-
worlds, namely worlds in which a given story is told as a true fact28. Fictional 
names will then refer to those individuals, in those story-worlds, who are and 
                                                          
26
 The arrows represent the relations between the elements of a sort of causal chain that 
explains how the name originates. 
27
 This could be a controversial supposition, but I am assuming a realistic stance toward 
possible worlds. 
28
 For an articulated definition of story-worlds see Currie G. (1990). 
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do what is said of them in the story. Therefore, the fact that we ascribe to 
Sherlock Holmes the property of being a detective is not problematic from a 
possibilistic point of view, given that the possible Sherlock Holmes is a 
detective in that world. However, this view faces two main serious problems. 
Firstly, we can have examples or contemplate impossible stories, stories in 
which contradictions intentionally or unintentionally are part of the story-
content. In this case possible worlds by definition are not suitable candidates as 
story-worlds29. Secondly, even if the problem of impossible stories can be 
overcome, the identification of fictional characters with possible individuals 
faces the problem of transworld identity. In fact, in different story-worlds we 
may have different Sherlock Holmes who are all alike for what has been 
predicated about Holmes in the story, but they may differ for what has not been 
VSHFLILHGLQWKHVWRU\:KLFKRQHRIWKHVHZRXOGWKHQDPH³6KHUORFN+ROPHV´
pick out? 
 
0.5.4  Meinongian Views30 
)RU D 0HLQRQJLDQ VFKRODU WKH DVFULSWLRQ RI SURSHUWLHV VXFK DV µEHLQJ D
GHWHFWLYH¶WRDILFWLRQDOREMHFWLVDOVRXQSUREOHPDWLF,QIDFWDOWKRXJKGLIIHUHQW
scholars have developed different versions of what has been labelled 
                                                          
29
 An answer to the problem of impossible fiction can be found in Lewis, D. (1983) Postscripts 
WR³7UXWKLQ)LFWLRQ´LQ/HZLV, Philosophical Papers, vol.1, pp. 276-280. 
30
 I am talking of Meinongian views because there are different versions of Meinongianism. 
See Routley, R. (1980) ([SORULQJ 0HLQRQJ¶V -XQJOH DQG%H\RQG 'HSDUWPHQWDO 0RQRJUDSK
#3. Canberra:Philosophy Department, RSSS, Australian National University. Parsons, T. 
(1980) Nonexistent Objects. ed. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. Priest, G. (2005) 
Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality. ed. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
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Meinongianism, generally I think that they would all agree that Sherlock 
Holmes is a non-existent object who bears the property of being a detective.  
Terence Parsons in Non-Existent Objects31, illustrates an ontology comprising 
different types of properties, nuclear and extranuclear properties. The property 
RI µEHLQJ D GHWHFWLYH´ EHORQJ WR WKH IRUPHU W\SH ZKHUHDV SURSHUWLHV VXFK DV
³EHLQJ QRQ-H[LVWHQW´ ³EHLQJ SRVVLEOH´ ³EHLQJ LPSRVVLEOH´ ³EHLQJ ILFWLRQDO´
comprise the latter. Therefore, in this ontological framework, there are32 
existent objects just as there are non-existent ones and Sherlock Holmes is a 
non-existent object and is a detective. Peter van Inwagen poses an interesting 
question for this Meinongian stance. Consider two different definite 
GHVFULSWLRQV ³7he main satiric villainess of Martin Chuzzlewit" and "the 
character in Martin Chuzzlewit who appears in every chapter." Since no 
character in Martin Chuzzlewit appears in every chapter, there seems to be an 
important difference between these two descriptions. The first one may denote 
a fictional character the second one not; we may say that a character who 
appears in every chapter in Martin Chuzzlewit does not exist. 
Will a Meinongian want to say that each of these descriptions denotes 
something, and that what each denotes fails to exist? In that case a Meinongian 
will need to account for a clear important ontological difference between the 
ways in which these two descriptions relate to the world. 
 
 
                                                          
31
 See Parsons, T. (1980). 
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 ,DPXVLQJ WKH LWDOLFV WRUHFDOO WKH0HLQRQJLDQGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµWKHUHDUH¶DQGµH[LVWV¶
Only the former covers a similar function to the existential quantificator adopted in classical 
ORJLFZKLOVWWKHµH[LVW¶DVZHOODVµQRQ-H[LVW¶H[SUHVVHVDILUVWOHYHOSURSHUW\RIREMHFWV 
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Conclusion 
The study of the reference of fictional names seems to gather together the 
interest of different domains. From a metaphysical point of view the puzzle can 
be interesting in terms of what, if anything, can be designated by a fictional 
name. From a cognitive point of view, it can be interesting to enquire how we 
can understand and classify our thought about fiction and fictional entities, if 
there are such things as fictional entities. Linguistics provides part of the 
technical apparatus with which we may aim to formulate the most economical 
and convincing explanation of how the reference works in this case. Theories 
of pretence offer a distinct understanding of the reference of fictional names 
and introduce pretence as an important element in the study of the relation 
between Language and Reality. 
In this study I am offering a criticism of those theories which endorse a 
FRPSOHWHHPSWLQHVVRIILFWLRQDOQDPHV,QSDUW,ZLOOGLVFXVV'DYLG%UDXQ¶V
proposal and, in part 2, I will discuss the work developed by Stecker, Adams 
and Fuller. Whilst both of these pURSRVDOV PDNH XVH RI WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\
SURSRVLWLRQV¶WKH\GHYHORSWZRYHU\GLIIHUHQWIUDPHZRUNV,ZLOOGLVFXVVZKLFK
solutions they can offer in solving the different puzzles which arise in 
supposing that fictional names are proper names whilst being empty. In part 3, 
I will consider the view developed within the theories of pretence. I will 
SUHVHQWDQDQDO\VLVRIILFWLRQPDLQO\EDVHGRQ:DOWRQ¶VZRUNDQGGLVFXVVKLV
proposal on the reference of fictional names.  
In the analysis I develop, I will delineate some problems that each one of the 
proposals under discussion faces.  
29 
 
7KLV VWXG\ KDV OHG PH WR WKH FRQFOXVLRQ WKDW :DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO LV WKH PRVW
explanatory of the anti-realistic views. In fact, I will show that it is able to 
account for the whole range of examples that I have submitted to each 
theoretical stance, whereas the others examined include the possibility of one 
or more counterexamples which remain outside of their explanatory 
framework. I will reply to the criticism of implausibility, often directed to 
:DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO QRW RQO\ E\ GHOLQHDWLQJ D FOHDU DQG VLPSOLILHG DFFRXQW RI
:DOWRQ¶VFRPSOH[SRLQWRIYLHZEXWDOVRE\RIIHULQJDQLQWHUSUHWDWLRQLQZKLFK
acts of pretence can be read as acts of communication. My contribution will 
consist of pURYLGLQJ DQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI VSHDNHUV¶ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ JDPH RI
make-believe as part of the communicational exchange in conversations. In the 
same way as metaphors or figurative language, acts of pretence can be included 
DVFRQVWLWXWLYHSDUWVRIVSHDNHUV¶communication process. 
However, although I think that this study will offer a more accessible reading 
RI:DOWRQ¶VSURSRVDORQWKHUHIHUHQFHRIILFWLRQDOQDPHVDQGWKHRSSRUWXQLW\WR
go beyond the criticism of implausibility, I still believe that more work is 
QHHGHGRQWKHQRWLRQRIµPDNH-EHOLHYH¶0DNHQRPLVWDNH,GRQRWWKLQNWKDW
ZLWKRXW D SKLORVRSKLFDO DQDO\VLV RI µPDNH-EHOLHYH¶ :DOWRQ¶V YLHZ ORVHV LWV
strength: I do not believe such an analysis is essential, even if it may be 
desirable. I rather belieYH WKDW :DOWRQ¶V ZRUN VHUYHV DV D EDVLV IRU D GHHSHU
LQVLJKWLQWRµPDNH-EHOLHYH¶DQGSRLQWVWRQHZGLUHFWLRQVRIUHVHDUFKLQGLIIHUHQW
fields, for example in psychological studies pertaining to imaginative activities 
and participation in make-believe. 
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PART I 
 
In this first part, I will consider two answers to the problem of fictional names. 
In the first chapter I will discuss a quite radical view; one which has been 
elaborated by David Braun. Originally, it was thought as a semantic answer to 
the problem iQ ZKLFK WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ¶ ZDV LQWURGXFHG DV D
remedy to the puzzles engendered by maintaining a direct referential approach 
to the reference of names and the emptiness of fictional names. I will show 
which problems this view has faced and how the attempt to find a solution has 
led Braun to mix a radical semantic view with a cognitive understanding of the 
uses of fictional names and endorsement of the distinction between different 
uses of these terms. 
In the second chapter I will discuss the framework developed by F. Adams, G. 
Fuller and R. Stecker. This is a result of a long term collaboration that is still 
today an important contribution to the debate on fictional names.  Although in 
WKLV SURSRVDO WKH QRWLRQRI µJDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ¶ LV FHQWUDO, as the independent 
semantic content expressed by sentences containing fictional names, the need 
to complete the unfilled semantic content is supplied by considering the 
pragmatic content imparted into the conversation. Namely, a descriptive 
content will replace the vacuous fictional name on a pragmatic level imparting 
a full proposition within the conversation. I will show that Adams, Fuller and 
6WHFNHU¶VZRUNZLOOSURYLGHDQDQVZHUWRPDQ\RIWKHSUREOHPVUDLVHGDJDLQVW
%UDXQ¶V RQH 7KH GLVFXVVLRQ ZLOO Oead on to consider broader philosophical 
TXHVWLRQVVXFKWKHQDWXUHRIµJDSS\SURSRVLWLRQs¶DQGWKHVHPDQWLFVIUDPHZRUN
in which such a notion can be endorsed as a primitive notion.   
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Introduction 
7KHUHLVRQO\RQHZRUOGWKH³UHDO´ZRUOG6KDNHVSHDUH¶VLPDgination is part 
of it, and the thoughts that he had in writing Hamlet are real. So are the 
thoughts that we have in reading the play. But it is of the very essence of fiction 
that only the thoughts, feelings, etc.., in Shakespeare and his readers are real, 
and there is not, in addition to them, an objective Hamlet. 
Bertrand Russell 
The spirit of the gappy proposition view seems to flow from the Russellian 
sense of reality in an attempt to extend a Russellian semantic framework to the 
analysis of nonreferring terms. Nowadays, David Braun can be seen as a sort of 
paladin of the gappy proposition view in the literature on empty names; his 
work in developing and defending the notion of gappy propositions is well 
NQRZQ LQ WKH ILHOG , ZLOO DVVXPH %UDXQ¶V YLHZ DV a starting point for the 
semantic analysis of fictional names, given that my intuitions are close to the 
Russellian sense of reality for what concerns the objectivity of any fictional 
persona,ZLOOGLVFXVVWKHVROXWLRQVDQGSUREOHPVRI%UDXQ¶VYLHZDQGhow it 
deals with the puzzles that emerge from the no proposition view. Let us outline 
it in the four following points: 
(a) If a proposition P is expressed by a sentence S, the constituents of P 
correspond to the contents of the words contained in S. 
(b) The content of a name is the individual it refers to.  
(c) Fictional names do not refer to anything.  
(d) If a component of a sentence has no content, the sentence does not 
express a proposition. 
Therefore: 
32 
 
(e) A sentence containing a fictional name does not express any 
proposition. 
$FFHSWLQJ G ZRXOG HQWDLO WKDW WKH XWWHUDQFH RI ³6KHUORFN +ROPHV LV D
GHWHFWLYH´ ZRXOG QRW H[SUHVV D SURSRVLWLRQ HQJHQGHULQJ the problem of 
nonsense, the problem of cognitive values, the problem of the proposition 
believed and the problem of truth introduced in the previous chapter. Different 
strategies may be employed and I will discuss some of them in the following 
chapters. (a) can be abandoned by adopting a different semantic framework, (b) 
can be denied by refuting a directly referential account of the reference of 
proper names, and (c) can be refuted by adopting the view that fictional names 
FRQWULEXWHDVHPDQWLFFRQWHQW%UDXQ¶VFKDOOHQJHFRQVLVWVRIPDLQWDLQLQJZKDW
he calls a Naïve Russellianist semantic framework sketched in (a), with (b): a 
direct referential account of the reference of proper names; in conjunction with 
(c): the emptiness of fictional names. In doing so he employs the notion of 
unfilled or gappy propositions. The idea of an incomplete proposition is 
mentioned originally in Kaplan33, but it finds its proper development in 
%UDXQ¶V ZRUN34 Gappy propositions are structured entities that are like 
propositions in some respects but not in others. For example, they display the 
same structure of propositions even if some of the positions composing the 
propositional structure can remain unfilled. On the one hand they seem to be a 
straightforward answer to the case of empty names. Sentences express 
propositions, where each component of the sentence contributes a content to 
the proposition expressed and sentences containing empty names will express 
                                                          
33
 Kaplan, D. (1989), pg. 496 fn. 23. 
34
 Braun, D. (1993) Empty Names. Noûs, Vol. 27, no. 4, pp. 449-469. 
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gappy propositions where the position covered by the nonreferring term will 
remain unfilled. On the other hand, gappy propositions may appear to be a 
technical expedient that lacks any metaphysical justification and would find its 
legitimation in offering solutions to the puzzle of empty names. Moreover, 
gappy propositions seem to almost betray that original Russellian spirit from 
ZKLFKWKHQRWLRQRIDµSURSRVLWLRQ¶DVLWKDVEHHQWUHDWHGVRIDr, has sprung. In 
fact, if propositions are representations of a state of affairs, how can they be 
incomplete?  
,QVHFWLRQ ,ZLOOSURYLGHDQRYHUYLHZRIWKHQRWLRQRIµJDSS\SURSRVLWLRQV¶
providing the technical details employed by Braun in elaborating such a notion. 
,QVHFWLRQ,ZLOOGLVFXVV%UDXQ¶VPRVWUHFHQWDFFHSWDQFHRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRI
fictional characters and the consequences that this move entails for the analysis 
of sentences containing fictional names. In section 3, I will discuss the 
solutions Braun offers to the problem of nonsense, the problem of cognitive 
values, the problem of the proposition believed, and the problem of truth. I will 
treat the first three problems as pertaining to the relation between language and 
thought and the last problem as concerning the connection between language 
DQG UHDOLW\ $OWKRXJK %UDXQ¶V DWWHPSW WR DVVLPLODWH WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\
SURSRVLWLRQ¶ WDNHV SODFH ZLWKLQ D FRJQLWLYH DFFRXQW , ZLOO VKRZ WKDW
counterintuitive consequences may issue forth assuming his proposal. 
)XUWKHUPRUH , ZLOO SURYLGH VWURQJ HYLGHQFH WKDW %UDXQ¶V DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW
gappy propositions bear truth values is wrong. 
,Q FRQFOXVLRQ WKHQRWLRQRI µJDSS\SURSRVLWLRQ¶ VHHPV WREH DYDOLG WRRO IRU
pursuing our intuitions about the fact that in creating fiction or in talking about 
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fiction, there is no actual individual that we are talking about. Without doubt 
Braun has recognized and developed this idea, making it available for different 
SURSRVDOV , ZLOO VXJJHVW WKDW %UDXQ¶V HPSOR\PHQW LV VXVFHSWible to strong 
objections. However, in the following chapters I will show how different 
replies to the problem of empty names have stemmed from the idea of gappy 
propositions. 
  
1.1 Gappy Propositions 
:KDWDUH³JDSS\-SURSRVLWLRQV´"7KH\DUHVSHFLDOW\SHVRISURSRVLWLRQV³1HR-
5XVVHOOLDQLVP´ RU ³1DLYH-5XVVHOOLDQLVP´ LV XVXDOO\ WKH IDYRXUHG VHPDQWLF
framework adopted in treating these special propositions. The appellation 
³QDwYH´ FRPHV IURP WKH DWWHPSW RI HPSOR\LQJ DQG GHYHORSLQJ )UHJH DQG
5XVVHOO¶V LQLWLDO YLHZV RQ WKH QRWLRQ RI µSURSRVLWLRQ¶ WR WKHVH VSHFLDO FDVHV
+HUHLVDQRXWOLQHRIWKHFRUHIHDWXUHVRI³1DwYH5XVVHOOLDQLVP´ 
(a) Words have contents. The content of a name is the object the name 
refers to; the content of a predicate is the property it expresses. 
(b) Sentences have contents. The content of a sentence is a proposition 
that is what the sentence semantically expresses. 
(c) Propositions have constituents. When a proposition P is expressed 
by a sentence S, the constituents of P correspond to the contents of 
the words contained in S. 
As a result of the view that I am assuming here, propositions are not thought of 
as sets of possible worlds, but are instead structured entities and can be 
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represented by adopting different conventions35. Consider the following 
sentence: 
1. Obama is the American President. 
&RQVWLWXHQWV RI  DUH WKH LQGLYLGXDO 2EDPD DQG WKH SURSHUW\ RI µEHLQJ WKH
$PHULFDQ3UHVLGHQW¶%\FRQYHQWLRQFDQEHUHSUHVHQWHGWKURXJKDQRUGHUHG
pair: 
P1     < Obama, being the American President> 
Let us label this Convention 1, and consider that according to it, the ordered 
pair represents a proposition whose constituents are its constitutive 1-place 
UHODWLRQµEHLQJWKH$PHULFDQ3UHVLGHQW¶DQGLWVFRQVWLWXWLYHVXEMHFW2EDPD 
An alternative convention, say Convention 2, represents the proposition 
expressed by (1) by an ordered pair of sets.  
P2 <^Obama`,^being the American President`> 
According to Convention 2 each object that is a constituent of the proposition 
expressed is either the member of a singleton set or is the empty set and the 
constitutive n-place relation of the proposition will be the member of a set. In 
the example above, the proposition is represented as an ordered pair whose 
constituents are sets. In the first position there is a singleton set whose member 
is Obama and the second position is filled by a second set whose member is the 
1-SODFHUHODWLRQµEHLQJWKH$PHULFDQ3UHVLGHQW¶ 
Finally, propositions may be represented through trees. Let us call this 
Convention 3: 
                                                          
35
 I adopt here a distinction between different conventions employed in the representation of 
propositions delineated in Braun (2005). 
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                         P1                                PROPOSITION 
                                       
 
  
            
As Braun explicitly states36 in presenting the different foregoing conventions, 
these conventions are ways to model propositions and their use bears no 
implications about the nature of propositions. That is, n-tuples or sets or trees 
are not thought of as constituents of propositional structures. 
These solutions have become helpful in supporting the idea of structured 
entities which are proposition-like, where one of the positions is unfilled. This 
idea, allegedly presented by David Kaplan in an unpublished lecture and of 
which we can find some trace in Demonstratives37, has been developed and 
adopted in the literature discussing the case of empty names. Consider the 
following example: 
2. Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
8QGHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶LVDQHPSW\QDPHZKDW.DSODQ
would call more precisely a nondenoting directly referential term, the 
SURSRVLWLRQDO VWUXFWXUH ZRXOG SUHVHQW D ³JDS´ KHQce the label gappy 
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 Braun, D. (2005), pg.621, fn.6. 
37
 See D. Kaplan (1989), pg IQ³>«@ZHQHHGRQO\DGG^«` to mark the places in a 
VLQJXODU SURSRVLWLRQ ZKLFK FRUUHVSRQG WR GLUHFWO\ UHIHUHQWLDO WHUPV >«@ 7KLV WHFKQLTXH FDQ
also be used to resolve another confusion in Russell. He argued that a sentence containing a 
nondenotLQJUHIHUHQWLDO WHUPKHZRXOGKDYHFDOOHGLWDQRQGHQRWLQJµORJLFDOO\SURSHUQDPH¶
would be meaningless, presumably because the purported singular proposition would be 
incomplete. But the braces themselves can fill out the singular proposition, and if they contain 
nothing, no more anomalies need result than what the development of Free Logic has already 
LQXUHGXVWR´ 
Argument     1-place Property 
being-the-American President 
  Obama       
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proposition. Modelling it by means of a tree convention we would find a block 
in one of the branches. 
P1                               PROPOSITION 
                                       
 
  
            
Alternatively, it may be thought that (2) expresses a proposition representable 
by an ordered pair: 
P2                <^«`, ^being a detective`> 
P2 represents the atomic gappy proposition whose constitutive relation is the 
SURSHUW\RIµEHLQJDGHWHFWLYH¶DQGZKLFKKDVQRVXEMHFWFRQVtituent. The uses 
of brackets do not imply that the subject constituent is the empty-set; in that 
case it would be represented as  <^^``, ^being a detective`>.  
More commonly, the notation adopted in the literature concerning gappy 
propositions, is the underline notation: 
P3 <__  , ^being a detective`> 
Braun suggests that the underline notation works as a place holder for a future 
set-theoretical representation. The elaboration of the more convenient notations 
for gappy propositions reposes on the theoretical point that propositional 
structures may have unfilled positions and notwithstanding them being 
incomplete, may still be treated as propositions.  
Argument     1-place Property 
being-a-detective X      
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%UDXQ¶VYLHZRQJDSS\SURSRVLWLRQVKDVEHHQDGRSWHGDVDEHQFKPDUNIRUDQ\
non realistic position and for the avoidance of any compromise with the 
attempt to find an existent or non-existent referent for empty names. However, 
the recent ontological turn toward the existence of fictional characters seems to 
KDYHVRIWHQHG%UDXQ¶VSRVLWLRQVDERXWWKHHPSWLQHVVRIfictional names. At the 
least, it seems that Braun considers paring down the types of terms that can be 
considered as nondenoting directly referential terms. In fact, he distinguishes 
between different uses of fictional names38 and endorses the view of gappy 
proposition for one of these. 
In the following section I will present some arguments in favour of the 
existence of fictional characters and consider to what extent the notion of 
µJDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ¶ LV GHHPHG KHOSIXO LQ WKH VWXG\ RI ILFWLRQDO QDPHV
Furthermore, I will discuss the idea that even in those cases where gappy 
propositions play a role, their application is very controversial. Can gappy 
propositions be asserted or believed? Do they bear truth values? In the rest of 
the chapter I will discuss BraXQ¶V YLHZ DQG and I will present some of the 
problems that it faces.   
  
1.2 Gappy Propositions and Fictional Characters 
Surprisingly enough for the pioneer of the gappy propositions, Braun has come 
WRFRXQWHQDQFHWKHH[LVWHQFHRIILFWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUV³,WKLQk we should accept 
the existence of fictional characters, even if we have questions about their 
                                                          
38
 See Braun (2005). 
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H[DFWQDWXUH´39 However, this does not relieve semanticists from the problems 
engendered by fictional names. In fact, the metaphysical claim that fictional 
characters exist leaves open many semantic issues. For example, do all 
inscriptions of fictional names refer to fictional characters? Surely, there are 
examples in support of a realistic stance. Consider the following example: 
3. There are fictional characters that appear in more than one of 
&RQDQ'R\OH¶VVWRULHV 
Philosophers such as Saul Kripke (1973), Peter van Inwagen (1978), Nathan 
Salmon (1999) and Amie Thomasson (1999) would agree that an utterance of 
(3) entails the existence of such things as fictional characters. The adoption of 
such things in our ontology would come very handy when dealing with the 
semantics of sentences such as (4) and (5): 
       4. Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle. 
       5.        Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any real detective. 
The semantics of (4) and (5) would be, under this hypothesis, as 
straightforward as the semantics for a subject-predicate sentence. In this case 
the subject position would be filled by the fictional character Sherlock Holmes. 
It is possible to find different views on this in each one of the theoretical 
pictures RIWKHSKLORVRSKHUVPHQWLRQHGDERYHKHUH,ZLOOGLVFXVV%UDXQ¶VYLHZ
Braun adopts an account initially illustrated by Kripke and then carried out by 
Amie Thomasson. Fictional characters are thought of as having originated in 
works of fiction, created by the authors of the story they belong to. Readers 
competently learn the use of the name through reading the stories and talk of 
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 Braun, D. (2005), pg. 609. 
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the fiction spreads the use of the name to non-competent users who have not 
read the story and who may not know the characteristics of the character. So 
far it seems we are able to reinstate the idea of a causal chain of the use of a 
name that harks back to the origin of its use, even for the case of fictional 
names. Some philosophers would be satisfied by such an explanation: fictional 
names refer to fictional characters; the problems which arise from here are then 
delegated to a pragmatic explanation of the use of the name40. However, Braun 
follows the view that not all the inscriptions of fictional names have reference. 
Therefore, there are inscriptions that refer to fictional characters and others that 
are empty. The question is then when a fictional name acquires a reference. 
Braun disagrees with the view that fictional names refer to fictional characters 
once the story has terminated41, instead he thinks that the referential process is 
established gradually in concomitance with the gradual clarification of the 
DXWKRU¶V WKRXJKWVDQGLQWHQWLRQVZKHQZULWLQJWKHVWory. Consequently, Braun 
chooses a middle way between the two extreme views according to which, for 
H[DPSOHRQWKHRQHKDQGDOORI'R\OH¶VLQVFULSWLRQVRIµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶DUH
empty and on the other hand, all of the inscriptions refer to the fictional 
chDUDFWHU +ROPHV ³&RQDQ 'R\OH PLJKW >«@ JUDGXDOO\ KDYH VWDUWHG WR KDYH
singular thoughts and intentions regarding the character as he wrote his story. 
Then his first inscriptions in writing the story would have failed to refer, while 
his later inscriptions would have referred to the fictional character ± and there 
PD\EHVRPHLQGHWHUPLQDF\UHJDUGLQJVRPHLQVFULSWLRQVLQEHWZHHQ´42 
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%UDXQDOLJQVKLPVHOIZLWKWKHLGHDWKDWµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶LVDPELJXRXVJLYHQ
that one use lacks any reference and the other designates a fictional character. 
It would then be recommendable, from his point of view, to study its semantics 
UHSODFLQJ µ+ROPHV¶ ZLWK µ+ROPHV1¶ RU µ+ROPHV2¶ LQ DFFRUGDQFH ZLWK WKH
different semantic properties of the fictional name.     
According to Braun, WKLV DPELJXLW\ LV DOVR UHIOHFWHG LQ WKH VSHDNHU¶V XVH RI
µ+ROPHV¶ JLYHQ WKDW RXU ZD\ RI HPSOR\LQJ WKH ILFWLRQDO QDPH KDUNV EDFN
WKURXJK FDXVDO UHODWLRQV WR 'R\OH¶V XVH 7KHUHIRUH HYHQ LI QRW FRQVFLRXVO\
VSHDNHUV¶ HPSOR\PHQW RI µ+ROPHV¶ LV LQ WXUQ VXVFHStible to the distinction 
EHWZHHQ µ+ROPHV1¶ DQG µ+ROPHV2¶ ³:H KDYH D VWDQGLQJ LQWHQWLRQ WR XVH WKH
name in the same way that those around us do, and those people intend to use 
the name in the same way as those from whom they got the name did, and so 
on, unWLOZHUHDFK&RQDQ'R\OH´43 
7KHFRQWHQWDQGUHIHUHQFHRIVSHDNHUV¶XWWHUDQFHVDQGLQVFULSWLRQVRIµ+ROPHV¶
DUH GHWHUPLQHG LQ SDUW E\ 'R\OH¶V XWWHUDQFHV DQG LQVFULSWLRQV PRUHRYHU
VSHDNHUV¶ WKRXJKWV DERXW ILFWLRQDO FKDUDFWHUV DOVR VHHP WR SOD\ D UROH LQ
detHUPLQLQJWKHUHIHUHQFHRIWKHLUXVHRIµ+ROPHV¶7KHUHIRUH%UDXQFRQVLGHUV
WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI D FHUWDLQ GHJUHH RI LQGHWHUPLQDF\ EHWZHHQ µ+ROPHV1¶ DQG
µ+ROPHV2¶LQWKHVSHDNHUV¶XVHRIWKHILFWLRQDOQDPHDVZHOODVIRUWKHDXWKRU¶V
employment of it.  
A sentence such as (2) may be semantically analysed in terms of (2i) and (2ii) 
in relation to the semantic content contributed by the fictional name: 
2. Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
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2i. Sherlock Holmes1 is a detective. 
 2ii.  Sherlock Holmes2 is a detective. 
7KHUHLVURRPWRFDVWVRPHGRXEWVRQ%UDXQ¶VVWUDWHJ\)LUVWO\WKHDVVXPSWLRQ
of the ambiguity of fictional names from a methodological point of view 
should not be taken for granted. According to Braun, (6) illustrates how the 
employment of  different usHVRIµ+ROPHV¶LVSDUWLFXODUO\UHFRPPHQGDEOH 
6. There is no Sherlock Holmes. Sherlock Holmes does not exist. 
Sherlock Holmes is just a fictional character. 
Braun considers this a good example to see how the name can be used when 
contributing different semantic contents, or more precisely when it does not 
contribute a semantic content in certain occurrences while contributing it in 
others. In fact, Braun suggests a reading of the first and second conjunct in 
ZKLFK µ6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ VKRXOG EH UHDG DV µ+ROPes1¶ ZKLOH LQ WKH WKLUG
FRQMXQFW DV µ+ROPHV2¶&DVWLQJDVLGH IRU WKHPRPHQW WKHSUREOHPV UHODWHG WR
the truth values of the first and second conjuncts, there are cases where this 
methodological choice does not seem appropriate. Consider (7): 
7. Sherlock Holmes is a detective and was created by Conan Doyle. 
,WLVGLIILFXOWWRVHHKRZWKHVLQJOHRFFXUUHQFHRIµ+ROPHV¶LQFDQEHUHDGLQ
terms of two different occurrences, each one with a different semantic 
specification.  
Secondly, the extension of causal UHODWLRQVIURPWKHDXWKRU¶VXVHRIµ+ROPHV¶
to the speakerV¶XVHRIµ+ROPHV¶VKRXOGQRW receive blind consent. In fact, it is 
GLIILFXOW WR XQGHUVWDQG KRZ VSHDNHUV¶ XVH RI µ+ROPHV¶ LV UHODWHG WR 'R\OH¶V
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HPSOR\PHQWRIµ+ROPHV¶DVDQHPSW\ILFWLRQDOQDPHRUWR'R\OH¶VLQWHQWLRQWR
refer to a fictional character. To illustrate this point, consider the difference 
between an anecdote and the narration of a story. For example, Claire may 
share with me the achievements of her rowing crew and tell me about her 
project, with her pair mate Maria, to race in a double at the next regatta. When 
WDONLQJZLWKP\SDLUPDWHDWWKHURZLQJFOXEDERXW&ODLUHDQG0DULD¶VSURMHFW
WRUDFHLQWKHGRXEOHP\XVHRIµ0DULD¶FDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWR&ODLUH¶VXVHRI
that name, that in turn is bDVHG RQ &ODLUH¶V DFTXDLQWDQFH ZLWK Maria. The 
GLIIHUHQW XVHV RI µ0DULD¶ E\ GLIIHUHQW SHRSOH DUH FRQQHFWHG FDXVDOO\ &ODLUH
knows Maria, she talks to me intending to refer to her, and I intend to talk 
about the person Claire intended to refer to. My uVHRIµ0DULD¶LVWKHQFDXVDOO\
UHODWHGWR&ODLUH¶VRQH)RUDQHFGRWHVWKHLGHDRIFDXVDOUHODWLRQLQWKHXVHRI
the name between the person who tells the story and the one who talks about it 
afterwards seems to work. However, in fiction, things seem to work quite 
GLIIHUHQWO\:KLOHZHDUHUHDGLQJRQHRI'R\OH¶VVWRULHVGRHVLWUHDOO\PDWWHUWR
XVLI'R\OHXSWRDFHUWDLQSRLQWGLGQRWXVHµ+ROPHV¶WRUHIHUWRWKHILFWLRQDO
character because he had not completely shaped it in his mind but after a 
certain SRLQW XVHV µ+ROPHV¶ WR UHIHU WR WKH FKDUDFWHU KH ERUH LQ PLQG" ,Q
writing the stories, Doyle does not seem interested in sharing the process of 
creation of the fictional character with the reader. There is no causal relation 
EHWZHHQ'R\OH¶VSULRUHPSW\XVHRIµ+ROPHV¶RU'R\OH¶VODWHUXVHRIµ+ROPHV¶
referring to a fictional character and spHDNHUV¶XVHRIµ+ROPHV¶'R\OH intends 
UHDGHUVWRPDNHEHOLHYHZKDWLVQDUUDWHG+HXVHVµ+ROPHV¶ZLWKWKHLQWHQWLRQ
that readers make believe that there is a certain Watson who wrote about a 
detective called Sherlock Holmes, independently of whether Doyle is actually 
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UHIHUULQJ WR D ILFWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU RU QRW 6SHDNHUV¶ XVH RI µ+ROPHV¶ GRHV QRW
VHHP WR EH FDXVDOO\ UHODWHG WR 'R\OH¶V XVH EXW UDWKHU WR KRZ WKH QDPH LV
employed in the story. It seems plausible then to think that once the story has 
terminated it is possible to abstract the role of Holmes from the whole story, 
referring in this way to the fictional character.   
,Q WKH QH[W WZR VHFWLRQV , ZLOO GLVFXVV %UDXQ¶V analysis of sentences that 
contain those uses of fictional names that lack any reference. 
   
1.3 Gappy Propositions and Fictional Names 
According to Braun, not all occurrences of fictional names refer to fictional 
characters. There are some uses of fictional names that still fail to contribute 
any semantic content, even when fictional characters are accepted as part of 
RXU RQWRORJ\ )RU WKHVH FDVHV %UDXQ DGYRFDWHV WKH HPSOR\PHQW RI µJDSS\
SURSRVLWLRQV¶ ,Q WKLV VHFWLRQ , ZLOO LQWURGXFH %UDXQ¶V YLHZ LOOXVWUDWLng the 
W\SHV RI VROXWLRQV ZKLFK KH HODERUDWHV DGRSWLQJ WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\
SURSRVLWLRQV¶ , GR QRW HQGRUVH KLV VWUDWHJ\ DQG , EHOLHYH LW LV VXVFHSWLEOH WR
GLIIHUHQWREMHFWLRQV,ZLOOSUHVHQWWKHPLQUHSO\WR%UDXQ¶VDUJXPHQWV 
7KH³XQILOOHGSURSRVLWLRQVYLHZ´44 seems to provide an answer to many of the 
SUREOHPV HQFRXQWHUHG E\ 0LOOLDQLVP E\ DGRSWLQJ WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\
SURSRVLWLRQV¶ 
The problem of the proposition expressed is one of the consequences of 
DVVXPLQJ D ³1HR-Russellian´ VHPDQWLF IUDPHZRUN ,Q Iact, given that the 
constituents of the proposition P expressed by the sentence S correspond to the 
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contents of the word contained in S, if one of the constituents of S lack the 
semantic content, then S does not express any proposition. However, according 
to Braun, sentences containing occurrences of fictional names that lack a 
semantic content still express a proposition. For instance, sentence (2) 
expresses the unfilled or gappy proposition (2g): 
2. Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
2g.  <__ , being-a-detective> 
Therefore, Braun offers a very straightforward, even if purely technical, answer 
to the problem. A second consequence of assuming that S does not express a 
proposition P if one of the words composing it lacks semantic content, is that S 
would be nonsense. For the problem of nonsense, as Russell stated it, a 
VHQWHQFHWKDWFRQWDLQVDQHPSW\QDPHZRXOGEH³QRQVHQVHEHFDXVH\RXFDQQRW
KDYHDFRQVWLWXHQWRIDSURSRVLWLRQZKLFKLVQRWKLQJDWDOO´45 However, there is 
a clear difference between (2) and a string of grammatically unrelated sounds, 
IRUH[DPSOH³EODEODEORRVLVWHU´$FFRUGLQJ WR%UDXQ LW LVSRVVLEOH WRFDWFK
this intuitive difference by considering the cognitive relations that speakers 
entertain with a sentence like (2). The solution to the problem of nonsense is 
that (2) will make sense because speakers, in uttering (2), express a gappy 
proposition. According to Braun the relation between speakers and the gappy 
proposition expressed is on a cognitive level. Speakers believe (2) and they 
relate to the gappy proposition expressed by (2) because this is the object of 
WKHLU EHOLHI %UDXQ DGRSWV DQ DFFRXQW RI WKH QRWLRQ RI µEHOLHI¶ DFFRUGLQJ WR
ZKLFKVSHDNHUV¶EHOLHIVDUHPHQWDO UHSUHVHQWDWLRQVDQG LQJHQHUDOZLWKLQ WKLV
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account, mental representations  are understood as composed of two entities: a 
certain mental state and a proposition. According to Braun, gappy propositions 
can be the object of these intrinsic mental states. This solution deals with the 
problem of nonsense when this is understood with regard to the connection 
between language and thought. Contrariwise, adopting gappy propositions does 
not seem to offer a solution to the problem of nonsense as this is understood to 
be concerning the connection between language and reality; when one aims to 
ascertain which object in the world the subject of the sentence refers to. 
/LNHZLVH %UDXQ¶V YLHZ GRHV QRW RIIHU D VROXWLRQ WR WKH SUREOHP ZKHQ WKLV
concerns the connection between thought and reality; it does not offer an 
explanation as to what the thought grasped by the speaker in using (2) is about.   
According to Braun, gappy proposisitions also play an crucial role in offering a 
solution to other problems faced by a Millianist stance which pertain to the 
connection between language and thought. As I illustrated in the Introduction 
both the problem of the proposition believed and the problem of cognitive 
significance FRQFHUQ WKLVFRQQHFWLRQ ,SUHVHQW%UDXQ¶VVROXWLRQIRU WKHVHDQG
the objections to his proposal in the following section.  
  
1.3.1  %UDXQ¶V9LHZRQWKH3UREOHPRI&RJQLWLYH6LJQLILFDQFHDQGthe 
Problem of the Proposition Believed 
Consider the classic example introduced by Frege to illustrate the problem of 
significance. 
8. Hesperus is identical with Hesperus. 
9. Hesperus is identical with Phosphorus. 
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This is the example which put a strain on Naïve Russellianism. According to 
this semantic framework outlined above, (8) and (9) express the same 
SURSRVLWLRQ WKH FRQWHQW RI µ+HVSHUXV¶ DQG µ3KRVSKRUXV¶ EHLQJ RQH DQG WKH
same: Venus. However, one may believe that (8) is true while holding that (9) 
LV IDOVH )RU LQVWDQFH &ODLUH PD\ QRW NQRZ WKDW µ+HVSHUXV¶ DQG µ3KRVSRUXV¶
refer to the same object and she recognises (8) as necessarily true while she 
GHHPVIDOVHJLYHQWKDWVKHEHOLHYHVµ+HVSHUXV¶WRUHIHUWRWKHPRUQLQJVWDU
DQGµ3KRVSKRUXV¶ WR WKHHYHQLQJVWDU&ODLUH LVXQDZDUH WKDW WKHPRUQLQJDQG
the evening star are the very same object. Consequently, Claire believes that 
(8) and the negation of (9) are true. However, according to the Naïve 
Russellian account (8) and (9) express the same proposition, as a result Claire 
believes both a proposition and its negation. But no rational agent believes a 
proposition and its negation, therefore the Naïve Russellian account of 
meaning must be wrong.  
The gappy proposition view inherits some of the problems met by the Naïve 
Russellian account. Consider the following version of the problem of cognitive 
significance for sentences containing empty names.  
10.  Superman is in love. 
11.  Clark Kent is in love. 
12.  Romeo is in love. 
Adopting the gappy proposition view (10), (11) and (12) express the same 
proposition, in fact, according to Braun, utterances of atomic subject-predicate 
sentences which differ only in the empty name they involve will count as 
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expressing the same gappy proposition. Therefore, (10)-(11) all express the 
proposition P4: 
P4  <__ , being-in-love> 
However,  intuitively there is a sense in which (12) has a different 
propositional content in respect to (10) and (11). Yet, the gappy proposition 
view is unable to provide an explanation of these intuitions.  
Moreover, consider the following example as a parallel of the one above, 
illustrated with (8) and (9), for the case of fictional names: 
13.  Superman is Superman. 
14.  Clark Kent is Superman.   
According to the gappy proposition view (8) and (9) express the same 
proposition: 
P5  <__ , identity,__> 
However, consider the case in which Claire has never read or watched any of 
WKH 6XSHUPDQ¶V VWRULHV DQG VKH GRHV QRW NQRZ WKDW µ&ODUN .HQW¶ is, in the 
fiction, the name for Superman in his ordinary life. Consequently, Claire may 
believe that (13) is a necessary truth while believing that (14) is false. As a 
result Claire may believe (13) and the negation of (14). But given that 
according to the gappy proposition view (13) and (14) express the same 
proposition, Claire believes a proposition and its very negation. However, as 
before, no rational agent believes a proposition and its negation, therefore the 
gappy proposition view must be wrong. 
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The same argument may be restated considering sentences that express 
attributions of beliefs, for example: 
15.  Claire believes that Superman is Superman. 
16.  Claire believes that Clark Kent is Superman. 
The that-clauses embedded in (15) and (16) are the sentences (13) and (14) 
above, which express the same gappy proposition P5, therefore (15) and (16), 
by composition, express in turn the same gappy proposition: 
P6.  <Claire believes that <__ , identity, __>>  
Hence the same argument stated above can be restated for (15) and (16). 
$SSO\LQJ %UDXQ¶V RXWOLQH RI WKH SUREOHP RI FRJQLWLYH VLJQLILFDQFH IRU WKH
Naïve Russellian view to what pertains to the gappy proposition view, we can 
delineate the argument by means of the following structure: 
a. There is a rational agent who understands (13) and (14) and 
believes that (13) is true and (14) is false. 
b. If a rational agent understands (13) and (14), and believes that (13) 
is true and (14) is false, then she believes the proposition expressed 
by (13) and the negation of (14). 
c. If the gappy proposition view is true, (13) and (14) express the 
same proposition. 
d. Therefore, there is a rational agent who believes the proposition 
expressed by (13) and the negation of that very same proposition. 
e. No rational agent believes a proposition and its negation. 
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f. Therefore, the gappy proposition view is wrong.   
%UDXQ¶VUHSO\WRWKLVDUJXPHQWLVFHQWUHGRQUHIXWLQJH$FFRUGLQJWR%UDXQD
rational agent may believe a proposition and its negation. This is possible in 
%UDXQ¶VYLHZLIWKHDWWLWXde of believing a certain propositional content means 
IRUDQDJHQWWREHLQDFHUWDLQEHOLHIVWDWH$GRSWLQJ3HUU\¶VSURSRVDO46, Braun 
individuates a belief state in a more articulated way than its propositional 
content.  
³I use the term 'belief' as a term for a mental state. A belief (or belief state, we 
might call it) is an enduring event-like entity that occurs in a brain (or mind). It 
LV ZKDW KDSSHQV LQ RQH
V KHDG ZKHQ RQH EHOLHYHV D SURSRVLWLRQ >«@ 7KH
FRQWHQWRIDEHOLHILVDSURSRVLWLRQ>«@6REHOiefs and propositions are distinct 
entities. But beliefs express propositions, in much the same way that sentences 
express propositions. A person believes a proposition by having a belief (state) 
WKDWH[SUHVVHVWKDWSURSRVLWLRQ´47  
Under this hypothesis, (13) and (14) express the same propositional content, 
namely the same gappy proposition, and yet their being believed occurs within 
different belief states. To exemplify this view, Braun compares it to assertive 
utterances such as: 
(i)  Fred: "I am hungry".  
(ii)  Wilma: "You are hungry" [addressing Fred].  
Fred and Wilma express the same proposition, even if they use different 
sentences in doing so. Therefore, they express the same proposition in different 
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ways. Moreover, Fred and Wilma believe that proposition in different ways. In 
fact, this difference may be understood by considering the causal role of Fred 
DQG :LOPD¶V EHOLHI VWDWHV LQ WKHLU EHKDYLRXU )UHG ZLOO ORRN IRU IRRG ZKLOH
:LOPD ZLOO QRW %UDXQ ODEHOV WKLV DQVZHU WR WKH SUREOHP WKH ³many ways of 
believing reply ´ DQG LW ³will appear especially plausible if one thinks that 
belief states involve tokenings of sentence-like mental representations, for 
there might be distinct mental sentences that have the same propositional 
content. If so, then a person might rationally believe both a proposition and its 
QHJDWLRQE\KDYLQJVXLWDEO\GLIIHUHQWVHQWHQFHVLQKLVEHOLHIER[´48    
According to this view, two different belief states are involved in believing the 
single proposition expressed by (13) or (14) and this belief state may be 
thought of as having (13) or (14) in one belief box. Consequently, one can be 
in one of these belief states without being in the other; one can have (13) in her 
belief box without having (14). According to Braun this would cause one to 
believe that (13) is true and have no opinion about (14). Alternatively, one can 
also be in a different belief state while believing that (13) is true, so she will 
have (13) together with the negation of (14) in her belief box.       
For Braun49 belief states are intrinsic mental states and as such, an agent may 
QRW UHDOLVH WKDW WKH FRQWHQW RI KHU EHOLHI LV D JDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ µ6XSHUPDQ¶
µ&ODUN.HQW¶ DQG µ5RPHR¶DUHPHDQLQJIXO IRU VSHDNHUV HYHQ LI WKH\KDYHQR
semantic content, because, according WR %UDXQ VSHDNHUV ³EHDU FRJQLWLYH
relations to these names that are importantly similar to the cognitive relations 
                                                          
48
 Braun, D. (2002), pp. 69-70. 
49
 Braun, D. (2005). 
52 
 
WKH\EHDUWRUHIHUULQJQDPHV´50 Therefore the ways in which a person believes 
that (13) is true and (14) is false differ in the same way in which she may 
believe that (17) is true and (18) is false: 
17.  Mark Twain is Mark Twain. 
18.  Samuel L. Clemens is Mark Twain. 
Furthermore, the ways in which a person believes (10)-(12) differ in the same 
way in which a person may believe (19)-(21): 
19.  Mark Twain is an author. 
20.  Samuel L. Clemens is an author. 
21.  Conan Doyle is an author. 
The cognitive difference between (10)-(12) is a difference in the ways in which 
a person believes (10)-(12). Braun would say, probably in an attempt to 
simplify hiVYLHZ WKDWRQHEHOLHYHV  LQ D ³6XSHUPDQ-LVK´ZD\  LQ D
³&ODUN.HQW-LVK´ZD\DQGLQD³5RPHR-LVK´ZD\ 
However, if we investigate this proposal further we shall see unsatisfactory 
consequences. Consider the explanation that can be derived by %UDXQ¶V YLHZ
on why we have the intuitions that we do concerning (10)-(12), despite the fact 
that we may assume that the fictional names they contain are empty. 
It would seem that, according to Braun, utterances of sentences which are 
associated to different mental states would differ in what is said, for example 
(10)-(12) may be associated to different belief states and therefore their 
utterances express different propositional contents. It may be that (10) and (11) 
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are associated to the same mental state, let us say that the speaker has the same 
FRJQLWLYHUHODWLRQVZLWKWKHILFWLRQDOQDPHVµ6XSHUPDQ¶DQGµ&ODUN.HQW¶7KLV
would justify our intuitions according to which the utterance of (10) and (11), 
to a certain extent, say the same thing while (12) has a completely different 
FRQWHQWWKHFRJQLWLYHUHODWLRQVHQWHUWDLQHGZLWKWKHILFWLRQDOQDPHµ5RPHR¶DUH
at the basis of a completely different mental state.  
,WLVSRVVLEOHWRJUDQWWKDWVRPHWLPHVZHPD\MXGJHDQXWWHUDQFH³a is F´DQG
RQH³b LV)´DVH[Sressing different propositions because these two utterances 
are associated to different mental states. However, ultimately, our judgements 
concerning the propositional content of (19) and (20) will be sensitive to the 
semantic values we take "a" and "b" to have. Take as examples (19) and (20), 
when we come to learn that Samuel L. Clemens is the pen name for Mark 
Twain we will recognise that there is some sense in which utterances of (19) 
DQGVD\WKHVDPHWKLQJEXWVD\VRPHWKLQJGLIIHUHQWIURP³Conan Doyle is 
DQ DXWKRU´. This does not seem to be the case with (10)- µ6XSHUPDQ¶
µ&ODUN.HQW¶DQGµ5RPHR¶DUHDOOILFWLRQDOQDPHVDQGWKHZD\LQZKLFKWKH\
are employed should all have the same semantic value, according to Braun; 
nonetheless, utterances of (10)-(12) are not understood as saying the same 
thing at all.   
,QFRQFOXVLRQ%UDXQ¶VUHVSRQVHWRWKHSUREOHPRIFRJQLWLYe significance is not 
satisfactory, as the problem of our different understanding between utterances 
of (10), (11), (12) highlights, and this lack of resolution replicates in the 
problem of the proposition believed. As Ben Caplan notes, the gappy 
proposition view can be seen as an attempt to extend the direct reference theory 
54 
 
to the cases of non-referring terms. As a natural extension, it is problem-
preserving and therefore we should not expect a solution to the problem of the 
difference in cognitive values in (10)-(12).  
0RUHRYHU%UDXQ¶Vmany ways of believing reply seems to be somewhat out of 
focus for that which aims to resolve the problem of cognitive significance for 
fictional names. The problem of the difference in cognitive values of fictional 
empty names does not pertain to a belief state, but rather to the imaginative 
processes which relate speakers to these terms. Braun accepts the thesis of 
different semantic contents for different uses of fictional names: the same 
fictional name can be empty or have a referent. The case of fictional empty 
QDPHVLVIRU%UDXQPDLQO\UHODWHGWRVRPHRIWKHDXWKRU¶VXVHVLQZULWLQJWKH
story, and VRPHVSHDNHUV¶XVHVWKDWVHHPWRILQGDFDXVDOFRQQHFWLRQWRWKRVH
original authorial uses. Therefore, if the majority of gappy propositions are 
expressed by sentences containing fictional empty names, then the cognitive 
relations that connect us with the uses of these fictional names are not a belief 
state but rather a mental state that we may call a make-belief state. Braun 
maintains that the difference in ways of believing shows up in the difference in 
the behaviour engendered in the speaker. But for a VSHDNHUZKRVD\V³6KHUORFN
+ROPHVLVDGHWHFWLYH´LIVKHVKRXOGILQGKHUVHOILQWKHXQIRUWXQDWHVLWXDWLRQRI
looking for a detective, she would not ask for Sherlock Holmes, because she 
does not believe that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. She is not engaged in any 
belief state towards that utterance. Speakers may rather have make-believed 
that someone had written a story about a detective called Sherlock Holmes 
ZKLOHWKH\ZHUHUHDGLQJ'R\OH¶VVWRULHV7KHTXHVWLRQLVZKHWKHUWKHFRJQLWLYH
relations we entertain with the fiction provide a basis for an understanding of 
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the different cognitive values of various fictional empty names. In this case 
DGRSWLQJWKHQRWLRQRIµEHOLHI¶GRHVQRWVHHPSHUWLQHQWDQGWDNLQJIRUJUDQWHG
the relation between mental states such as between a belief and a pretence is 
not a proper way of facing the problem at hand. Therefore, an essential 
LQJUHGLHQW WKDW LVPLVVLQJ LQ%UDXQ¶V UHSO\ LV how the cognitive relations that 
speakers entertain with the fiction play a role in their uses of fictional empty 
names.  
Finally, as Everett points out51 %UDXQ¶V VROXWLRQ WR WKH SUREOHP RI FRJQLWLYH
significance seems  to naturally merge into the pragmatic answer to the 
problem. Utterance of (10)-(12) may pragmatically convey different 
descriptive propositions. If this solution were to be adopted in the discussion of 
different cognitive values of fictional names, it would be likely to assume this 
view in discussing also the truth values of sentences containing such names, 
yet this is in tension with %UDXQ¶V YLHZ , ZLOO SUHVHQW %UDXQ¶V YLHZ RQ WKH
problem of truth for sentences containing fictional empty names in the next 
section.  
 
1.3.2  %UDXQ¶V9LHZRQWKH3UREOHPRI7ruth 
The problem of truth concerns the connection between language and reality. 
Adopting the simplest explanation, a sentence derives its truth values from the 
proposition it expresses, if the proposition expressed is true, i.e. it corresponds 
to a state of affairs in the world, then the sentence that expresses that 
proposition is true; otherwise it is false. But from a point of view of a Naïve 
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 (YHUHWW $  (PSW\ QDPHV DQG µ*DSS\¶ SURSRVLWLRQV Philosophical Studies: An 
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, Vol. 116, no. 1, pp. 1-36. 
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Russellianist, when a proposition P is expressed by a sentence S, the 
constituents of P correspond to the contents of the words contained in S. 
Consequently, given that in terms of the semantic content of its constituents a 
sentence containing fictional empty names would be incomplete it would not 
express any proposition and therefore it would not be possible to assign to it a 
truth value.   
In contrast, for Braun, when one of the constituents of sentence S lacks any 
content, S will not fail to express a proposition but will express an unfilled or 
gappy proposition. Generally speaking, Braun holds that gappy propositions 
can be believed, asserted and bear truth values. In doing so they follow a 
general principle that is valid for any other proposition. Braun introduces this 
as the principle R52: 
R: If P is a proposition having a single subject position and a one-place 
property position, then P is true iff the subject position is filled by one, and 
only one, object, and it exemplifies the property filling the property position. If 
P is not true then it is false. 
According to Braun, the adequacy of his view seem to be confirmed by the 
delivering of the correct predictions for what concern the truth values that we 
would intuitively assign to existential and negative existential statements. 
Consider the following examples: 
22.  Sherlock Holmes exists. 
23.  Sherlock Holmes does not exist. 
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 Braun (1993), pg. 464. 
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8QGHU WKHDVVXPSWLRQ WKDW µ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶ LV XVHG LQ WKHVH VHQWHQFes as a 
fictional empty name, for Braun (17) and (18) express the proposition (17g) and 
(18g): 
22g.  < __ , existing> 
23g.  < < __ ,existing> NEG> 
In accordance with principle R, (22g) is false, given that the subject position is 
unfilled and therefore there is no object which exemplifies the property 
µH[LVWLQJ¶53. As a result, its negation (23g) is true.  
The gappy proposition view seems thus able to predict truth-values conditions 
for (22) and (23) which completely match our intuitions. There is not such an 
individual as Sherlock Holmes and we would not look for a certain Sherlock 
Holmes if in need of a good detective. 
Having said that, let us consider the case of a sentence with predicate or 
property negation. Our interpretation of (23) corresponds to the application of 
WKH QHJDWLRQ WR WKH ZKROH VHQWHQFH DV WDQWDPRXQW WR ³,W LV QRW WKH FDVH WKDW
6KHUORFN +ROPHV H[LVWV´ +RZHYHU WKLV DSSURDFK VKRXOG QRW EH WDNHQ IRU
granted. Consider (2) and (2n): 
2.  Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
2n.  Sherlock Holmes is not a detective. 
According to Braun, (2) and (2n) are semantically analogous. In both cases we 
have a simple subject-predicate sentence in which the predicate contributes 
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 I am assuming here, as Braun doesWKDWµWRH[LVW¶H[SUHVVHVDSURSHUW\7KLVLVFRQWURYHUVLDO
DVVKRZQE\WKHEURDGGHEDWHRQWKHQRWLRQRIµH[LVWHQFH¶,QWKLVFKDSWHU,ZLOOQRWGLVFXVVWKH
problem of existential or negative existential statements, but I will reserve this topic for a 
further chapter. 
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some property to the proposition expressed by the sentence. In fact, Braun 
suggests that an object satisfies the property expressed by a negated predicate 
just in case it does not satisfy the property expressed by the un-negated 
SUHGLFDWH7KHUHIRUH³6KHUORFN+ROPHVLV)´DQG³6KHUORFN+ROPHVLVQRW-)´
are treated semantically in the same way: by principle R, they are both false 
given that the subject position is unfilled. 
Extending this argument to (22) and (23), and assuming, as Braun does, that 
µH[LVWLQJ¶LVDSURSHUW\DQGH[SUHVVWKHSURSRVLWLRQg) and (23g1):   
22g.  < __ , existing> 
23g1.  < __ , not-existing> 
Both (22g) and (23g1 DUH IDOVH DFFRUGLQJ WR %UDXQ¶V DFFRXQW DQG ZRXOG
produce a counterintuitive result, namely the truth of (24), which expresses the 
negation of (23g1): 
(24)  It is not the case that Sherlock Holmes does not exist. 
24g.  < __ , not-existing> NEG> 
It seems possible to derive more counterintuitive consequences adopting 
%UDXQ¶V YLHZ WKDQ WKH LQWXLWLYH RQHV WKDW LQLWLDOO\ VHHPHG WR VXSSRUW LW
Consider (25) and (26): 
25.  Clark Kent is Superman. 
26.  Sherlock Holmes is Superman. 
25. appears to be true while (26) appears to be false. However, according to 
Braun both sentences express the same proposition (25g): 
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25g.  < __ , identity relation , __ > 
Notwithstanding the semantics provided for (25g), it will nevertheless offer 
counterintuitive predictions. On the one hand, if (25g) is evaluated as true we 
would conclude that (25) and (26) are both true. On the other hand if the 
semantics provided lead to evaluate (25g) as false, then both (25) and (26) will 
EH IDOVH &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH SUHGLFWLRQV GHULYHG E\ DGRSWLQJ %UDXQ¶V YLHZ GR
not match our intuitions. Consider another example: 
27.  Sherlock Holmes is self-identical. 
In this case the gappy proposition expressed by (27g) would be false according 
to Braun, while intuitively (27) is true. 
27g.  < __ , being self-identical> 
In fact, (27g) is false under the application of principle R. The intuitions on 
many of the examples considered so far are incongruous with the predictions 
RIIHUHG E\ %UDXQ¶V JDSS\ SURSRVition view and in order to justify this 
incongruence one should explain why our intuitions are wrong. Alternatively, 
Braun may argue that (25)-(27) seem not to be appropriate for subjection to the 
JDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ YLHZ LQ UHVSHFW WR VSHDNHUV¶ LQWXLWLRQV Eecause in these 
examples the fictional names seemed to be used with the intention to refer to a 
fictional character and they are not empty. Therefore we should not expect to 
employ the gappy proposition view for these cases. 
Let us consider then examples in which one can assume, more easily than for 
the previous sentences, that there is no intention to refer to a fictional character.  
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Consider (2) and (28): 
2.  Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
28.  Superman is a detective.  
Both sentences can be understood as reports about fictions and intuitively (2) is 
true while (28) is false. Once again the gappy proposition view predictions do 
not match with our intuitions; in fact (2) and (28) would express the same 
gappy proposition (2g): 
2g.  < __ , being-a-detective > 
(2gDVZHVDZDERYHLV IDOVHLQ%UDXQ¶VDFFRXQWE\SULQFLSOH5 LWEHLQJWKH
case that the subject position is unfilled.  Even granting that (2) and (28) are 
XQGHUVWRRG DV UHODWLYH WR 6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ VWRULHV RU 6XSHUPDQ¶V VWRULHV
%UDXQ¶V YLHZ GRHV QRt provide semantic predictions that would match our 
intuitions. Consider these sentences evaluated within the fictional context, we 
may represent the propositions expressed as (Pf) and (Pf1): 
Pf.  < F < __ , being-a-detective>> 
Pf1.  < F1 < __ , being-a-detective>> 
Here F standVIRU6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶VWRULHVDQG)1 IRU6XSHUPDQ¶VVWRULHV%RWK
(Pf) and (Pf1) would turn out to be false while we would expect the former to be 
WUXHDQGWKHODWWHUIDOVHJLYHQWKDW6KHUORFN+ROPHVLVDGHWHFWLYHLQ'R\OH¶V
stories while Superman is not in all the stories pertaining to this character. 
Braun tries to cope with the numerous counterintuitive consequences of his 
YLHZ E\ PRYLQJ WKH SUREOHP WR D FRJQLWLYH OHYHO 6SHDNHUV ³EHOLHYH WKH
VHQWHQFH µ6KHUORFN +ROPHV LV D JUDSHIUXLW¶ LV IDOVH EHFDXVH WKH\ EHOLHYH WKH
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JDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ WKDW 6KHUORFN +ROPHV LV QRW D JUDSHIUXLW´54 Even for this 
case, as it was for the problem of cognitive significance, Braun has recourse to 
the distinction between a belief state and the believed propositional content. 
Therefore,  one could be in an intrinsic mental state believing that Sherlock 
HolmeVLV)ZKLOHWKHFRQWHQWRIRQH¶V belief is a gappy proposition.  
This solution could maybe be developed for mythical names VXFKDVµ9XOFDQ¶
where a false story may be at the origin of a false belief; however, it is not 
pertinent to fictional contexts. For appreciators of work of arts do not entertain 
beliefs towards the content of fictional stories, rather they are engaged in 
imaginative attitudes, in make-believe, in pretence.  
In conclusion, The problem of truth VHHPV WR SHUVLVW DGRSWLQJ %UDXQ¶V YLHZ
given the numerous counterintuitive consequences that his solution engenders 
and the fact that it yields a lack of a proper understanding of truth in fiction. 
 
Conclusion 
%UDXQ¶V YLHZ LV D SLRQHHULQJ RQH LQ WKH DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\
SURSRVLWLRQ¶ WR WKH FDVH RI QRQ-referring terms. The important contribution 
consists in the introduction and defence of such a notion. This idea may 
undoubtedly be of particular interest for those who are not comfortable with the 
assumption of fictional characters within the ontology. Moreover, it can be 
employed in a general understanding of our engagement with fictional works 
and the semantics of fictional names ZLWKLQWKHVWRU\RULQVSHDNHUV¶WDONDERXW
it. The adoption of gappy propositions is restricted to some occurrences of 
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ILFWLRQDO QDPHV E\ YLUWXH RI %UDXQ¶V ODWHVW DFFHSWDQFH RI WKH H[LVWHQFH RI
fictional characters. As I have shown, the solutions developed in his work give 
rise to strongly counterintuitive consequences and no reasons are provided for 
why we should not trust our intuitions. The attempt to adjust the notion of 
structured propositions and the direct reference view in order to be 
conjunctively applicable to the problem of non-referring terms reveals a strong 
IDLWKLQWKHVHQRWLRQV\HWDGRSWLQJ%UDXQ¶VYLHZGRHVQRWVHHPWRRIIHUYLDEOH
solutions. Other accounts do use gappy propositions, combining them with a 
pragmatic reading of the problem. I will discuss the solutions and problems of 
these different proposals in the next chapter.  
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PART 2 
 
Introduction 
Adams, Fuller and Stecker, in collaboration with other scholars, have worked 
consistently on the reference of empty names55, developing a research project 
which aims towards a unified account of this type of term. Gappy propositions, 
DV LQ%UDXQ¶VYLHZIRUPDFHQWUDO UROH LQ WKHLUZRUNDQGDUH considered as a 
primitive notion or the best explanatory tool available so far. 
In this chapter I will present their account illustrating their framework, the key 
notion and the framework they refer to in developing their proposal. In section 
1 I will illustrate in what sense their project aims at a unified account and the 
core elements contained in it. The idea that in our understanding of sentences 
containing fictional names a descriptive content conveyed on a pragmatic level 
plays a crucial role, will lead me to introduce a brief picture of the Gricean 
pragmatic framework and discuss how the notion of sense has been articulated 
by GLUHFWUHIHUHQFHWKHRULVWV,QVHFWLRQ,ZLOOFRPSDUHWKHGLIIHUHQWVSHDNHUV¶
attitudes towards sentences containing fictional names. Finally, this proposal 
assuming: (i) a direct reference account of names; (ii) that fictional names are 
names; (iii) fictional names are empty; will face those problems pertaining to 
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 Adams, Fuller and Stecker have published works on this topic since the beginning of the 
Nineties, with publications such as ³7KRXJKWV:LWKRXW2EMHFWV´LQLQMind &Language 
RU ³9DFXRXV 6LQJXODU 7HUPV´ LQ  again in Mind & Language. Their work has been a 
significant contribution on the literature pertaining to empty names, engendering a debate 
which has involved different scholars up to more recent publications, for example A. Everett 
³(PSW\ QDPHV DQG µ*DSS\¶ 3URSRVLWLRQV´ LQ  RU 0 *UHHQ ³'LUHFW UHIHUHQFH (PSW\
QDPHV DQG ,PSOLFDWXUHV´ LQ  7KH IUDPHZRUN ZKLFK WKH\ KDYH GHYHORSHG KDV EHHQ WKH
result of a collaborative work involving mainly Adams, Fuller and Stecker but also with 
contribution of other UHVHDUFKHUVXFKDV/DXUD$'LHWULFKLQ³:KDWLVLQDQHPSW\QDPH"´LQ
2004. In the literature about empty names their proposal is referred to as the one developed by 
Adams et al., I suppose for the purpose of speeding the writing process and to make the reader 
aware that the framework is the result of a long term collaboration. I will conform to this way 
of referring to their work.  
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the relation between language and thought  and between language and reality 
that I have discussed in the previous chapter. Therefore, in section 3 and 4 I 
will discuss how it answers  the problem of nonsense, the problem of difference 
in cognitive values, the problem of the proposition believed and the problem of 
truth. I will consider which objections have been put forward and which replies 
have been developed. I will take this discussion as an opportunity also for 
reasoning on some of the central notions of this framework, trying to reach a 
deeper understanding of the notion of gappy proposition and the notion of lore. 
In this way we will see which answers this framework may provide and which 
are the questions that can be posed.  
  
2.1  A Unified Pragmatic Account for Vacuous Names 
Adams, Fuller and Stecker aim to provide a unified account of names which 
would comprise proper names as well as what they term vacuous singular 
terms or unfilled names. They propose such an account within a theory of 
direct reference; on this view the meaning of a name is its bearer, if it has one. 
 It is possible to talk of a unified account under different respects. Firstly, 
proper names and empty names receive the same semantic treatment. Secondly, 
the distinction between empty names, fictional names and mythical names 
becomes superfluous given a comprehensive unified account for vacuous 
singular terms. Thirdly, Adams et al. offer a unified account of fictional names 
according to which these terms are not ambiguous, but rather, speakers 
entertain different attitudes towards sentences containing fictional names.  
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They assume that empty names are semantically homogeneous in the sense that 
empty names do not contribute anything to the propositions expressed by the 
sentences containing them, although they may display a different syntax, e.g. 
³6XSHUPDQ´ UDWKHU WKDQ ³6DQWD&ODXV´3URSRVLWLRQV FRQWDLQLQJ HPSW\QDPHV
are gappy propositions and, as such, are neither true nor false. How would we 
WKHQ XQGHUVWDQG WKH LQWXLWLYH GLIIHUHQFH EHWZHHQ ³6DQWD LV )´ DV RSSRVHd to 
³6XSHUPDQLV)´RU³9XOFDQ is )´"$FFRUGLQJWR$GDPVHW al. what is analysed 
as semantically isomorphic will require a differentiated understanding on a 
pragmatic level. Every name is associated with a set of descriptions, something 
they label the lore associated with the name; this association is made 
independently of the fact of the name being a filled or an unfilled one. Make no 
mistake though, the associated set of descriptions is not the meaning of the 
name, this being its bearer, if there is one. Generally speaking Adams et al. 
suggest that speakers express gappy propositions when employing any empty 
names but according to some pragmatic mechanisms, they imply a complete 
proposition where the empty name is replaced with the descriptive content 
associated to it. The fact that speakers can evaluate the pragmatically implied 
proposition as false or true is, according to Adams et al., what misled them into 
thinking that the proposition expressed by the sentence containing the empty 
name is false or true; but gappy propositions are devoid of truth values 
according to this account.  
/HWXVFRQVLGHUWKHIROORZLQJH[DPSOH³6DQWD&ODXVORYHVFKLOGUHQ´7KHUHDUH
stories that are part of the Western cultural background, they are sorts of myths 
that date back to old folk stories which probably constituted the corpus of an 
ancient oral culture. The lore related to these stories is of common background 
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and everyone in the Western world is familiar with the lore associated with the 
6DQWD &ODXV VWRU\ )RU LQVWDQFH µ6DQWD &ODXV¶ PD\ EH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK WKH
GHVFULSWLRQ ³7KH MROO\ SOXPS SHUVRQ ZKR EULQJV SUHVHQWV WR HYHU\RQH DW
ChristmaVDQG OLYHV LQ WKH1RUWK3ROHDQGVRRQ´ µ6DQWD&ODXV¶ LV DQHPSW\
QDPHLWGRHVQRWSLFNRXWDQ\LQGLYLGXDO7KHUHIRUHVSHDNHUVXWWHULQJ³6DQWD
&ODXV ORYHV FKLOGUHQ´ OLWHUDOO\ H[SUHVV WKH JDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ  BB  ORYLQJ-
children >, however, they imply a complete proposition where the empty name 
is substituted by the descriptive content associated with it. For example, 
speakers pragmatically imply that the jolly, plump person who brings presents 
to everyone at Christmas loves children.  
The first core element of the account developed by Adams et al. is the idea that 
there is a lore associated with every name, this being the case for empty names 
and proper names. For instance, after the 2008 American Presidential election 
everyone could have been informed aERXW%DUDFN2EDPD¶VELRJUDSK\ ,WZDV
information to which all have public access that Barack Obama was born in 
Hawaii, his mother was of a mixed European heritage and his father a foreign 
student from Kenya granted with a scholarship and that he has become the first 
Afro-American President of the United States. Adams et al. propose that 
VSHDNHUVDVVRFLDWHµEHLQJERUQLQ+DZDLLIURPDPRWKHURIDPL[HG-European 
heritage and a Kenyan father, being the first Afro-$PHULFDQ 3UHVLGHQW¶ ZLWK
µ%DUDFN 2EDPD¶ DV LQ a sort of stimulus-response. The idea of a descriptive 
content associated with a name may appear in contrast with a direct reference 
account of the meaning of proper names, but the distinction between a 
descriptivist account versus a referentialist one is not so categorical. In fact, 
since the first elaborations of what has been called the direct reference theory 
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there has been an articulated analysis that has separated a descriptive content 
associated with a name from the alleged function attributed to this descriptive 
content in determining the meaning of a name. A direct reference theorist 
would refute this latter function while accepting the former. This distinction 
has been clearly outlined by Nathan Salmon56 LQ KLV GLVFXVVLRQ RI %XUJH¶V
trifurcation of WKHGLIIHUHQWIXQFWLRQVWKDW)UHJH¶VQRWLRQRIVHQVHZDVGHVLJQHG
to fill. Consider it in what follows57: 
³Sense1. The purely conceptual representation of an object which a fully 
competent speaker associates in a particular way with his or her use of the 
term. Sense1 LVDSV\FKRORJLFDORUFRQFHSWXDOQRWLRQ>«@ 
Sense2. The mechanism by which the reference of the term is secured and 
semantically determined. Sense2 is a semantic notion. 
Sense3. The information value of the term; the contribution made by the term to 
the information content of sentences containing the term. Sense3 is a cognitive 
RUHSLVWHPLFQRWLRQ´ 
In contrast to any descriptivist account of names, Adam et al. would reject 
Sense2, but would probably recognise in Sense3 the descriptive content that 
speakers can derive from the lore associated with names. It should be clearer 
now that although this descriptive content does not play any role in terms of the 
individuation of the designatum, it is still part of what is associated with the 
use of the name and it may play a role in a communicative context. 
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 Salmon, N. (1982) Reference and Essence. ed. Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 
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 Ibid., pg. 12. 
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The second core element of the proposal put forward by Adams et al. consists 
in the inclusion of pragmatic mechanisms in an account of the meaningfulness 
of sentences containing empty names. In fact, although such sentences literally 
express gappy propositions, they pragmatically impart the complete 
proposition that would be expressed by substituting the name with the 
description associated with it.  Adams et al. adopt a Gricean account of the 
interpretation of an utterance. According to Grice, the literal meaning encoded 
in a sentence is only one of the elements to take into consideration when 
analysing a communicative process. Conversations take place in contexts made 
up of verbal and non-verbal commuQLFDWLRQFRPSULVLQJXWWHUDQFHVVSHDNHUV¶
intentions, body language, physical environment, etc., and therefore the 
interpretation of what the speaker means is an inference to the best explanation 
by way of intelligent guesswork, rather than by decoding signals. The best 
explanation is derived on the basis of the principle which, according to Grice, 
governs conversation; one that he himself labelled the Co-operative principle.  
³0DNH \RXU FRQYHUVDWLRQDO FRQWULEXWLRQ VXFK DV LV UHTXLUHG DW WKH VWDJH DW
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange in 
ZKLFK\RXDUHHQJDJHG´58 
The Co-operative Principle is itself rather general and vague. How can 
speakers make sure they are obeying it? Here, Grice lists a number of more 
specific conversational maxims, the idea being that by obeying them, a speaker 
will automatically be obeying the Co-operative Principle. Grice called these the 
maxims of Quantity, Quality, Relation and Manner; they are often called the 
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 Grice, H.P. (1975) Logic and Conversation. Syntax and Semantics, Vol. 3, pp. 41-58. 
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maxims of informativeness, truthfulness, relevance and clarity. These 
conversational maxims are outlined as follows:  
Quantity: 
1. Make your contribution as informative as is required (for the current 
purposes of the exchange). 
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required. 
Quality: 
Supermaxim: Try to make your contribution one that is true. 
'RQRWVD\ZKDW\RXEHOLHYHWREHIDOVHµPD[LPRIWUXWKIXOQHVV¶ 
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence. 
Relation: 
1. Be relevant. 
Manner: 
Supermaxim: Be perspicuous 
1. Avoid obscurity of expression. 
2. Avoid ambiguity. 
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity) 
4. Be orderly. 
Notice that Grice is not claiming that all conversations actually are co-
operative, or that the maxims are invariably obeyed. Any speaker can opt out 
of the Co-operative Principle, tacitly or overtly. Grice's basic claim is that in 
interpreting an utterance, hearers assume that the Co-operative Principle and 
maxims have been obeyed, and look for an interpretation that satisfies this 
assumption. Oftentimes, in order to find such an interpretation, they will have 
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to assume that the speaker believes, and was trying to communicate, something 
more than was strictly being said. These extra bits of information are 
conversational implicatures (intended implications). The Co-operative 
Principle and maxims guide the inference process by allowing the hearer to 
eliminate any interpretation that is inconsistent with the assumption that the 
speaker, in saying what she said, was obeying the Co-operative Principle and 
maxims (or at least the Co-operative Principle). The conversational 
implicatures of an utterance can be seen as those propositions that have to be 
DGGHG WR WKH VSHDNHU¶V PHDQLQJ LQ RUGHU WR SUHVHUYH WKH DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW VKH
was obeying the Co-operative Principle and maxims (or at least the Co-
operative Principle) in saying what she said.  
:KLOHSURYLGLQJWKHQXWVKHOORI*ULFH¶VSUDJPDWLFWKHRU\,DPQRWGLVFXVVLQJ
questions about the source of the Co-operative maxims or the degree of 
vagueness of the maxims, although I find that these and others are legitimate 
GRXEWVDERXW*ULFH¶VDSSURDFK0\LQWHQWLVUDWKHUWRSURYLGHDFOHDUSLFWXUHRI
the pragmatic element assumed in the framework outlined by Adams et al. so 
as to competently unravel it and acknowledge its virtues and its problems.  
The basic idea in Adams et al.¶V work would be then that speakers, in order to 
make a co-operative contribution to the conversation and meanwhile adhering 
to the co-operative principle and the maxims which rule it, use a singular term, 
even if this is empty, in order to pragmatically convey a certain lore they are 
addressing rather than employ a prolix list of descriptions. Adams and Fuller 
also consider the idea that a conversational rule according to which speakers 
XVH³singular terms associated with a lore that is relevant to the current purpose 
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RUSXUSRVHVRI WKH FRQYHUVDWLRQV LQZKLFK \RXDUHSDUWLFLSDWLQJ´PD\ EH DW
work in cases involving empty names59. The general point suggested by Adams 
and Fuller, apart from whether such a conversational rule applies or not in the 
case of empty names, is that speakers conforming their contribution to the 
conversation to the maxims of Relation (Be Relevant) and Manner (Be brief, 
avoid unnecessary prolixity) would adopt an empty name. We may also think 
of a slightly more articulated story to justify the alleged implication that an 
empty name carries with itself. An initial moment can be thought of when the 
prolixity of a certain amount of descriptions has led to the postulation of a term 
(an empty name) as a placeholder for the lore, otherwise conveyable through 
the explicit, extensive amount of information which would be, at least in part, 
non-QHFHVVDU\ +RZHYHU WKHUH DUH VRPH GLIILFXOWLHV LQ ILWWLQJ $GDP HW DO¶V
proposal ZLWKLQ*ULFH¶VIUDPHZRUN,QIDFWJHQHUDOO\DQLPSOLFDWHGFRQWHQWLV
inferred when one or more maxims are not obeyed, whereas, for what has been 
said so far, it seems that empty names are employed to obey the maxims of 
Relation (Be Relevant) and Manner (Be brief, avoid unnecessary prolixity). A 
more congruous account to the Gricean framework may simply state that the 
employment of empty names does not obey the maxim of Manner (be 
perspicuous) given that the empty name does not denote any individual, 
therHE\VSHDNHUV¶LQWHUORFXWRUVQRWLGHQWLI\LQJDQ\UHIHUHQWSLFNHGRXWE\WKH
empty name, will infer that the use of the term implicates the relevant lore 
associated with it. The fact that there is a lack of clarity in how inferences of 
the relevant lore associated with an empty name are explained employing 
                                                          
59In Adams and Fuller (2007) they reply to some objections raised in Green (2007) on the 
employment of Gricean mechanisms in explaining the substitutability of an empty name with a 
description associated to it.   
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*ULFH¶V IUDPHZRUN VHHPV WR PH D ZHDNQHVV LQ WKH SURSRVDO DGYDQFHG E\
Adams et al. Let us consider some examples: 
1. Santa Claus does not exist. 
The utterance of (1) would imply (1a)  
1a.   The jolly, fat person who owns reindeer, lives at the North Pole, 
gives presents to kids on &KULVWPDVGD\LVFDOOHG³6DQWD&ODXV´E\
many English speakers in the Christmas folkloric stories and so on, 
does not exist.  
(1a) is therefore what is meant by the speaker and it replaces within the 
communicative process the literal meaning expressed by the gappy proposition 
< __ , non-existence>. According to Adams et al., the solution of a 
pragmatically imparted proposition also provides an explanation of why we 
have misleading intuitions concerning the truth of (1). In fact, speakers may 
feel supported by strong intuitions concerning the truth of (1) rather than 
deeming it neither true nor false, as it expresses a gappy proposition. These 
misleading intuitions, according to Adams et al., can be explained considering 
that what speakers infer from the utterance of (1) is not the literal meaning 
expressed by the sentence but the pragmatically imparted proposition (1a). (1a) 
is a complete proposition and when it is glossed in the familiar Russellian way 
(in which existence is not a first order property of objects but something like a 
second-order property of properties), such as in (1b): 
1b. It is not the case that there is an unique, jolly, fat person who owns 
reindeer, lives at the North Pole, gives presents to kids on Christmas 
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GD\LVFDOOHG³6DQWD&ODXV´E\PDQ\(QJOLVKVSHDNHUVin the Christmas 
folkloric stories and so on. 
Then (1a) is clearly true. 
I will now have a closer look at how a pragmatic account based on Adams and 
al. proposal deals with the case of fictional names.  
 
2.2  6SHDNHUV¶$WWLWXGHVDQG'LIIHUHQW8VHVRI)LFWLRQDO1ames 
Different attitudes may be entertained when engaging with fiction. We may 
make-believe the content of a work of fiction or we may assert about it, for 
example when discussing the features of a work of art or comparing it to a 
different one. Therefore a sentence such as (2): 
2. Sherlock Holmes is a detective. 
can be penned by Conan Doyle in writing Sherlock Holmes stories, can be the 
object of readers¶SUHWHQFHLQWKHLUUHDGLQJRIWKHVWRU\RUFDQEHthe object of 
VSHDNHUV¶EHOLHIZKHQHYHUWKH\DUHWDONLQJDERXW'R\OH¶VVWRULHV0RUHRYHUWKH
proposition expressed by a sentence such as (3): 
3. Sherlock Holmes is a smarter detective than Poirot. 
would agaiQEH WKHREMHFWRIVSHDNHUV¶EHOLHI LWEHLQJDFRPSDULVRQEHWZHHQ
different works of fiction. The idea of recognising different attitudes in our 
utterances of sentences containing fictional names fits quite well within a 
unified account of these terms, especially if compared with the widespread 
assumption that there are different uses of fictional names; these being 
conniving, metafictional and non-fictional uses. On the one hand this latter one 
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is a useful way of categorising and distinguishing between sentences evaluated 
with respect to the fictional context rather than the actual world; but, on the 
other hand, this categorisation is sometimes adopted with the implication that 
ILFWLRQDOQDPHVDUHDPELJXRXVWHUPV6XFKWHUPVZLOOEHYDFXRXVLQVSHDNHUV¶
engagement with the fiction (conniving uses), for example in the reading of a 
novel; whereas they may provide a content (this being different with regard to 
different cases) to the proposition in the talk about fiction or in the comparison 
of one work of fiction to another. Contrariwise, fictional names are not 
ambiguous in a unified account. According to Adams et al., a fictional name 
plays the role of a name. It supports inferences and predications and other 
logical relations played by names. Therefore, its semantics will be determined 
in the same way as for any other name. Generally speaking, if a name has a 
meaning this will be its bearer, if it is vacuous it will lack meaning, however, it 
may be embedded in a sentence with meaningful parts or associated with other 
sentences that have meaning.  
&RQVLGHUDVDQH[DPSOHVHQWHQFHµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶LVDYDFXRXVWHUPLW
does not designate any individual. The proposition expressed is tantamount to 
< x, being-a-GHWHFWLYH ! ZKHUH µ[¶ LV D SODFHKROGHU IRU D referent in a 
VWUXFWXUHGHQWLW\WKDWLVDQLQFRPSOHWHSURSRVLWLRQµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶SOD\VWKH
grammatical role of a name and it functions within the fiction as a proper 
name. The idea is that Doyle makes believe or intends his readers to make 
believe that he is referring to a certain individual who is a detective, or, in other 
words, he is fictionally asserting that Sherlock Holmes is a detective. In 
reading the story therefore, readers pretend that there is an individual called 
Sherlock Holmes and they associate to the term whatever the author explicitly 
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RULPSOLFLWO\ILFWLRQDOO\DVVHUWVDERXW+ROPHV$OWKRXJKµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶LVD
vacuous term, it pragmatically imparts the descriptive connotation assumed in 
the course of the story.  
Let us now examine a different attitude that speakers may entertain employing 
WKHWHUPµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶&RQVLGHU 
4. ,Q'R\OH¶VVWRULHV6KHUORFN+ROPHVLVDGHWHFWLYH 
The assertion of (4) is not fictionally asserted. Speakers are not pretending that 
in Sherlock Holmes stoULHV&RQDQ'R\OHXVLQJWKHWHUPµ+ROPHV¶ILFWLRQDOO\
asserted the unfilled proposition < x, being-a-detective >. In the same way 
speakers are committed in what they say when talking about what is implied in 
'R\OH¶VVWRULHV&RQVLGHU 
5. ,Q'R\OH¶VVWRULHs, Sherlock Holmes is an empiricist. 
Although it would be very unlikely to find a sentence such as (5) explicitly 
VWDWHGLQRQHRI'R\OH¶VVWRULHVZHPD\WKLQNDVLPSOLHGLQWKHVWRULHV:H
PD\ LQIHU LW IURP 'R\OH¶V QDUUDWLYH +ROPHV VHHPV DOZD\V WR Neep in direct 
observational touch with what the world has to offer, his starting point is the 
collation of details combined with his ability to HOLFLWIURPDSHUVRQ¶VJDUPHQW
SHUKDSV D KDW D FRPSOHWH SLFWXUH RI WKDW SHUVRQ¶V DJH VRFLR-economic 
background, present financial status, psychological predispositions, and so 
forth. More precisely we may say that it is true that Doyle, using the term 
µ6KHUORFN +RPHV¶ ILFWLRQDOO\ LPSOLHV WKH XQILOOHG SURSRVLWLRQ [ EHLQJ-an-
HPSLULFLVW!ZKHUHµ[¶LVDSODFHKROGHr for a name.    
Adam et al. highlight the difference between on the one hand (3) and on the 
RWKHUDQGUHFDOOLQJ)RGRU¶VODQJXDJHRIWKRXJKWPHWDSKRUDWRNHQRID
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VHQWHQFH µM¶ FDQ EH LQ VRPHRQH¶V EHOLHI ER[ RU PDNH believe box. This 
different locaWLRQRIDWRNHQRIµM¶LQWZRGLIIHUHQWcognitive boxes is a way of 
UHSUHVHQWLQJ VSHDNHUV¶ GLIIHUHQW DWWLWXGHV WRZDUGV ZKDW WKH\ VD\ $ VHQWHQFH
VXFKDVZRXOGEHLQVSHDNHUV¶PDNHEHOLHYHER[ZKHUHDVDQGZRXOG
EHLQVSHDNHUV¶EHOLHIER[ 
Furthermore, we may contemplate the case in which speakers entertain 
different attitudes towards the very same sentence in different conversational 
contexts. Consider (6): 
6. Holmes is smarter than Poirot. 
A first case may be the one in which speakers are imagining something about 
&RQDQ'R\OH¶V+ROPHVDQG$JDWKD&KULVWLH¶V3RLURW,QWKDWFRQYHUVDWLRQRQH
would be pretending that there is an individual whom Conan Doyle wrote 
DERXWXVLQJWKHQDPHµ+ROPHV¶ZKRLVVPDUWWRDGHJUHHn, and that there is 
an individual ZKRP$JDWKD&KULVWLHZURWHDERXWXVLQJWKHQDPHµ3RLURW¶ZKR
is smart to a degree Q¶DQGLQGHSHQGHQWO\RIRQH¶VSUHWHQFHn > Q¶.  
Alternatively, an utterance of (6) may occur in a context in which one is talking 
DERXW&RQDQ'R\OH¶VDQG$JDWKD&KULVWLH¶s works. In this case, one is asserting 
WKDW LQ'R\OH¶V VWRULHV LW LV ILFWLRQDOO\ LPSOLHG WKDW µ[¶ LV VPDUW WR DGHJUHH n 
XVLQJWKHQDPHµ+ROPHV¶IRU[DQGLQ$JDWKD&KULVWLH¶VVWRULHVLWLVILFWLRQDOO\
LPSOLHGWKDWµ\¶LVVPDUWWRDGHJUHHQ¶ (using the QDPHµ3RLURW¶IRU\DQGn > 
Q¶.  
In the next session I will consider the answers that the pragmatic account put 
forward by Adams et al. provides to the problem of nonsense, problem of 
different cognitive values, problem of truth, problem of the proposition 
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believed; issues faced by any view which assumes the emptiness of fictional 
names and adopts a direct reference approach for names.  Moreover, I will 
discuss the respect with which scepticism has been raised towards assuming 
this theoretical stance. 
 
 2.3  Language and Thought  
As I showed previously, any theoretical proposal which endorses a directly 
referential account of names combined with the thesis that empty names are 
vacuous, encounters some problems concerning the connection between 
language and thought or the connection between language and reality. Such 
tension engenders what have been called the problem of nonsense, problem of 
different cognitive values, problem of truth, problem of the proposition 
believed and our interest in these puzzles pertains to the answers that a 
pragmatic account of fictional names, such as the one developed by Adams et 
al., can provide to them.     
The problem of nonsense, at least in part, concerns the relation between 
language and thought. In fact, considering its simplest version, if a fictional 
name is an empty term a sentence containing it would not express any 
SURSRVLWLRQ 6R WR XWWHU ³6KHUORFN +ROPHV LV D GHWHFWLYH´ LV WDQWDPRXQW WR
expressing nonsense insofar as no thought would be expressed. However, this 
is a strongly counterintuitive consequence given that such a sentence is clearly 
understandable and the question is then what it is and how we can account for 
the thought expressed by sentences containing fictional names. For Adams et 
al. the sentence would express the gappy proposition < x, being a detective>, 
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where x is a placeholder for a name. I have already expounded on the proposal 
of Adams et al. in the previous sections. I now aim to fathom the key notions 
employed in it in order to have a better idea of its strengths and weaknesses. 
7R WKLVSXUSRVH OHWXV WU\ WRSODFH WKHQRWLRQRI µJDSS\SrRSRVLWLRQ¶ZLWKLQD
broader understanding of the nature of propositions. Without any ambition to 
develop an overview or undertaking an exhaustive discussion on this complex 
topic, I think, however, it could be fruitful to have a closer look at the notion of 
µJDSS\SURSRVLWLRQ¶ZLWKRXW WDNLQJLWDVDJUDQWHGSULPLWLYHQRWLRQ:KDWLVD
gappy proposition? Where does this notion come from? How does it match the 
understaQGLQJDQGXVHRIWKHQRWLRQRI µSURSRVLWLRQ¶GHYHORSHGLQSKLORVRSK\
of language, linguistics and cognitive sciences? In the account developed by 
Adams et al. a gappy proposition is something that looks like a proposition but 
is not, given that it is incomplete.  
Recalling a Fregean definition of the predicate within a subject-predicate 
sentence, one may create a parallel between this and the notion of gappy 
proposition we have been dealing with so far. In fact, for Frege a subject-
predicate statement ³ >.] can be imagined to be split up into two parts; one 
complete in itself, and the other in need of supplementation, or unsaturated. [...] 
The second part is unsaturated ± it contains an empty place; only when this 
place is filled up with a proper name, or with an expression that replaces a 
SURSHUQDPHGRHVDFRPSOHWHVHQVHDSSHDU´60    
Notwithstanding the superficial similarities between the Fregean definition of 
WKH SUHGLFDWH FODXVH DQG WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ¶ PDQ\ GLIIHUHQFHV
                                                          
60
 Frege G. (1891) Function and Concept., in The Frege Reader, (1997) edited by Beaney M., 
ed. Oxford, MA: Blackwell Publisher, pg. 139. 
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may be found in the theoretical accounts on which such definitions rely. A 
whole dissertation could be written on what Frege meant in HPSOR\LQJµVHQVH¶
at the end of the above paragraph. I will rather, more purposefully in regard to 
this section, focus on the account of the nature of propositions developed from 
)UHJH¶V treatment of semantic composition as functional application within a 
metaphysics of possible worlds. Furthermore, I will compare the Fregean 
framework to what has been called a neo-Russellian approach. In fact the 
fundamental difference between the Fregean definition of a predicate clause 
YHUVXV WKH QRWLRQ RI µJDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQ¶ UHVLGHV LQ WKH GLVWLQFWLRQ EHWZHHQ
these two theoretical frameworks. In the possible world semantics, linguistic 
expressions are assigned extensions at possible worlds. Thus, for example, 
names, n-place predicates and sentences are assigned individuals, sets of n-
tuples of individuals, and truth values respectively, at different possible worlds. 
Thus names are associated with functions from possible worlds to individuals; 
n-place predicates with functions from possible worlds to sets of n-tuples; and 
sentences with functions from possible worlds to truth values. Such functions 
from possible worlds to extensions of the appropriate sort are also called 
LQWHQVLRQV RI WKH H[SUHVVLRQV LQ TXHVWLRQ 7KH ³FRPSOHWH VHQVH´ )UHJH
mentioned above has then been reinterpreted as the sentential intension, 
namely as a function from possible worlds to truth values that semanticists, 
working within this frDPHZRUNLGHQWLILHGZLWKWKHQRWLRQRIµSURSRVLWLRQ¶ 
The challenge to this semantic framework is raised as a convenient theoretical 
SLFWXUH UDWKHU WKDQ D SURSHU WKHRU\ LQ .DSODQ¶V ZRUN ,Q IDFW LQ
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Demonstratives61, Kaplan attributes to Russell the framework of structured 
proposition:  
³'RQ
WWKLQNRISURSRVLWLRQVDVVHWVRISRVVLEOHZRUOGVEXWUDWKHUDVVWUXFWXUHG
entities looking something like the sentences which express them. For each 
occurrence of a singular term in a sentence there will be a corresponding 
constituent in the proposition expressed. The constituent of the proposition 
determines, for each circumstance of evaluation, the object relevant to 
evaluating the proposition in that circumstance. In general the constituent of 
the proposition will be some sort of complex, constructed from various 
attributes by logical composition. But in the case of a singular term which is 
directly referential, the constituent of the proposition is just the object itself. 
Thus it is that it does not just turn out that the constituent determines the same 
object in every circumstance, the constituent (corresponding to a rigid 
GHVLJQDWRUMXVWLVWKHREMHFW7KHUHLVQRGHWHUPLQLQJWRGRDWDOO´62 
This account of structured propositions made the distinction between directly 
referential expressions and other expressions, rigid or not, more vivid. Directly 
referential expressions contribute their referents (in a context) to the 
propositions expressed (in that context) by the sentences containing them. Non-
directly referential expressions contribute some complexities that may or may 
not determine the same individual in all possible circumstances. The difference 
between a possible worlds semantics and an account of structured proposition 
becomes evident when comparing the analysis of a rigid definite description 
and directly referential expressions. On the one hand, a possible world 
                                                          
61
 Kaplan D. (1989). 
62
 Ibid., pg. 494. 
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VHPDQWLFV ZLOO GHOLYHU WKH VDPH VHPDQWLFV IRU D GHVFULSWLRQ VXFK DV ³7KH
VXFFHVVRURI´DQGWKHH[SUHVVLRQ³WKLV WDEOH´ WKLVEHLQJDFRQVWDQt function 
IURPSRVVLEOHZRUOGV WR WKHVDPHREMHFW µ¶DQG WKHREMHFW UHIHUUHG WR LQ WKH
context of utterance respectively. On the other hand, when propositions are 
thought of as structured entities, with individuals, properties and relations as 
constitueQWV D ULJLG GHILQLWH GHVFULSWLRQ VXFK DV ³7KH VXFFHVVRU RI ´ ZLOO
FRQWULEXWH WR WKH SURSRVLWLRQ D ORJLFDO FRPSOH[LW\ WKDW ZLOO GHVLJQDWH µ¶ LQ
HYHU\SRVVLEOHZRUOGZKHUHDVWKHH[SUHVVLRQ³WKLVWDEOH´ZLOOFRQWULEXWHWRWKH
proposition expressed (in that context) the object pointed out in that context. 
We can then see that a radical difference between the Fregean notion of 
predicate-FODXVHDQGWKHQRWLRQRIµJDSS\-SURSRVLWLRQ¶FDQEHIRXQGLQWKHWZR
different frameworks in which these notions reside. In the former, the semantic 
composition involves a self-independent notion of thought; in the latter, 
propositions as structured entities are symbolic representations which may 
subsume the objective world, as in the case of the directly referential 
expression63. 
Apart from suggesting the basic picture of what has been developed into a 
proper theory concerning structured propositions, Kaplan also gave some hints 
DERXWWKHLGHDRIDµJDSS\SURSRVLWLRQ¶.DSODQGRHVQRWGLVFDUGWKHLGHDRID
                                                          
63
 I think that it may be possible to stretch the comparison to a metaphysical level, between a 
possible worlds metaphysics and a Russellian metaphysics framed not only on particulars but 
also on facts)DFWVDUHH[SODLQHGDV³WKHNLQGRIWKLQJWKDWPDNHVDSURSRVLWLRQWUXHRUIDOVH
[...] is expressed by a whole sentence [...], that belongs the objective world. They are not 
FUHDWHGE\RXUWKRXJKWVRUEHOLHIV>@´VHH%5XVVHOOThe Philosophy of Logical Atomism, in 
Logic and Knowledge. Essay 1901-1950. edited by Marsh, R.C., (1956), pp. 182-185). In this 
picture a proposition is a symbol. Recalling this latter metaphysical background, the relation 
between language and thought may be understood as a symbolisation of objective facts. It may 
make sense then to see how an expression can contribute an object to the proposition expressed 
in a context in terms of directly anchoring the output of the symbolic representation of a fact to 
a specific object. This is also a way to offer an understanding of the notion of what has been 
called a singular proposition, or at least it is a way in which I can understand it. 
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proposition in which the object place can be unfilled. In fact, discussing the 
technical apparatus for a singular proposition, Kaplan opts for a singleton, a set 
containing a single member as the symbolic representation of the contribution 
RI D GLUHFWO\ UHIHUHQWLDO WHUP µ^...`¶ DV RSSRVHG WR D ORJLFDO FRPSOH[ IRU WKH
symbolization of the contribution of a definite description. Moreover, 
according to Kaplan :  
³ this technique can also be used to resolve another confusion in Russell. He 
argued that a sentence containing a non-denoting directly referential term (he 
would have called it a non-GHQRWLQJ µORJLFDOO\ SURSHU QDPH¶ ZRXOG EH
meaningless, presumably because the purported singular proposition would be 
incomplete. But the braces themselves can fill out the singular proposition, and 
if they contain nothing, no more anomalies need result than what the 
GHYHORSPHQWRI)UHH/RJLFKDVDOUHDG\LQXUHGXVWR´64   
It is likely that all the ideas and notions of gappy propositions originated from 
the above lines, although Kaplan himself never employed such a notion and in 
elaborating a formal semantics he worked within a possible world semantics 
framework.  
The challenge of the study of meaning in terms of formal representations can 
be seen as the attempt to equip philosophical studies with the same rigour and 
the purposefulness that has characterized the development of scientific 
VXEMHFWV$WWKHVDPHWLPHLWUHTXLUHGFRQVLGHULQJWKHQRWLRQRIµPHDQLQJ¶DQG
µWKRXJKW¶ DV H[WHUQDO WR WKHKXPDQPLQG WKURXJK V\PEROLF UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV LQ
the same way as in many scientific fields the rules governing different aspects 
                                                          
64
 See Kaplan D. (1989), fn. 23, pg 496. 
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of nature are represented formally in languages that adopt mathematical 
structures. A possible world semantics and a structured proposition approach 
are different apparatuses within a symbolic representation of meaning.  
Adams et al. adopt the latter approach, and they answer many of the problems 
raised to their solution by integrating their framework with a pragmatic 
element. The problem of different cognitive values also concerns the 
connection between language and thought; speakers seem to express different 
thoughts when uttering sentences containing different fictional names. 
However, according to the account developed by Adams et al., all these 
sentences express the same gappy proposition. Consider the following 
examples: 
7.  Superman is in love. 
8.  Clark Kent is in love. 
9.  Romeo is in love. 
There is a sense in which (7) and (8) express something similar while (9) does 
not. Although these sentences would all express the same gappy proposition < 
x, being-in-love >, Adams et al. account for the intuitive difference between 
them by having recourse to the information imparted on a pragmatic level. 
There are a few elements to take into consideration. What is pragmatically 
imparted will depend on the causal history, origin of the name and the lore 
associated with it. Every fictional name harks back to its introduction on behalf 
of the author, furthermore what is implied will depend on the way it is 
employed throughout the story. The author will use the name with the intention 
that her readers or hearers pretend that she is referring to someone or 
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something in employing that name. Using a different string of letters, the 
author of a story may intend her readers or hearers to pretend that she is 
referring to different individuals or make it explicit that in the fiction the same 
LQGLYLGXDOZLOOEHDUWZRGLIIHUHQWQDPHV7KHUHIRUHWKHXVHRIµ6XSHUPDQ¶ZLOO
DSSHDUZLWKLQDVHWRIVWRULHVZKHUHWKHVXSHUKHURLVFDOOHG³&ODUN.HQW´GXULQJ
his oUGLQDU\ OLIH DV D KXPDQ $GKHULQJ WR WKH DXWKRU¶V LQWHQWLRQV ZH ZLOO
DVVRFLDWH ZLWK WKH QDPH µ&ODUN .HQW¶ WKH GHVFULSWLRQV WKDW LQ WKH VWRU\ DUH
predicated of Superman and vice versa. It is, in fact, explicit that in the stories, 
Superman and Clark Kent are the same person. In this way we can justify the 
intuition that there is a sense in which (7) and (8) are about the same thing. 
These two fictional names are associated with the same lore, on the basis of 
their origin in the same stories and on what is fictionally asserted in them. 
&RQWUDULZLVHWKHWHUPµ5RPHR¶DSDUWIURPGLVSOD\LQJDGLIIHUHQWV\QWD[KDUNV
back to a different story where a different author fictionally asserts a 
completely different set of descriptions about Romeo. According to Adams et 
al., this difference is reflected in the pragmatically imparted content associated 
ZLWK µ5RPHR¶ LQ WKH XWWHUDQFH RI  DQG LV WKH UHDVRQ ZK\ ZH ZRXOG EH
inclined to say that there is a sense in which (7) and (8) seem to express 
something similar in contrast to (9), rather than saying that they express gappy 
propositions. 
But are there any criteria for discerning which part of the lore is associated 
with a fictional name? This may correspond to what is predicated in the story 
about the fictional persona, but may it also include speculations made by 
appreciators or critics about a certain character? As we saw above, Sherlock 
Holmes may be seen as emblematic of an empiricist view, or we may easily 
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read analysis about how a certain character is representative of certain values. 
Are these comments about the character part of the lore  conveyed on a 
pragmatic level? And what would happen if speakers were to find themselves 
in the position of what Gareth Evans would have called incompetent speakers? 
Namely, they do not know anything about a possible background associated 
with a certain name. Consider the example in which Claire finds herself in a 
discussion about the Indian Sanskrit epic Mahabharata. She has grown up in a 
Western cultural background and she is not familiar with the topic. She lets her 
PLQG ZDQGHU DQG RQO\ RYHUKHDUV WKH QDPH µ6DW\DYDWL¶ PHQWLRQHG GXULQJ WKH
conversation without acquiring any of the lore which was spun during the 
FRQYHUVDWLRQ/DWHU&ODLUHRIIKDQGHGO\VD\V WRKHUIULHQG³6DW\DYDWLGRes not 
H[LVW´ LQ DQVZHU WR KHU IULHQG¶V FXULRVLW\ DERXW 6DW\DYDWL ,W PD\ VHHP WKDW
lacking any lore associated with the fictional name, Claire would not be able to 
SUDJPDWLFDOO\ LPSDUW DQ\ PHDQLQJ E\ HPSOR\LQJ WKH WHUP µ6DW\DYDWL¶
Therefore, as Anthony Everett points out, the pragmatic account developed by 
Adams et al. would not work in this case. 
Furthermore, we may consider that speakers may associate all sorts of 
descriptive content with a fictional name. For example, Claire may associate 
ZLWK µ6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ WKH GHVFULSWLRQ µWKH RQH WKDW LQ &RQDQ 'R\OH VWRULHV
ZULWHVVRPHGLDULHVDERXWKLVLQYHVWLJDWLYHHQWHUSULVHV¶DQGLQVD\LQJ³6KHUORFN
+ROPHV LV WKH QDUUDWRU RI &RQDQ 'R\OH¶V VWRULHV´ VKH PD\ EH SUDJPDWLFDOO\
LPSDUWLQJ WKDW µ,Q &RQDQ 'R\OH¶V VWRUies, the man who writes some diaries 
DERXWKLVLQYHVWLJDWLYHHQWHUSULVHVLVWKHQDUUDWRURIWKRVHVWRULHV¶ 
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The answer provided by Adams et al. to these two cases not only shows that 
they are not problematic in their account but also provide us with a better 
understanding of the notion of lore associated with fictional names.  In the case 
LQZKLFK&ODLUHLVDQLQFRPSHWHQWVSHDNHURIWKHXVHRIµ6DW\DYDWL¶ Adams et 
al. believe that ³ZKHQRQHDFTXLUHVDQDPHWR WKHEHVWRIRQH¶VDELOLWLHVRQH
keeps a file RISDUWLFXODUVZKHUHZKHQIURPZKRPRQHKHDUGWKHQDPH´65. If 
Claire knows the name of the person who was talking about Satyavati, let us 
VD\0DUN VKHPD\DVVRFLDWHZLWK WKH ILFWLRQDOQDPH WKHGHVFULSWLRQ µWKHRQH
0DUN ZDV WDONLQJ DERXW¶ 7herefore, according to Adams et al., in saying 
³6DW\DYDWLGRHVQRWH[LVW´VKHZRXOGKDYHSUDJPDWLFDOO\LPSDUWHGWKDWWKHUHLV
QR RQH QDPHG µ6DW\DYDWL¶ ZKRP 0DUN ZDV WDONLQJ DERXW ,Q WKH FDVH WKDW
&ODLUH GLGQ¶W NQRZ WKH QDPH RI WKH SHRSOH LQYROYHG LQ WKH FRQYHUVDWLRQ Vhe 
PD\PRUHJHQHUDOO\LPSO\WKDWWKHUHLVQRRQHQDPHGµ6DW\DYDWL¶DERXWZKRP
she was hearing, from whomever was speaking. 
Not only does it seem plausible to shrink the lore associated with a fictional 
name to a minimum of information provided by the context of utterance - 
when, where and from whom one heard the name - but it also seems possible to 
expand it to include any personal association made to the name, even if this 
does not correspond with what is actually the case.  
Consider the case of Claire belLHYLQJWKDWLQ'R\OH¶VVWRULHV6KHUORFN+ROPHV
writes diaries about his own detective enterprise. Let us also consider this case 
as an exemplification of the problem of the proposition believed apart from an 
example of how the lore can be inclusive of any personal association held with 
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 Adams, F., Dietrich, L. A (2004), pg. 131. 
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a fictional name in the account proposed by Adams et al. The problem of the 
proposition believed concerns the relation between language and thought. To 
put it simply, if a sentence containing a fictional name does not express any 
proposition, when a speaker expresses her belief by employing that sentence it 
is not clear what she is actually believing. Let us consider sentence (10): 
10.  &ODLUH EHOLHYHV WKDW LQ 'R\OH¶V VWRULHV 6KHUORFN +ROPHV ZULWHV
diaries about his detective enterprise. 
 8QGHUWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶LVDYDFXRXVWHUPWKHVHQWHQFH
(10a): 
10a.  ,Q 'R\OH¶V VWRULHV 6KHUORFN +ROPHV ZULWHV GLDULHV DERXW KLV
detective enterprise. 
would not express any proposition. According to Adams et al., in uttering (10a) 
we would be saying something false. In fact, the speaker is saying that Doyle, 
HPSOR\LQJ WKH QDPH µ6KHUORFN +ROPHV¶ ILFWLRQDOO\ DVVHUWV RU LPSOLHV WKH
unfilled proposition < x, writes diaries about his detective enterprises > where 
µ[¶LVDSODFHKolder for a name. Given that Doyle does not fictionally assert or 
imply such an unfilled proposition (10a), it is false. However, Claire may 
PDLQWDLQ LQKHU LGLRV\QFUDWLF ORUH WKHGHVFULSWLRQ µWKHRQHZKRZULWHVGLDULHV
DERXWKLVGHWHFWLYHHQWHUSULVHV¶LQDVVRFLDWLRQZLWKµ6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶DQGWKH
fact that pragmatically she can replace the fictional name with that description 
is what, according to Adams et al., allows her to believe (10a). For everyone 
else whose lore correctly includes what is fictionally asserted or implied in the 
'R\OH¶VVWRULHVa) is false. But this is not a problem for Adams et al. given 
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that, as is well known, someone may hold a false belief, for when we assess 
VRPHRQH¶VEHOLHIVZHFRQVLGHULQWHQVLRQDOFRQWH[WV 
Previously in this chapter I built a parallel between the notion of lore and a 
certain notion of sense intended as a cognitive and epistemic notion. Now, we 
may reach a broader understanding of the lore associated with a fictional name. 
This looks very different from the contextual operator F that David Lewis66 
used in order to make explicit, in the logical form, the context of evaluation of 
VHQWHQFHVDERXWILFWLRQ,QDVHQWHQFHVXFKDV³6KHUORFN+ROPHVZULWHVGLDULHV
DERXW KLV GHWHFWLYH HQWHUSULVH´ WKH ILFWLRQDO RSHUDWRU may be understood as 
LPSOLFLWDQGWKHVHQWHQFHFDQEHLQWHUSUHWHGDV³)M´LQWKHVDPHZD\WKDW³,Q
'R\OH¶VVWRULHV6KHUORFN+ROPHVZULWHVGLDULHVDERXWKLVGHWHFWLYHHQWHUSULVH´
would be. In comparison, firstly, the lore associated with a fictional name does 
not strictly correspond to the fictional context provided by the stories in which 
the fictional name appears. In fact, it seems adaptable to the knowledge that the 
speaker has of the use of the name including, for example, the criticism 
developed towards a certain character. Or, as we saw in the discussion of (10), 
the lore can go far beyond the fictional context even including some mistaken 
descriptive content. Secondly, the notion of lore becomes relevant on a 
pragmatic level within the communication process and in what Adams et al. 
GHYHORS WKHUH LV QR WUDFH RI LW LQ WKH VHQWHQFHV¶ ORJLFDO IRUP QRW HYHQ ZKHQ
being thought of as an unarticulated element (I will discuss later in more detail 
how the account of Adams et al. may be related to the contemporary debate on 
the pragmatics/semantics divide). 
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 See Lewis, D. (1978) Truth in fiction. In Philosophical Papers, vol.1, (1983) ed. New York, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
89 
 
Moreover, the notion of lore is very different from the proposal of Kendall 
Walton and Gareth Evans who suggest that speakers are engaged in a game of 
make-believe when they utter sentences containing fictional names. Their idea 
is that the meaning of a sentence containing a fictional name and the reference 
of this are secured by the speakers through being engaged in a certain attitude, 
namely they pretend that a fictional name refers to a certain individual67 and 
their utterance is part of a game of make-believe. This idea finds its logical 
UHSUHVHQWDWLRQ LQ µ3M¶ ZKHUH µ3¶ LV DQ RSHUDWRU WKDW PDUNV WKH VSHDNHUV¶
attitude and shifts the context of evaluation from the actual world to the 
intensional context LQGLYLGXDWHG E\ WKH ZRUOGV RI WKH VSHDNHUV¶ SUHWHQFH ,Q
FRQWUDVW WKH ORUH DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK D QDPH LV LQGHSHQGHQW RI WKH VSHDNHUV¶
attitudes; there will be a lore associated with the name employed, both in the 
case of speakers being engaged in a pretence or of speakers asserting a 
sentence about a work of art. Moreover, according to Adams et al., a lore is 
associated with fictional names as well as genuine proper names; there are no 
special mechanisms that are triggered whenever fictional names are employed. 
Although Adams et al. do not suggest it, the notion of lore can be assimilated 
to the idea of a shared informational space. I would like to suggest this 
interpretation to create an effective parallel with the physical space, the 
surroundings in which the conversation takes place. In fact, the environment in 
which the conversation takes place is a common background that can provide 
HOHPHQWVZKLFKPD\HQULFKRUFRPSOHWHWKHPHDQLQJRIVSHDNHUV¶XWWHUDQFHVRQ
a pragmatic level, or at times it may be the object of misperception 
                                                          
67
 Walton provides a more complex explanation of the reference of fictional names, working on 
each of the uses in which they can be employed. However, it is not pertinent to the purposes of 
this chapter, therefore I am not going into details here.   
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engendering false beliefs. In a similar way, a lore understood as an 
informational space may provide a shared background to the conversation 
which speakers can adopt to pragmatically impart a complete proposition 
whenever they express an incomplete one with a sentence containing a fictional 
name. The idea of a lore as informational space will certainly require 
discussion and it is in need of development. For the time being and from what 
is discussed in Adams et al., we may consider that the lore is part of the 
presuppositions that speakers take to be the common ground of the participants 
in the conversation68.  
As we saw in the previous example, the lore associated with a name can be 
very variable and can be expanded and shrunk without many regulations. 
Hence, Anthony Everett69 considers the case in which different speakers 
associate a different descriptive content to the fictional name in use, or the case 
when the same speaker associates with the same fictional names different 
descriptive contents at different times.  
For example, two speakers may associate a different descriptive content with 
WKH WHUP µ)DXVW¶ RU WKH VDPH VSHDNHU PD\ DVVRFLDWH D GLIIHUHQW GHVFULSWLYH
content with the name at different times. Speakers may associate different 
GHVFULSWLRQVZLWKµ)DXVW¶IRUH[DPSOHµGRFWRULQ*RHWKH¶VSOD\¶µVHGXFHURID
\RXQJ JLUO GHSLFWHG LQ *RHWKH¶V SOD\¶ µPDNHU RI D SDFW ZLWK WKH GHYLO IURP
*RHWKH¶VSOD\¶RUµSHUVRQLILFDWLRQRIHYLOLQ*RHWKH¶VSOD\¶, and so on. It may 
well happen then, that at different times a speaker may pragmatically impart a 
                                                          
68
 I am here adopting WKHQRWLRQRIµSUHVXSSRVLWLRQ¶DVLWLVGLVFXVVHGDQGHPSOR\HGLQ5 C. 
6WDOQDNHU6HH6WDOQDNHU³3UDJPDWLF3UHVXSSRVLWLRQ´DQG³$VVHUWLRQ´UHSULQWHGLQ6WDOQDNHU¶V
Content and Context, (1999). 
69
 See Everett, A. (2003). 
91 
 
GLIIHUHQWGHVFULSWLYHFRQWHQWZKHQHPSOR\LQJWKHILFWLRQDOQDPHµ)DXVW¶RUWKDW
in a conversation two speakers impart a different pragmatic implication when 
employing that term.  
It might be thougKWWKDWWKHGLIIHUHQWDVVRFLDWLRQVPDGHE\VSHDNHUVWRµ)DXVW¶
would lead to such different implications that there would be nothing in 
common implied in uttering the same sentence over different times or by 
different speakers. For example, would different descriptions associated to 
µ)DXVW¶LQWKHXWWHUDQFHRI³)DXVWGRHVQRWH[LVW´HQWDLOWKDWWKHUHLVQRWKLQJLQ
FRPPRQLPSOLHGLQWKHVSHDNHUV¶FURVV-temporal utterances or in the utterances 
of two different speakers? This is not the case according to Adams et al.; in 
fact, what is pragmatically imparted depends also on the causal history and 
origin of the name. 7KHIDFWWKDWWKHXVHRIµ)DXVW¶KDUNVEDFNWRWKHVDPHVWRU\
DQG ILQGV LWV RULJLQ LQ *RHWKH¶V VWRULHV JXDUDQWHHV WKDW ZKDW LV LPSOLHG LV
something DERXWWKHVDPHORUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµ)DXVW¶LQWKHVWRU\HYHQLIWKH
descriptions associated with the term on a particular occasion may vary in time 
and among speakers. What is pragmatically imparted would not be part of the 
VDPHORUHDVVRFLDWHGZLWKµ)DXVW¶HYHQLIVSHDNHUVHPSOR\HGWKHVDPHQDPH
HJµ)DXVW¶LQWKHFDVHLQZKLFKWKHRULJLQRIWKHQDPHFDQEHWUDFHGEDFNWR
different stories written by different authors with different intentions in the 
writing of the stories and who associate a different descriptive content with 
µ)DXVW¶  
According to Adams et al. the semantic content expressed by a sentence 
containing a fictional name is stable; for example, a different utterance of the 
VHQWHQFH ³)DXVW GRHV QRW H[LVW´ H[SUHVVHV WKH XQILOOHG SURSRVLWLRQ < _ , non-
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existence >. The concern about the seeming stability of content in utterances 
containing empty names across times and speakers does not show that the 
WKHRU\ LV LQFRUUHFW EXW UDWKHU ³FRUUHFWO\ SRLQWs to the flexible nature of the 
pragmatic dimension of language and thought (as opposed to the somewhat 
OHVVIOH[LEOHQDWXUHRIWKHVHPDQWLFGLPHQVLRQRIODQJXDJHDQGWKRXJKW´70  
How to discern what goes into pragmatics and what goes into semantics is part 
of a contemporary and animated debate in the philosophy of language. 
Different proposals reinterpret in different ways the pragmatics/semantics 
divide. There are theories that have no use for any kind of contextual 
information, not even indexicaOLW\DQGPDNH³ZKDWLVVDLG´WKHVDPHDV³OLWHUDO
meaniQJ´ 2WKHUV WKDW UHFRJQLVH, through contextually sensitive expressions, 
that pragmatic elements may affect the meaning expressed by sentences and 
may be traceable in the logical form. Finally, we may think of other radical 
ones, for example the one that ReFDQDWL FDOOV ³PHDQLQJ HOLPLQDWLYLVP´, in 
which ³ZKDWLVVDLG´LVHQWLUHO\DPDWWHURIFRQWH[WZLWKQRFRQWULEXWLRQRIWKH
³OLWHUDOPHDQLQJ´. 71 
Adams et al. do not enter into this debate; in their proposal there is a very clear 
distinction between the semantic content expressed, i.e. a gappy proposition 
that is neither true nor false, and the pragmatically imparted content associated 
with the fictional name. Fictional names do not seem to be context-sensitive 
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 See Adams et al. (2004), pg. 136. 
71
 Consider the literature on different expressions that have received a contextualist analysis: 
SHUVRQDO SURQRXQV LQ WKHLU YDULRXV JUDPPDWLFDO IRUPV GHPRQVWUDWLYHV WKH DGYHUEV µKHUH¶
µWKHUH¶ µQRZ¶ µWRGD\¶  \HVWHUGD\¶ µWRPRUURZ¶ µ   DJR¶ µKHQFHIRUWK¶ WKH DGMHFWLYHV
µDFWXDO¶DQGµSUHVHQW¶WHQVHDQGDVSHFWLQGLFDWRUVJHQHUDOO\FRPPRQQRXQVOLNHµHQHP\¶DQG
µIRUHLJQHU¶ DQG DGMHFWLYHV OLNH µIRUHLJQ¶ DQG µLPSRUWHG¶ 0RUHRYHU µHYHU\¶ FRQWH[WXDO
TXDQWLILHU GRPDLQ UHVWULFWLRQ µNQRZ¶ FRQWH[WXDO VWDQGDUGV RI NQRZOHGJH RU µKDSS\¶
(contextual comparison class). For an introduction to this debate see Cappelen H. & Lepore E. 
(2005), Predelli S. (2005), Recanati, F. (1993), Stanley, J. (2007). 
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expressions; in fact the variation of lore associated with them is related to the 
VSHDNHU¶VNQRZOHGJHDERXWWKHXVHRIWKHQDPH- it is not, in itself, variable in 
relation to different contexts. However, the debate on the semantics/pragmatics 
divide may lead Adams et al. to a revision of their theory. For the time being, 
in their proposal, there may always be a minimum of information that can be 
pragmatically imparted when employing a fictional QDPH HJ ³WKH RQH P\
LQWHUORFXWRU LV WDONLQJ DERXW´ HQJHQGHULQJ WKH IHHOLQJ WKDW D FRPSOHWH
proposition has been expressed whereas what has been said is an incomplete 
one.    
 
2.4  Language and Reality 
The problem of truth concerns the relation between language and reality, for 
the truth or falsehood of a proposition establishes the connection between what 
is saLGDQGKRZWKHIDFWVDUH$VHQWHQFH¶VWUXWKYDOXHVDUHGHULYDWLYHIURPWKH
truth values of the proposition expressed; however, according to the account 
endorsed by Adams et al., a sentence containing a fictional name expresses a 
gappy proposition and a gappy proposition, in their view, is neither true nor 
IDOVH7KHUHIRUHZHDUHOHGWRWKHFRQFOXVLRQWKDWVHQWHQFHVVXFKDV³6KHUORFN
+ROPHVLVDGHWHFWLYH´RU³6KHUORFN+ROPHVGRHVQRWH[LVW´DUHQHLWKHUWUXHQRU
false, although we have strong intuitions about their truth.  
According to Adams et al. our intuitions are misleading. In fact, speakers 
associate with a fictional name a lore and pragmatically employ this lore to 
implicate a proposition that is true. The gappy proposition is replaced with 
pragmatically imparted propositions, eJ ³WKH GHWHFWLYH &RQDQ 'R\OH writes 
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DERXW LV D GHWHFWLYH´ RU ³WKH GHWHFWLYH &RQDQ 'R\OH writes about does not 
H[LVW´7KH WUXWKRI WKH SUDJPDWLFDOO\ LPSDUWHG FRQWHQWPLVOHDGs us such that 
we consider the semantic content expressed by sentences containing a fictional 
name to be true, when in fact they express gappy propositions that are truth 
valueless.  
Everett72 puts forward an argument against this solution that, if correct, would 
undermine the entire account developed by Adams et al.  Consider the 
following example: 
11.  Superman is identical to John Perry. 
According to Everett (11) is necessarily false; there are no possible worlds in 
which John Perry is Superman. In contrast, the modal profile of the descriptive 
claim that, according to Everett (11) pragmatically conveys, differs from the 
modal profile of (11). Consider (11a): 
11a.  The superhero who flies over the city saving lives in danger is 
identical to John Perry. 
The proposition expressed by (11a) is contingently false; we can imagine 
possible worlds where John Perry is a superhero who flies over the city to save 
HQGDQJHUHGOLYHV(YHUHWW¶VDUJXPHQWFDQEHRXWOLQHGDVIROORZ 
(a) The modal profile of (11) cannot be accounted for by appealing to 
the profile of the gappy proposition expressed by (11), in fact, this 
lacks truth values in every world. 
                                                          
72
 See Everett, A. (2003). Everett adopts the example ³6DQWDLVLGHQWLFDOWR-RKQ3HUU\´,DP
discussing his argument replacing the mythical name with a fictional name. 
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(b) The modal profile of (11) cannot be accounted for by appealing to 
the modal profile of (11a) the descriptive claim that (11) is taken to 
convey pragmatically. 
(c) The way of explaining our intuitions concerning the modal profile 
of a sentence should conform to the way we explain our intuitions 
concerning its propositional content and actual truth value. 
Therefore, 
(d) If we cannot explain our intuitions about the modal profile of (11) 
in terms of the descriptive claim that (11) is taken to convey 
pragmatically, then we should not rely on the descriptive content 
conveyed pragmatically to explain our intuitions about the 
VHQWHQFH¶VSURSRVLWLRQDOFRQWHQWDQGWUXWKYDOXH 
(e) In conclusion, an account that explains the intuitions about the truth 
values of sentences containing fictional names by resorting to the 
pragmatically conveyed descriptive content is incorrect.  
 Adams et al. reply to this argument rejecting (c). In fact, they argue that in 
general the intuitions concerning the modal profile of a sentence come from the 
VHQWHQFH¶VORJLFDOIRUPZKHUHDVWKHLQWXLWLRQVRIWUXWKRUIDOVHKRRGFRPHIURP
the facts evaluated. For what concerns (11), the intuition of necessity comes 
from the logical form of the expression that can be reduced to the sentence 
schema µD D¶ZKLFKLVQHFHVVDULO\WUXH,IZHFRQVLGHUWKHYDULDWLRQµD E¶
WKLVZLOOEHQHFHVVDULO\ WUXHRUQHFHVVDULO\ IDOVHGHSHQGLQJRQ WKH µD¶DQG µE¶
referents. (11) can be formalised in WHUPVRI µD E¶DQG  LVQHFHVVDULO\ IDOVH
JLYHQ WKDW µD¶ DQG µE¶ KDYH GLIIHUHQW UHIHUHQWV ,W LV QRW VXUSULVLQJ WKDW ZH
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cannot explain the modal intuitions we maintain for (11) through the modal 
intuitions we have about (11a) ± which is, according to Everett, the descriptive 
claim for (11). In conclusion, the explanation of the intuitions of the truth 
values of sentences containing fictional names employing the descriptive claim 
that they are supposed to convey is not proven wrong by the fact that the 
intuitions of the modal profile of such sentences cannot be explained by the 
modal intuitions about the descriptive claim they are taken to convey 
pragmatically. The reason for this is that the intuitions of truth come from the 
evaluations of facts, whereas the intuitions concerning the modal profile come 
from the logical form of the sentence. 
In my opinion the argument put forward by Everett does not show that the 
account developed by Adams et al. is incorrect. I also believe that the reply to 
his argument can be better articulated than the one provided by Adams et al.; 
moreover, GLVFXVVLQJ WKH GLIIHUHQW UHDVRQV ZK\ (YHUHWW¶V DUJXPHQW LV QRW D
definitive one may be a chance to reach a deeper understanding of the 
reference of fictional names.  
I will discuss a few points RI(YHUHWW¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWVHHP to me controversial.  
In doing so, I am going to introduce and take for granted two notions which are 
µtruth in fiction¶ and µstory-worldV¶)XUWKHUPRUH, I will make four simplifying 
assumptions in discussing (11). First, I will assume that Superman stories, from 
the first story which ever appeared in 1938 to the contemporary adaptations, 
are parts of a single comprehensive story, which adopt different media ± 
comics, movies, books ± but which all concern the same fictional character. 
Second, that the whole of 6XSHUPDQ¶VVWRU\LVDFRQVLVWHQWRQHand is therefore 
97 
 
ontologically presentable through the set of the story-worlds ± possible worlds 
where everything that is true in the stories is true. Third, that Superman is the 
RQO\ ILFWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU LQ WKH ZRUN )RXUWK WKDW WKH VWRULHV¶ FRQWHQWs are 
entirely devoted to telling us things about Superman. 73  
The utterance of (11) is susceptible to two interpretations. We can imagine a 
context of utterance in which the speaNHUV¶ XWWHUDQFH LPSOLHV the implicit 
RSHUDWRU³,QWKHILFWLRQ´DQGFDQEHPDGHH[SOLFLWDVE 
11b.  ,Q6XSHUPDQ¶VVWRULHV6XSHUPDQLVLGHQWLFDOWR-RKQ3HUU\ 
or a different context in which there is no such implication. (11b) and (11) will 
be assessed differently, the context of evaluation of the former will consist of 
the set of the story-worlds ± those possible worlds in which everything true in 
the stories is true ± whilst the context of evaluation of the latter will correspond 
to the actual world. Story-worlds are not worlds in which only things true in 
the story are true, because stories leave much undetermined, therefore they 
differ in various ways from one another. For example, in our imaginative 
engagement to the work we are invited to pretend that there is an individual 
called Superman that does all the things Superman is said to do in the story; 
however, a different individual may be picked out in each story-world as long 
as the one designated satisfies the qualitative conditions predicated of 
Superman in the story. It follows that if w1 and w2 are story-worlds, 
³6XSHUPDQ´GHVLJQDWHVWKHLQGLYLGXDO$LQZ1 and the individual B in w2.  
                                                          
73
 The notion of truth in fiction, story-worlds, the idea that a set of different stories can be 
treated as a unique, broader story about the same fictional character and the representation of 
the story adopting possible worlds can be put under discussion. I postpone a deeper analysis of 
these notions to a different time when I will develop a study of fictional contexts. Although the 
third and fourth assumptions are not realistic they allow us to avoid complication in the 
exposition while not affecting the point I shall be making.   
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The ambiguity of the utterance of (11) resides in the fact that we may be 
talking within the scope of the set of the story-worlds or we may not. To 
represent this ambiguity I will adopt a two-dimensional semantic framework.74 
In w1, this being a story-ZRUOG³6XSHUPDQ´VHUYHVDVD ULJLGGHVLJQDWRU LW LV
WKHQSRVVLEOHWRUHSUHVHQWWKHLQWHQVLRQRI³6XSHUPDQ´LQ the following way: 
  w1 w2 w3 
w1 A A A  
w1 appears twice, on the left in its role of world of utterance and above in its 
role as world of evaluation. Being employed as a rigid designator in w1, 
³6XSHUPDQ´ ZLOO GHVLJQDWH A in all worlds, irrespective of whether the other 
worlds are story-worlds or not. Let us assume now that w2 is a story-world and 
w3 is the actual world, we can construct the two dimensional concept K for 
³6XSHUPDQ´DVIROORZs:              
K            w1 w2 w3 
                     w1  A A  A 
                   w2           B B  B 
                   w3  x  x  x 
HHUH³[´LQGLFDWHVQRYDOXH ,QOLQHZLWKWKe proposal advanced by Adams et 
DO ³6XSHUPDQ´ LV XVHG DV D ULJLG GHVLJQDWRU LQ DOO WKHVH ZRUOGV KHQFH LQ
relation to each world of utterance there is uniformity of designation in each 
                                                          
74
 This framework has been clearly stated by Robert Stalnaker in a classic paper called 
³$VVHUWLRQ´ *UHJRU\ &XUULH HPSOR\V WKLV IUDPHZRUN LQ D SDSHU FDOOHG ³&KDUDFWHUV DQG
&RQWLQJHQF\´  GLVFXVVLQJ WKH PRGDO SURILOH RI VHQWHQFHV FRQWDLQLQJ ILFWLRQDO QDPHV
such as: (i) Necessarily, someone who did not fall for Vronsky would not be Anna Karenina; 
(ii) Someone who QHFHVVDULO\IHOOIRU9URQVN\ZRXOGQRWEH$QQD.DUHQLQD$OWKRXJK,GRQ¶W
discuss here the interesting analysis developed by Currie in his paper, I borrow from it the idea 
of employing a two-dimensional semantic to discuss (11) and the reference of fictional names 
in general. 
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ZRUOGRIHYDOXDWLRQVRLQURZ³6XSHUPDQ´XQLIRUPO\GHVLJQDWHV$LQURZ
it uniformly designates B and in row 3 it uniformly fails to pick out any 
individual at all. The difference between row 1 and 2 reveals the fact that, as 
employed in different story-ZRUOGV ³6XSHUPDQ´ PD\ Gesignate different 
individuals. In fact, A and B may differ from each other for what concerns all 
the attributes not specified in the story.  
Everett claims that the utterance of (11) expresses a necessarily false 
proposition. However, constructing a two dimensional concept for (11) I will 
VKRZWKDW(YHUHWW¶VLQWXLWLRQVZRXOGEHFRUUHFWRQO\LQ WKHFDVHZKHUHLV
LQWHUSUHWHG DV ³,Q WKH ILFWLRQ 6XSHUPDQ LV LGHQWLFDO WR -RKQ 3HUU\´ In fact, 
considering the different interpretations of (11), this is not false in every 
possible world. For example, (11) expresses a truth-valueless gappy 
proposition, selecting the actual world w3. /HW XV FRQVLGHU .¶ DV WKH WZR
dimensional concept for (11): 
.¶ w1 w2 w3 
 w1 F F F 
 w2 F F F 
 w3 x x x 
Maintaining the assumption held by Adams et al. that fictional names are 
proper names although unfilled, (11) as uttered in w1 and w2 is false in every 
possible world of evaluation. w1 and w2 are story-worlds, in these worlds we 
DUH LQWHUSUHWLQJ  DV LPSOLFLWO\ WDQWDPRXQW WR ³,Q WKH ILFWLRQ 6XSHUPDQ LV
LGHQWLFDO WR -RKQ 3HUU\´ Z3 is the actual world and given that in the actual 
ZRUOG³6XSHUPDQ´GRHVQRWSLFNRXWDQ\LQGLYLGXDODVXWWHUHGLQZ3, will 
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lack any truth value. The proposition expressed by (11) is therefore not false 
for every possible world, but is rather, either false or truth-valueless.  
A second FODLPLQ(YHUHWW¶VDUJXPHQWWKDWLVFRQWURYHUVLDOLVKLVLQWHUSUHWDWLRQ
of (11a) as the alleged descriptive content pragmatically conveyed by the 
utterance of (11).  
11.        Superman is identical to John Perry. 
11a.    The superhero who flies over the city saving lives in danger is 
identical to John Perry. 
In accordance with the framework put forward by Adams et al., ³6XSHUPDQ´
DQG³WKHVXSHUKHURZKRIOLHVRYHUWKHFLW\VDYLQJHQGDQJHUHGOLYHV´KDYHYHUy 
different semantic properties; the former being a proper name, the latter a 
definitive description. Therefore, the former will be treated as a rigid 
designator which designates the same individual in any possible world, if any; 
the latter will pick out the individual who in each world bears the properties 
expressed in the description. For this reason (11) and (11a) will have a different 
modal profile and, on this basis, Everett argues that the modal profile of (11) 
cannot be accounted for by appealing to the modal profile of (11a). However, 
the way in which Adams et al. render the descriptive content pragmatically 
conveyed by a sentence containing a fictional name includes an important 
HOHPHQW WKDW LV PLVVLQJ IURP (YHUHWW¶V UHQGHULQJ RI LW &RQVLGHU RQH RI WKe 
examples employed by Adams et al.: 
12.  Pegasus flies. 
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According to Adams et al., when one utters (12), although literally expressing 
the gappy proposition < __ , flies >, one pragmatically implies a full 
proposition, for example: 
12a.  The winged horse of Greek mythology flies. 
(12a LQFOXGHV WKH VSHFLILFDWLRQ WR WKH RULJLQ RI WKH QDPH ³RI *UHHN
P\WKRORJ\´7KHUHOHYDQWGHVFULSWLYHFRQWHQt is the one concerning the myth, 
and the description will designate an individual in the worlds where the myth is 
true, otherwise it will not pick out any individual. Taking into account this 
element we may consider that (11c) is more coherent to the proposal advanced 
by Adams et al. in rendering the content implied by (11) than (11a) is. 
11c. The superhero who flies over the city saving lives in danger in the 
Superhero stories is identical to John Perry.75 
(11c) will be false in all the story-worlds where what is said to happen in 
Superman stories is true. In all the other worlds (11c) lacks a true value. 
Therefore, in answer to the argument put forward by Everett, the proposition 
expressed replacing the fictional name with descriptive content pragmatically 
implied has the same modal profile of the proposition expressed by the 
VHQWHQFHFRQWDLQLQJWKHILFWLRQDOQDPH,QFRQFOXVLRQ(YHUHWW¶VDUJXPHQWGRHV
not show that the framework developed by Adams et al. is incorrect.  
                                                          
75
 ,DPXVLQJWKHH[SUHVVLRQ³,QWKHVXSHUKHURVWRULHV´LQWHQGHGDVDJHQUHWRLQFOXGHDOO WKH
different stories and adaptations involving Superman as a character. Remember that I am 
building my argument under the simplifying assumption that all the different stories and 
adaptations in the various media concerning Superman pertain to the same character. I am 
discussing this example as I would discuss simpler examples, as, for instance, one concerning 
Anna Karenina that appears in a Tolstoy¶VQRYHODQGZRXOGQRWEULQJDQ\FRPSOLFDWLRQDERXW
whether different appearances are ones of the same character or not. 
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This framework developed by Adams et al. does present some explanatory 
strengths in respect to other frameworks that adopt the notion of gappy 
proposition as central to the understanding of sentences containing fictional 
names. For example, this framework would be able to provide an 
understanding of sentences that were putting strain on a proposal such as the 
one advanced by David Braun. Consider (13): 
13.        Superman is Clark Kent. 
The utterance of (13) literally expresses the gappy proposition < __ , 
identity,__ >; however, one uttering (13) pragmatically implies something 
along the lines of (13a): 
(13a)    The superhero who flies over the city saving lives in danger in the 
Superhero stories is the disguised superhero who works as a 
reporter for the Daily Planet in those very Superhero stories. 
:KHQ LQWHUSUHWHG DV LPSOLFLWO\ KDYLQJ WKH SUHIL[ ³,Q WKH ILFWLRQ´  LV
evaluated in the story-worlds where those Superhero stories are true and in 
WKRVHZRUOGVRIHYDOXDWLRQLVWUXH:KHQLQWHUSUHWHGZLWKRXWWKHSUHIL[³,Q
WKHILFWLRQ´3) expresses the above gappy proposition that is neither true nor 
false. In this latter case speaker intuitions that (13) is true is explained through 
the proposition expressing the pragmatic implications that I have simplified in 
(13a). 
 In my opinion the DQVZHUSURYLGHG WR(YHUHWW¶V REMHFWLRQ LV VDWLVIDFWRU\ DQG
the framework developed by Adams et al. provides an explanation for cases 
WKDWDUHSUREOHPDWLFIRURWKHUDFFRXQWVVXFKDV%UDXQ¶VRQH1RWZLWKVWDQGLQJ
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I find that there is still one case in which analysis would be problematic if 
adopting the proposal advanced by Adams and al. Consider (14): 
14.          Sherlock Holmes was created by Conan Doyle. 
Although we have strong intuitions about the truth of (14), when interpreted as 
implicitly prefixed b\ ³,Q WKH ILFWLRQ´  ZRXOG EH IDOVH JLYHQ WKDW LQ
'R\OH¶V VWRULHV 6KHUORFN +ROPHV LV QRW FUHDWHG E\ DQ\RQH :KHQ LQWHUSUHWHG
without any prefix (14) expresses the gappy proposition < __ , being created by 
Conan Doyle >, which is neither true nor false. When understood as 
pragmatically implicating a proposition in which the fictional name is replaced 
by a descriptive content associated with it, (14) may be understood as implying 
(14a):  
14a.  The detective who smokes the pipe and lives in Baker street in 
'R\OH¶VVWRULHVZDVFUHDWHG by Conan Doyle. 
The definite description in (14a) which replaces the fictional name in (14) 
picks out an individual in the story-ZRUOGVLGHQWLILDEOHZLWK'R\OH¶VVWRULHVDQG
otherwise lacks a designatum. In the story-worlds identifiable in 'R\OH¶V
stories, the detective who smokes the pipe and lives in Baker street does not 
EHDU WKH SURSHUW\ RI µEHLQJ FUHDWHG E\ &RQDQ 'R\OH¶ WKHUHIRUH ZH FDQnot 
account for the intuitions of the truth of (14) by appealing to the alleged 
pragmatic implications conveyed by it.  
The fact that this last case falls outside the explanatory abilities of the 
framework developed by Adams et al. may not mean that the overall proposal 
is incorrect; however, if left unanswered it would, at least, cast doubts on this 
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account in terms of it being an unitary account for the meaning of fictional 
names. 
 
Conclusion 
The work developed provides many answers to the many problems faced by 
%UDXQ¶VSURSRVDO7KHVWXG\RIWKHLUIUDPHZRUNOHDGVWRJHQHUDOSKLORVRSKLFDO
qXHVWLRQV7KHVHFRQFHUQ WKHQDWXUHRI µJDSS\SURSRVLWLRQV¶DVDTXHVWLRQIRU
the metaphysics of propositions. I had the opportunity to address this point 
comparing a possible worlds semantics with a semantics which employs the 
notion of structured propositions that is the only notion of proposition that 
would be able to be considered as DQXQILOOHGVWUXFWXUHRUµJDSS\SURSRVLWLRQ¶.  
Moreover, the idea that the incomplete semantic content is completed on a 
pragmatic level within the conversation may lead them to revise their 
framework by taking into account the contemporary debate about the 
semantics/pragmatics divide. For the time being there is a clear distinction 
between the semantic content expressed by a sentence containing fictional 
names, which correspond to a truth-valueless gappy proposition, and what is 
communicated on a pragmatic level by replacing the fictional name with the 
lore associated with it. However, it may be interesting to wonder how the 
framework elaborated by Adams et al. may take into account the proposal that 
the pragmatic contribution may enrich the semantic content and therefore 
affects its truth values. 
Finally, as I noted in the last section of this chapter, our intuitions about a 
VHQWHQFHVXFKDV³6Kerlock Holmes was created by CoQDQ'R\OH´ZRXOGQRWEH
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explained by considering the pragmatically imparted content in the 
conversation. Examples of this type, even if they would not show that the 
proposal put forward by Adams et al. is incorrect, cast doubts on the main aim 
of their work, namely providing a unitary account for vacuous names.   
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PART 3 
 
³,I'RQDOd Duck is anything he is a duck (a talking duck); not an invention or a 
FXOWXUDODUWHIDFW6RPHFRQFHSWVPD\EH³HPSW\´WKHFRQFHSWRI'RQDOG'XFN
(if there is such a thing) is one of them. But Donald Duck himself is not a 
FRQFHSW´ 
K. Walton (2000) 
 
Introduction 
:KDWLVµPDNH-EHOLHYH¶":K\DQGKRZGRHVWKLVQRWLRQEHFRPHFHQWUDOLQWKH
discussion of the reference of fictional names? These are some of the questions 
I will broach in the following sections.  As we saw in the previous chapters, the 
case of fictional names, within the broader category of empty names, raises 
interesting puzzles in the understanding of the relations between Language and 
Thought and between Language and Reality. As we said, if when we think we 
think of something and when we use a name we name something, the 
contrasting intuitions about the reference of fictional names are at the origin of 
ontological and semantic debates pertaining to the existence or the reference to 
fictional characters rather than to the employment of terms which lack a 
referent. According to some philosophers though, such as Gareth Evans and 
Kendall Walton, debating on an alleged ontological puzzle on the basis of 
those contrasting intuitions means to overlook an important and crucial element 
in the understanding of fictional names. Fictional names are employed in 
fiction and our understanding of their function requires an understanding of 
what fiction is and of tKHQDWXUHRI WKH DSSUHFLDWRUV¶HQJDJHPHQW LQ WKHP ,Q
the most general terms I will talk of fiction employing examples of works of 
representational art and as such I will define them as artefacts shaped with the 
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intention of representing something. AppreciDWRUV¶HQJDJHPHQWLQZRUNVRIDUW
KDV EHHQ XQGHUVWRRG LQ :DOWRQ¶V ZRUN DV SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ D JDPH RI PDNH-
believe in which the work of art serves as a prop.  
%RWK LQ(YDQV¶DQG:DOWRQ¶VZRUNVSHDNHUV¶HPSOR\PHQWRI ILFWLRQDOQDPHV
outside the fiction is understood as a sort of participation in a game of make-
believe, either as an extension of the game in which speakers were involved in 
the appreciation of the work of art or as a different type of pretence76.  
In the discussion of this approach to the puzzle of fictional names, it seems 
then essential to have a proper understanding of what Walton intends for make-
believe and for participation in a game of make-believe. Furthermore, these 
topics go hand in hand with a general understanding of the nature of works of 
representational art; here not including the aesthetic value of the work, but 
rather its constitutive elements and how these contribute to its intended 
function to serve as a prop in a game of make-believe. Drawing an overview on 
the nature of a work of representational art may lead us to consider that 
different art forms have their own specificity and a differentiated analysis may 
be required dependent upon whether we are talking of a painting, a narrative or 
a piece of music. I have then chosen narratives as an exemplification and I will 
draw, in the following sections, an outline of the constitutive elements of 
narratives combined with an overview of the notion of make-believe and 
:DOWRQ¶VDFFRXQWRQSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQDJDPHRIPDNH-believe.  
 
                                                          
76
 The type of pretence will depend on the type of sentence, I will discuss this point in detail 
SUHVHQWLQJ:DOWRQ¶VSURSRVDO 
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This background being provided, we have what Evans and Walton would 
consider the essential elements with which to discuss the case of fictional 
QDPHV 7KHUHE\ :DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO PRYHV WKH IRFXV RQWR VRPH HOHPHQWV
belonging to our aesthetic experience and onto how these elements can be 
central for the discussion of the reference of fictional names. To hail the 
problem as the ontological problem is, for Walton, the wrong approach. In his 
view, the puzzles posed by fictional names are ones which pertain to the 
understanding of make-believe and our participation in pretence.  
*HQHUDOO\ VHPDQWLFLVWV ILQG :DOWRQ¶V VROXWLRQV XQFOHDU RU WKH\ FRQVLGHU WKH
XVHRI WKHQRWLRQRI µPDNH-EHOLHYH¶XQQHFHVVDU\7KLV LV QRW VXUSULVLQJ LIZH
FRQVLGHUWKDW:DOWRQ¶VSURSRVDOLVQRWD semantic one. In fact, Walton offers a 
very straightforward answer to the semantic puzzle: sentences containing 
fictional names do not express any proposition. The problem does not reside in 
the semantic analysis we can provide of these sentences but in the cognitive 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI VSHDNHUV¶ DWWLWXGHV LQXWWHULQJ VHQWHQFHV FRQWDLQLQJ ILFWLRQDO
names. 
,QFRQFOXVLRQ:DOWRQ¶VSURSRVDOVHHPVWRSRLQWWRZDUGDGLIIHUHQWGLUHFWLRQRI
research in facing this problem, shifting it from a semantic to a cognitive 
GRPDLQ$OWKRXJKLQGRLQJVRµPDNH-EHOLHYH¶FRXOGEHDGRSWHGDVDSULPLWLYH
notion, I believe, a deeper and more articulated understanding of what the 
experience of make-believe involves would strengthen the explanatory quality 
of this proposal and may help to solve the complications that we will meet in 
VWXG\LQJ:DOWRQ¶VVROXWLRQVFDVHE\FDVH 
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3.1   Fictionality and the Imagination  
Imaginations take different forms and may develop in different ways. 
Imaginings can be spontaneous or deliberate, can consist of occurent or non-
occurent mental events and our imaginative activities can be solitary rather 
than social. Consider for example Claire's imaginings triggered by some shade 
in the trees which resembles, to her eyes, the face of an Asiatic man she saw 
WKH HYHQLQJ EHIRUH LQ D 0DQJD LQ WKLV FDVH &ODLUH¶V LPDJLQLQJV DUH
spontaneous. In contrast, let us suppose that Claire could not go out on the river 
and, as she is waiting onshore in front of her boathouse for her rowing mates, 
she imagines her ideal rowing session. She is imagining herself in her favourite 
boat delivering perfect strokes one after another, leaving on the water the 
recognisable circle of her rowing and passing by the boathouse looking as if 
she were sliding on the water. In this case her imagining is deliberate and 
consists of the occurrent mental event of rowing in a certain boat but also of 
other non-occurrent ones; while she is imagining rowing in a certain boat she is 
also implicitly imagining being on a very flat water in a lovely sunny warm 
morning without wind. Walton would loosely define these thoughts as part of 
KHU³PHQWDOIXUQLWXUH´GXULQJWKHGD\GUHDP77 Moreover, consider the scenario 
in which Claire and her rowing mate are working on the rowing technique, 
training indoors on the rowing machine (also called erg). They make-believe 
that the rowing machine is their boat and that they are on the water. They both 
imagine their pushing on the erg to be their delivering the strokes on the water, 
their controlling the slide to be controlling the seat while the boat is running on 
the water, their raising the handle of the erg to be their raising the handles of 
                                                          
77
 See Walton, K. (1990), pg. 17. 
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WKHEODGHVIRU WKH³FDWFK´7KH\LPDJLQHWKLV WRJHWKHUEHFDXVHWKH\DUHLQ WKH
same boat and everything must be done in synchrony. This case is an example 
of a social rather than a solitary imaginative activity.  
There are studies that show how our abilities to participate in imaginary 
activities and the kind of imagination we participate in evolve as we grow up. 
In Dorothy DQG-HURPH6LQJHU¶VZRUN78 a thorough account is provided on how 
imagination develops from our first months as infants to our time as 
adolescents. It is interesting to note that for each phase of their early years 
children may experience a solitary and a social play. However, according to the 
Singers, within the first two years the child seems happy in her private playful 
world, exploring the environment around herself, toddling around, tasting the 
most attractive object she finds. Although she is happy to participate in games 
with her sister or an adult in this period she will mainly experience a solitary 
dimension of the game. From the 12th-WKPRQWKFKLOGUHQ¶VSOD\PD\DVVXPH
a symbolic character, for example the child can make-believe to feed her doll, 
or mimic the rumble of a car engine while playing with a toy truck, or put a 
teddy bear to bed. During their second year children acquire a broader social 
awareness and this becomes part of their games. In the second year social 
games become more frequent, children recognise the role of other children with 
whom they are playing, for example following each other in turn. It is from 
their third year that children start playing a collaborative game of make-
believe. They employ their social awareness in the game and choose and 
recognise each other¶V role, e.g. stipulating each other¶V part in the game: 
                                                          
78
 Singer, D. Singer J. (1992) The House of Make-%HOLHYH&KLOGUHQ¶V3OD\DQGWKH'eveloping 
Imagination. ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.  
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³/HW¶VVD\,DPWKHGRFWRUDQG\RXDUHWKHSDWLHQW´7Key are aware that each 
other is pretending within a game.   
 7KH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI FKLOGUHQ¶V JDPHs of make-believe is crucial for the 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI:DOWRQ¶VWKHRUHWLFDOZRUN/HWXVKLJKOLJKWWKHPDLQHOHPHQWV
of a game of make-believe with an example. Luc and Annabel are playing as 
SLUDWHV7KH\VWLSXODWHWKHLUJDPHH[SOLFLWO\³/HWXVEHSLUDWHVWKHVPDOOblue 
VRIDLVRXUERDWWKHZKLWHRQHLVWKHRQHZHZDQWWRERDUG´VD\V$QQDEHO³2N
EXWPLQGWKHOLWWOHERDWZLWKWKHEDFNXSWURRSVRYHUWKHUH´DGGV/XFSRLQWLQJDW
the armchair. One of the essential features of Luc and Annabel¶V game of 
make-believe is the use of props. In their game the blue sofa is a ship as well as 
the white one and the armchair. Luc and Annabel are themselves props in their 
game. They make-believe of themselves that they are pirate and that their 
attempt to move the blue sofa closer to the white sofa is, in the game, an 
attempt to board another ship - always keeping an eye on the backup troops. 
Their jumping from one sofa to the other one is, in their game, their jumping 
from one ship to the other one, hiding in the sofa checking the armchair is, in 
the game, hiding from and checking the backup troops.   
Annabel and Luc do not merely imagine five-masted ships, they imagine those 
two sofas to be five-masted ships. They do not imagine pirates boarding a ship, 
they imagine themselves being pirates and they imagine themselves boarding 
the ship jumping and fighting and hiding in the sofa. It is their doing certain 
things that is a prop for their imagining. Luc and Annabel imagining the blue 
sofa being a ship can be classified as an act of imagining de re, while their 
imagining of themselves as pirates and of their jumping from one sofa to the 
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other as boarding the other ship as an act of imagining de se - they themselves 
are objects of their imaginings. Walton suggests a classification slightly more 
articulated adding to the previous distinction the notion of imagining de se 
³IURPWKHLQVLGH´. The difference between an act of imagination de se and an 
act of imagination GHVH³IURPWKH LQVLGH´ resides in how we experience our 
imagining. Luc entertaining the imagining of himself being a pirate while in 
bed after the exciting playful afternoon, or Clare imagining herself rowing 
while onshore are acts of imagining de se; both Luc and Clare are objects of 
their own imaginative activities. However, Luc imagining he himself boarding 
the white ship or Clare imagining she herself rowing while practising on the 
rowing machine is an act of imagining GHVH³IURPWKHLQVLGH´. In these latter 
scenarios Luc and Clare are not entertaining an imagining of themselves but 
their imagination is prompted by their acting in a certain way, their rehearsing 
in reality what is true of them in the game of make-believe. Let us consider a 
schematic version of this classification.  
Acts of imaginings: 
Imagining De 
Re 
Imagining De Se Imagining De Se 
³)URPWKH,QVLGH´ 
Use of a specific 
prop in a game 
of make-believe. 
 
The sofa is the 
prop for a ship 
in Annabel and 
/XF¶V JDPH RI
make-believe. 
One uses oneself as 
prop in a game of 
make-believe. 
 
 
Clara entertains an 
imagining of herself 
rowing, while she is 
waiting onshore. 
One imagines 
behaving and acting in 
a certain way. 
 
 
Luc and Annabel 
imagine boarding a 
ship, jumping from 
one sofa to another. 
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What Annabel and Luc imagine is fictional but not everything that is fictional 
in $QQDEHODQG/XF¶VJDPHLVLPDJLQHGE\WKHP/HWXVVD\WKDWWKH\VWDUWWKH
game on the stipulation that the living room is the sea and any furniture is a 
ship or a boat in relation to its size. According to this principle of generation, it 
is fictional in their game that the china cabinet in the corner of the living room 
is a big ship, yet they are not imagining it ± fortunately for the family treasure. 
Thereby, sofas have the function to serve as props on the particular occasion of 
$QQDEHODQG/XF¶VJDPHeven if that is not their intended function. Given that 
sofas are pressed into service for a single game they are an exemplification of 
what Walton labels ad hoc props. In contrast with these types of props there 
are other ones that are designed to be such; for example, dolls or toy trucks 
were made specifically for the purpose of being used as props in games of 
FHUWDLQNLQGV'ROOVDUHLQWHQGHGWR³FRXQWDV´EDELHVDQGWR\WUXFNVDVWUXFNV
Certainly, there are indefinitely many games played by different appreciators 
on different occasions; however, in all of them the toy is used according to the 
function it was made to serve. Walton labels games of the kind in which a 
given prop has the function of serving in, authorized ones for it. Games of 
make-believe of the kind in which the prop does not serve the function it was 
made for, are instead labelled unofficial games. For example, Luc and Annabel 
make-believe to be young chemists and try to discover how long it takes plastic 
WRPHOWE\EXUQLQJ$QQDEHO¶VGROO. This would be an unofficial game in which 
there is a misuse of the doll, in the sense that the two children, as appreciators, 
ignore the kind of games the doll was made for. Furthermore, we shall 
complete the parallel between games of make-believe prompted by ad hoc 
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props and by toys and game of make-believe prompted by works of 
representational art.   
2QHRIWKHFRUHHOHPHQWVRI:DOWRQ¶VWKHRU\LVWKDWZRUNs of representational 
art are made with the purpose of serving as props in games of make-believe. 
They are made with the intention to prompt certain kinds of games, generating 
certain fictional truths rather than others. Appreciators recognising the function 
the work of art serves and the type of games it prompts, for example making 
believe that a certain story has taken place by reading a novel, will engage in 
an authorized game for that work. According to Walton, the type of function a 
work of art is supposed to serve in the imaginative activities appreciators 
engage with, results from conventions, from the way in which certain works 
DUHXVHGLQFHUWDLQVRFLHWLHVRUIURPWKHDXWKRU¶VLQWHQWLRQDQGKRZVKHH[SHFWV
the work to be used. Props in conjunction with principles of generation 
establish certain fictional truths, namely they establish that certain propositions 
are to be imagined. What is a principle of generation?  Principles of generation 
are an understanding, agreement or convention on which basis props generate 
certain fictional truths, independently of what one does or does not imagine. 
According to Walton, what is true in a work of art is what is prescribed to be 
imagined and more generally what is true is a set of propositions, a set of 
fictional propositions defined as those propositions that are to be imagined ± 
whether or not they are in fact imagined. A final important distinction in 
Walton¶VIUDPHZRUN FRQVLVWVLQZKDWPHWDSKRULFDOO\LVFDOOHGWKH³ZRUOGRIWKH
ZRUN´DVGLIIHUHQWDWOHDVWLQFHUWDLQUHVSHFWs IURPWKH³ZRUOGRIWKHJDPH´79 
                                                          
79
 I will discuss in a further section why the analogy between the set of fictional propositions 
SUHVFULEHGE\WKHZRUNDQGWKHQRWLRQRIµSRVVLEOHZRUOGV¶LVQRWDGHTXDWH 
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In our engagement with works of art there are fictional propositions generated 
E\WKHZRUNDQGILFWLRQDOSURSRVLWLRQVJHQHUDWHGE\DSSUHFLDWRUV¶HQJDJHPHQW
ZLWKWKHZRUN)RUH[DPSOHLQ*XOOLYHU¶V7UDYHOVLWLVILFWLRQDOWKDWWKHQRYHO
LWVHOI LV D MRXUQDO RI D FHUWDLQ VKLS¶V SK\VLFLDQ DW WKH VDPH WLPH LQ Clare's 
engagement with the novel it is fictional of herself that she is reading a journal 
RI D FHUWDLQ VKLS¶V SK\VLFLDQ +RZHYHU WKLV ODWWHU ILFWLRQDO SURSRVLWLRQ LV QRW
generated by the novel, Claire is not mentioned in the novel, but rather it is 
generated in participation in the game of make-believe in which the novel 
serves as a prop.      
In conclusion, I suggest that a genHUDO SRVLWLYH GHILQLWLRQ RI µILFWLRQDOLW\¶ ZH
FDQGHULYHIURP:DOWRQ¶VZRUNLVWKDWDFFRUGLQJWRWKHZD\DFHUWDLQSURSLV
intended to be used and the rules that are associated to the way we use it, what 
LVILFWLRQDOFRUUHVSRQGVWRZKDWLVWREHLPDJLQHG,UHLWHUDWHWKLVZLWK:DOWRQ¶V
ZRUGV³)LFWLRQDOLW\KDVWXUQHGRXWWREHDQDORJRXVWRWUXWKLQVRPHZD\VWKH
relation between fictionality and imagining parallels that between truth and 
belief. Imagining aims at the fictional as belief aims at the true. What is true is 
WREHEHOLHYHGZKDWLVILFWLRQDOLVWREHLPDJLQHG´80 
  
3.2       Representations and Narratives 
My goal in this section is to introduce a more articulated understanding of what 
we may mean for a work of representational art intended as an intentional-
communicative artefact. As an exemplification, I will provide in what follows 
an overview of the constitutive elements of narratives. Although I will only 
                                                                                                                                                                                                
 
80
 Walton, K. (1990), pg. 41. 
116 
 
draw the very essential elements of narratives with many aspects pertaining to 
the study of narratives not even being mentioned, I believe that for the 
GLVFXVVLRQ RI :DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO LW LV LPSRUWDQW WR SURYLGH VRPH Iorm of 
exemplification of our understanding of a representational art form.   
        
3.2.1        Representational Systems 
Dretske in Explaining Behaviour delineates a distinction between different 
types of representations. 
I will follow and synthesize his proposal, however, with a different purpose. 
Dretske aims at a classification of representations distinguishing between 
mental representations and a form of representation that, he wants to argue, is 
generated by our sensorial experiences; I will instead consider different 
representational systems in order to find some room for narratives within 
'UHWVNH¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQ 
Let us assume a general definition of a representational system as follows: 
³7KHIXQGDPHQWDOLGHDLVWKDWDV\VWHP6UHSUHVHQWVDSURperty, F, if and only 
if S has the function of indicating (providing information about) the F of a 
FHUWDLQGRPDLQRIREMHFWV´81. 
 There are two elements that seem to be crucial in the definition of a 
representational system: firstly, the function that a system performs in 
indicating a property of a certain object; secondly, what this function is 
generated by within the system, e.g. by convention, by our use of the system, 
                                                          
81
 Dretske, F. (1997) Naturalizing the Mind. Ed. Massachusetts: MIT Press. 
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or by a lawful dependency between the indicator and the indicated. Dretske 
distinguishes three types of representational systems.  
        In Type 1, the function of providing information about something else is 
assigned by convention. For example, consider that in a discussion about a 
football match the speaker assigns to some pen lids the function of representing 
football players and to the rubber the function of representing the ball. He 
reproduces on his desk some highlights of the match. The representation of the 
match is accomplished through the function assigned to the pen lids and this 
function is established conventionally by the speaker on that particular 
occasion. 
        In Type 2, systems are shaped to perform a certain representational 
function in the form of artefacts. For example, devices such as thermometers or 
fuel gauges are shaped to perform the function of indicating the temperature or 
the amount of fuel in the tank. Unlike Type 1, in this case the representational 
function is not attributed on a certain occasion but it is fixed by the way in 
which a certain artefact works. On the one hand, the function these devices 
perform is independent from us. In fact, we may contemplate the case of a 
broken fuel gauge in which any of our attributions of a representational 
function would not be taken into account; the fuel gauge would not indicate 
anything, even if, coincidentally, the amount of fuel displayed corresponds in 
that particular moment with the actual amount of petrol in the tank. On the 
other hand, there is a sense in which the use of a fuel gauge is conventional. 
Given the way in which electrical fuel gauges operate they cannot indicate the 
amount of fuel in the tank without also exhibiting the electrical flow in the 
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wire. However, we recognize that the fuel gauge was made with the intention 
of performing the function of indicating the amount of fuel, and conventionally 
we assume that as its representational function. Therefore, in Type 2 the 
representational function is fixed by the way in which the device works, but the 
fact that that device serves to provide information about, for example, the 
amount of fuel in the tank and not the amount of electrical current flowing in 
the wires connecting the gauge to the tank, is established by the way in which 
we use it and by the recognition of the intention for which it was made. 
        In Type 3UHSUHVHQWDWLRQDOV\VWHPV¶LQGLFDWLRQ of the property of a certain 
object is generated by a lawful dependency between the indicator and the 
indicated. Consider examples such as tracks in the snow, or fingerprints on a 
gun or growth rings in a tree stump. Following Dretske82, we may call these 
VLJQV ³LQGLFDWRUV´ XQGHUVFRULQJ WKHLU LQWULQVLF UHODWLRQ RI GHSHQGHQF\ XSRQ
what they indicate. Namely, their indications are not a result of a particular 
function that we conventionally attribute to them, or of a particular way in 
which we use them, but there is a lawful dependency between the indicator and 
the indicated. There is a physical relation between some particular tracks and 
the passage of something in particular, just as the physical relation between 
fingerprints and the person to whom they belong is an intrinsic one, or between 
a type of skin spot and the presence of a virus that generates a particular 
disease. Even if we do not see or use those signs as indicators, they still 
indicate what they have been generated by. Let us sum up in the following 
table. 
                                                          
82
 Dretske, F. (1988) Explaining Behaviour. World of Causes. ed. Massachusetts: MIT Press, 
chapter 3. 
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R. S. Type 1 R.S. Type 2 R.S. Type 3 
Representation is not 
an indicator. 
 
 
The representational 
function is assigned 
conventionally on a 
particular occasion. 
Indicators shaped to 
perform a certain 
representational 
function. 
 
The representational 
function may vary in 
relation to the way we 
use it. 
Indicators. 
 
 
 
What it is used 
to indicate is 
not a matter of 
convention. 
 
Narratives may be understood as forms of representations, for example of 
events, facts or stories. They may be assimilated to an artefact shaped by an 
author who intends it to perform a certain function that is: telling a story. 
Employing the classification delineated above, narratives may be associated 
with a representational system of Type2. In fact, narratives are shaped to 
perform a certain representational function; moreover the function may vary in 
relation to the use we make of the narratives. We may use a narrative, ignore 
the function it was made for and instead adopt it as an example of the 
vocabulary of a certain author, or as an example of grammatical structures in 
XVHDWWKHDXWKRU¶VWLPHRULQDFHUWDLQFRPSRVLWLRQRUZHPD\ZLVKWRXVHLWWR
identify the social structure of a certain period within a certain national context, 
etc. These uses would not correspond to the function a narrative is intended to 
perform or is conventionally assumed to perform but can be still possible. 
+RZHYHUWRHPERG\QDUUDWLYHVZLWKLQ'UHWVNH¶VFODVVLILFDWLRQZHPD\QHHGWR
face some difficulties. Reconsider the general definition provided above: ³D
system, S, represents a property, F, if and only if S has the function of 
LQGLFDWLQJSURYLGLQJLQIRUPDWLRQDERXWWKH)RIDFHUWDLQGRPDLQRIREMHFWV´
Restricting this definition to the representational system of Type 2, we assume 
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that there is a certain domain of objects, for example, fuels in the tank or 
temperatures about which a system represents a property, that is, the amount of 
fuel in the tank or the level of temperature. A test for a representational system 
would seem to consist of determining whether that system is able to 
misrepresent what it is intended to indicate. For example, a fuel gauge may 
misrepresent the amount of fuel in the tank if broken. The misrepresentation is 
possible because we are assuming domains of objects. In contrast to the 
assumed general definition of a representational system, a fictional narrative 
would not provide information about the F of a certain domain of objects. In 
fact, it may be the case that the F it represents is ascribed to someone or 
something that is not actual, and so does not belong to any domain of objects. 
The concept of misrepresentation needs to be reformulated if we want to apply 
it to fictional narratives.  
 
3.2.2     The Constitutive Elements of Narratives 
Narratives are intentional-communicative artefacts. As artefacts they require a 
maker, namely the author; as intentional-artefacts, they have been made with 
the intention of performing a specific function, as intentional-communicative 
artefacts, the realisation of their purpose consists in telling a story. In other 
words, there is a storyteller or an author that makes up a story and he or she 
recounts it to an audience.  
/HW XV VWDUW IURP WKH µVWRU\¶ 7KLV WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH DXWKRU DQG WKH DXWKRU¶V
intentions is a core element of narratives and for the understanding of our 
engagement with them. We may see narratives as representations of stories and 
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the stories as their content. There may be fictional stories or ones based on true 
fact or historical accounts. I see at least three elements indispensable in the 
GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI D µVWRU\¶ )LUVWO\ D VWRU\ LV WROG E\ VRPHRQH
therefore, where there is a story, there is an author of the story, there is 
someone who tells us the story. Secondly, it seems that we talk about a story to 
talk about what has happened, about a sequence of events. Thirdly, the chains 
of events develop in a temporal dimension, each event covers a time interval; 
in addition a temporal relation between two events sometimes ascribe a causal 
relation to these events, for we think that causes precede their effects. Thus 
temporal dimensions seem to be essential elements of stories. It is quite 
intuitive to see that we would not have a story without an agent who authors or 
causes the story, just as a story without events would be a story without any 
content: it would be odd to imagine a story about nothing; and finally it is 
difficult to imagine a sequence of events developed outside of a temporal 
dimension. 
 
3.2.3      Stories: Possible Worlds and Impossible Stories 
$EURDGXVHRIWKHQRWLRQRIµSURSRVLWLRQ¶UDWKHUWKDQµHYHQW¶LVDGRSWHGLQWKH
study of fiction and consequently a story is generally individuated as a set of 
propositions, rather than a sequence of events. A proposition is a function from 
a possible world to a truth value and a set of propositions may individuate a 
possible world. A possible world intuitively is an alternative way in which 
things could be. Assuming a story as a possibility, we may easily describe a 
VWRU\ DVDSRVVLEOHZRUOGDQGVWDUW UHIHUULQJ WR LW DV³the ZRUOGRI WKHVWRU\´
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However, the nature of a story and the nature of a possible world are different 
and this analogy is erroneous. A possible world is complete and determinate 
whereas a story comprises a set of propositions but is indeterminate in different 
aspects. A story can be then associated more appropriately with a set of 
possible worlds: this set is composed of all those worlds in which the set of 
propositions formed in the story is true. We should think of a (consistent) story 
as corresponding to a "way some part of the world might have been". However, 
a metaphysic of fiction based on the notion of possible worlds will face strong 
difficulties. Consider for example the case of impossible stories. The notion of 
impossibility taken into account here is tantamount to logical impossibility. 
When we talk of impossible stories we should consider stories that represent 
contradictory propositions. Any possible world by definition will not contain 
any contradictory propositions.  
Can we imagine a contradiction? Assuming that the imagination could be a test 
for possibility, if we can imagine a contradiction we should conclude that we 
can entertain possible contradictions. That is, there are possible worlds that are 
impossible and yet this is quite contradictory in itself. However, there are 
contents of intentional states that can be inconsistent: a person can have 
contradictory beliefs, or a person can have contradictory perceptions, e.g. 
EHKROGLQJWKHRSWLFDOLOOXVLRQRI(VFKHU¶VGUDZLQJV/HZLVVXJJHVWHGUHJDUGLQJ
an inconsistent story as a fragmented corpus; P would be true according to a 
fragment and non-P true in respect to another fragment. For example, in Sunset 
Boulevard the proposition that Joe Gillis is alive is true according to the 
fragment in which it is implied that he is narrating the story; whilst the 
proposition that Joe Gillis is dead is true according to the fragment representing 
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his death. There are no parts of the story in which both the propositions are true 
at the same time. It seems that in the case of inconsistent stories, we do not 
infer the truth of the conjunction from the truth of conjoined propositions.  
*UDKDP3ULHVWREMHFWV WKDW/HZLV¶ IUDJPHQWDWLRQVWUDWHJ\ is not a solution. In 
IDFW KH SURSRVHV ZH FRQVLGHU D VWRU\ VXFK DV WKH ³6\OYDQ¶V %R[ VWRU\´ LQ
which the thematic unity of the story would not allow fragmentation to solve 
WKHFRQWUDGLFWLRQ,QWKH³6\OYDQ¶V %R[VWRU\´WZRORJLFLDQVPHHWHDFKRWKHULQ
the home of one of their friends to organise his scripts, notes and materials 
after his death. In cataloguing different papers Graham discovers a box in 
which there both is something and at the same time there is not. Graham - the 
character in the story - discovers the existence of a contradiction in the actual 
world and shares his discovery with Nick. Both of them react in the same way, 
with incredulity and fear, they feel responsible for protecting a precious secret. 
After two nights spent together, they leave for different directions. In this story 
the thematic unity is founded on the discovery of a contradiction.83 
3ULHVW¶V VROXWLRQ ZRXOG EH WR FRQVLGHU D IUDPHZRUN RI D SOXUDOLW\ RI ZRUOGV
some possible and some open worlds in which contradictions are admitted. 
Possible and open worlds have the same domain in terms of actual and possible 
objects, but we could have access to open worlds contemplating impossible, 
nonexistent objects and contradictory propositions.84    
 
                                                          
83
 Daniel Nolan proposes a consistent reading of the story, based on the unreliability of the 
narrator in the story VHH 1RODQ  $ FRQVLVWHQW UHDGLQJ RI 6\OYDQ¶V ER[. Philosophical 
Quaterly, Vol. 57, no.229, pp. 667-673. 
84
 See Graham Priest, Towards Non-Being: The Logic and Metaphysics of Intentionality, 2005, 
for a detailed account of open worlds. 
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3.2.4    Authors and Narrators 
According to what has been said so far, thinking about a narrative means 
thinking of a storyteller or an author who makes up a story, and he or she 
recounts it to an audience. Abstracting from literary examples for the moment, 
let us consider three figures to which the authorship of the narrative may be 
attributed. Firstly, to the real author in the activity of making up the story 
Secondly, to the author as he represents himself, for example in recounting the 
story assuming a particular attitude towards facts and events. We may suppose 
that his narration is created in such a way that the author puts himself or herself 
in the shoes of someone else. This other self of the author has been introduced 
LQOLWHUDU\WKHRU\XQGHUWKHQDPHRI³LPSOLHGDXWKRU´7KLUGO\DILJXUe which 
can be in charge of the narration may be a fictional author/narrator that belongs 
to the story and according to the story, he or she is the author of the story. On 
these bases, a general distinction can be delineated between the authorship 
attributed to a real author or implied author who does not belong to the story 
and to an author/narrator which is so according to the story. Let us exemplify 
this in the following representation: 
 
      Outside the story                                            Real Author                          
Implied Author 
 
     Within the story                                      Author/Narrator (fictional character) 
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Consider some examples: let us begin from a perspective internal to the fiction. 
We may encounter a fictional narration developed in first person by one of the 
characters; he or she will tell us his or her story. Take as example the novel 
Moby Dick, the narrator is a fictional character, Ishmael, and within the fiction 
it is true that he is the narrator. It is possible to demarcate here a clear 
distinction between the external position to the story of Herman Melville as 
author of the novel and the internal position (within the pretence) of Ishmael as 
author and narrator of the story. In the story Ishmael is the sole survivor of the 
Pequod shipwreck and he is telling us his story. In this sense we may infer that 
he is the author of the story. A similar and more classical example is Doctor 
:DWVRQ LQ&RQDQ'R\OH¶V Sherlock Holmes stories85. In fact, it is part of the 
fiction that Watson has written those stories during his collaboration and 
adventures with Sherlock Holmes. As in the previous case, we may draw the 
distinction between the external position of Conan Doyle to the fiction and the 
internal position of Watson as the character that holds the role of 
author/narrator in the story. Let us exemplify this with the following schematic 
representation: 
                                                                    Real Author: Conan Doyle   
     Outside the story                                            
 
    :LWKLQWKHVWRU\6KHUORFN+ROPHV¶VWRULHV                                                         
Author/Narrator: Doctor Watson  
                                                          
85
 There are some classifications of types of authors/narrators that would distinguish the case of 
Watson from the case of Ishmael. In the first case it is explicit in the story that Watson writes 
Sherlock Holmes stories, in the second case the reader may infer from the story that Ishmael is 
narrating his story. Walton, for example, classifies this second case as the µVWRU\WHOOLQJ
QDUUDWRU¶:DWVRQZRXOGEHDILFWLRQDOFKDUDFWHUWKDWKRlds the role of author/narrator whereas 
Ishmael would hold the role of storytelling narrator. I think that for the purpose of this 
paragraph we can skim over these distinctions and be focused on the main difference between 
external and internal perspectives to the fiction.   
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There are cases in which there seems to be a more complicated structure. 
Consider the novella by Alexander Dumas One Thousand and One Ghosts or 
The Divine Comedy by Dante. Here, in the fiction the narrator corresponds to 
the actual author. Dumas and Dante in their respective works are themselves 
narrators within the pretence. For example, Dante is a character in the story 
that interacts with other characters and builds his path from Hell to Heaven. In 
explaining this case, the option for which I would opt consists in distinguishing 
the actual author in his external position to the fiction from the author/narrator 
within the pretence. We may suppose that the actual authors portray themselves 
in the story, as in a self-portrait. In the story the actual Dante experiences and 
says things that he never did or said in actual life. The following would be a 
schematic exemplification: 
                                                        Real Author: Dante Alighieri 
    Outside the story                                            
 
   Within the story: Divine Comedy    
                                                         Author/Narrator: Dante Alighieri  
 
The above examples cover the cases in which a character is the author or 
narrator. In addition, there are cases in which there is an implied author that we 
may identify as a fictional author/ narrator that is not part of the story. Consider 
the case in which we recognise a different personality of the author from the 
one we know to be from the reading of the novel. For example, in reading 
Death in Venice, we may build up an idea of the personality of the author that 
is different from the one we would have if we had known the actual maker, 
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Thomas Mann. Whilst as readers, we may associate the author with a narrow-
minded and unforgiving person, people acquainted with Mann described him 
as an open-minded and understanding person. In this case for example, that 
narrow-minded person who, we feel, is telling us the story, may be associated 
ZLWKWKH³LPSOLHGDXWKRU´7KLVFRUUHVSRQGVWRD ILFWLRQDOHQWLW\WKDWGRHVQRW
belong to the story. According to the story there is no such character, a narrow-
minded and unforgiving person that is in charge of writing and narrating it. In 
fact, the narration is in third person. However, in the reading of the novel we 
may reconstruct which set of intentions rests in the narration, in which way the 
author is communicating to us, which kind of personality is expressed by his or 
her way of narrating. These kinds of suppositions can lead us to imagine a 
person different from the real author; this is an imaginary person, and in this 
sense is fictional but is not part of the story. The delineation of a certain 
implied author rather than a different one is a stylistic choice of the real author. 
The choice of a certain point of view in the narration may be justified by an 
aesthetic purpose that the author may want to achieve with that stylistic 
solution. Given that the implied author is a fictional entity that does not belong 
to the story, we may consider that it will belong to another story: a meta story 
in which the story he fictionally has authored is embedded. Let us resume the 
previous example, Death in Venice. In this case there is a meta story about a 
narrow-minded and unforgiving person who writes a story about a man who 
falls unhappily in love with a young boy and eventually dies. This latter story 
is embedded in the former. It is then possible to describe the communicative 
process of the narrative as follows:  (a) the real author makes up a story1 where 
an alter ego of Thomas Mann, a narrow-minded and unforgiving person writes 
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and is the narrator of a story2; (b) this fictional character, the implied author, 
will hold the role of the author/narrator in respect to the story2. Moreover, note 
that story2 is fictional from the stance of story1. Let us exemplify this with the 
following schematic representation: 
     Real Author: Thomas Mann 
                                      
  Implied Author          Story1: a narrow-minded and 
                                               unforgiving person who writes a story.     
                                               
                                    Story2: 
                                    a man who falls unhappily in  
                                    love with a young boy and  
                                    eventually dies. 
                                                                                                                                         
            
 
 
The main characteristic of embedded stories is that there is a relation of 
fictionality between story1 and story2. Story2 is fiction from story1¶V stance; 
therefore we may talk of a fiction within the fiction. Every narration led by an 
implied author is analysable in terms of embedded stories. Other cases of 
embedded stories, where we do not need to refer to any implied author, are 
readily available in the history of literature. Consider The Murderer of 
Gonzago in Hamlet. Within the fiction of Hamlet (story1), the main character 
with some old friends makes up a play entitled The Murderer of Gonzago 
(story2). Hamlet, as director, and other fictional characters will be the audience 
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of this latter, embedded story. In this sense we may speak of a fiction within 
the fiction and describe the relation between story1 and story2 as the second one 
being a fiction within the former. In fact, according to story1, The Murderer of 
Gonzago is authored by the fictional character Hamlet. Let us exemplify this in 
the following schema: 
         Real Author: William Shakespeare  
             Story1:  Hamlet 
                    
                 Fictional author: Hamlet  
                                
                              Story2:    
                                               
The Murderer of Gonzago 
                                                            
 
Every narrative in which an implied author is recognisable is associable with 
the schema of embedded stories. As a fictional author, the implied author will 
fill the role of the individual responsible for the act of fiction making, from 
which the narrative is created. 
Finally, a third example of narrative may be recognised in third person 
narrative where no fictional author is assumed in the story, either being part of 
the story or being a fictional author external to the story. In these cases the 
actual author is the narrator of the story86. For example, Middlemarch by 
George Eliot is a narrative in third person where there is no clue in the story of 
an internal narrator. The story is made up by Eliot and she is the narrator of the 
story. The narrative is a result of an act of fiction making and is an intentional-
                                                          
86
 There is a current debate on the presence of an effaced narrator in any narrative. However, 
P\HPSKDVLVLVKHUHPRUHRQWKHDXWKRU¶VLQWHQWLRQVVR, WDNHRQHVWDQFe without discussing 
the different points of view on the effaced narrators. For an overview on the different 
arguments in favour or in disfavour of the different stances see Levinson (1996) and Wilson 
(2006).   
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communicative artefact resulting from the communicative act of its maker. Our 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRILWLVUHODWHGWRWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHDXWKRU¶VLQWHQWLRQVDQG
what he or she wants to communicate. The author makes up a representation by 
writing a text; this is a set of indicators through which the reader may infer the 
DXWKRU¶V LQWHQWLRQ RU WKH UHDGHU PD\ LQIHU ZKDW LW LV WKH DXWKRU LQWHQGV WKH
reader to infer. Consider the following as a schematic representation of the 
communicative process in narratives: 
                                     $XWKRU¶VLQWHQWLRQV 
                                                                  
Set of  indicators 
        
 
 Representation                                                            Story Content                                                   
       (Text)   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
131 
 
3.3        Participation in a Game of Make-Believe 
The previous section shows the central role of authors and aXWKRUV¶LQWHQWLRQV
for what concerns narratives. The text of the narrative as a set of indicators 
UHSUHVHQWV WKHDXWKRU¶V LQWHQWLRQVZKLFK LQ WKHFRPPXQLFDWLRQSURFHVVVHWXS
by the narrative, guide appreciators recognising its fictional or non-fictional 
VWDWXV +RZHYHU WKH UROH RI WKH DXWKRU¶V LQWHQWLRQV VKRXOG QRW EH WDNHQ IRU
JUDQWHG 7KHUH DUH GLIIHUHQW SRLQWV RI YLHZ RQ WKH FHQWUDOLW\ RI WKH DXWKRUV¶
intentions in establishing the fictionality of a work. According to Walton, this 
can be determined by different factors: convention or the ways in which a 
FHUWDLQ DUWHIDFW LV HPSOR\HG LQ D FHUWDLQ FXOWXUDO FRQWH[W DV ZHOO DV DXWKRU¶s 
intentions. Moreover, one or the other of these elements may have a different 
relevance in relation to the different art forms. Appreciation of a narrative in 
WHUPVRI D ILFWLRQDO DFFRXQWRU D WUXH VWRU\ LV VWURQJO\ UHODWHG WR WKHDXWKRU¶V
intentions. However, even in this case, counterexamples are not difficult to 
find. For instance, narratives comprised in Greek Mythology are fictional in 
our culture whereas they were not in the Ancient Greek societies. I am not 
entering the debate about at which degree intentionality is a central element in 
establishing the fictionality of a work of art in contrast to other factors, such as 
certain uses or conventions in certain cultural contexts. My interest here is 
directed to a clear definition of what it is to be fictional. In fact, this would give 
XVDFKDQFHWRKDYHDFOHDUHUDFFRXQWRIZKDWLQ:DOWRQ¶VYLHZLVDILFWLRQDO
truth or what it means to speak truly within a game of make-believe. These are 
central notions in his construal about sentences appearing to make a reference 
to fictional entities. As discussed above, a proposition is fictional if there is a 
prescription to imagine it. Or, in other words, something is true in fiction if it is 
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to be imagined. Works of representational arts intended as props within games 
of make-believe are generators of fictional truths. There are different principles 
and rules that an author can adopt in designing an art work; certain rules are 
categorical, for example, novels set up a certain type of engagement in our 
social context that is different from the one in which appreciators are involved 
when appreciating a painting. The work of art prescriEHV RQH¶V UROH DV D
participant in the imaginative activity in question. For example, *XOOLYHU¶V
Travels SUHVFULEHVRI LWVHOI WKDW LW LVD MRXUQDORIDVKLS¶VSK\VLFLDQDQGZKHQ
we read it, it prescribes that we make-believe of ourselves that we are reading 
WKHMRXUQDORIDVKLS¶VSK\VLFLDQ,IZHDUHUHIXVLQJWRLPDJLQHZKDWKDVEHHQ
SUHVFULEHGZHDUHUHIXVLQJWR³SOD\WKHJDPH´RUZHDUHSOD\LQJLWLPSURSHUO\
Walton considers conditional rules next to categorical ones: ones to the effect 
that if certain circumstances obtain, certain things are to be imagined. These 
rules may be adopted to different degrees, for example in loosely designing 
what is to be implicitly imagined. However, a discussion of the principles of 
generation, although very interesting from an aesthetic point of view, can lead 
us very far from the focus of interest of this study. In fact, it would create 
confusion to overlook the distinction between what is a fictional truth and how 
LW LV JHQHUDWHG $V :DOWRQ H[SOLFLWO\ VSHFLILHV ³7KH FRntingent means by 
which fictional truths are generated in one or another social context have no 
EHDULQJ RQ ZKDW LW PHDQV IRU D SURSRVLWLRQ WR EH ILFWLRQDO´87. What matters 
here, is the clear understanding that what is fictional is what is to be imagined. 
On these bases, we find ourselves confronting an important crossroad: for an 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIILFWLRQDOLW\ZHQHHGWRWXUQWRZDUGVWKHVWXG\RIDSSUHFLDWRUV¶
                                                          
87
 Walton, K. (1990), pg.140. 
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imaginative activities in their participation in the game of make-believe rather 
than towards the study of mechanisms employed in the generation of fictional 
truths. Having said this, these two different paths may sometimes intertwine; 
the understanding of the mechanisms of generation may be employed to see 
DSSUHFLDWRUV¶PRYHV LQ WKHLUSDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQJames of make-believe in which 
works of art serve as props.  
Participation in a game of make-believe is the explanatoU\ NH\ LQ :DOWRQ¶V
account of different phenomena. For example, our emotional response to 
fiction can be understood as a participation in a game, one in which 
DSSUHFLDWRUV¶ quasi-emotions are their contributions to the game; their 
emotional reactions make themselves props in a game of make-believe. For 
example, playing cops and robbers Luc, the robber, hiding from Annabel, the 
cop, experiences a feeling which resembles the fear of being discovered. In a 
similar way, Claire, watching a horror movie with some friends, is scared by 
the moves of a bloodthirsty monster; she is not hiding herself in a safe place or 
running out from the house, however, she is experiencing the physical 
symptoms of actual fear.88 Participation is also verbal. Appreciators participate 
verbally in the game of make-believe, commenting on what is going on in the 
game or talking about it in different ways. This happens to ordinary players of 
games of make-believe as well as to appreciators of works of representational 
arts. For example, Annabel is verbally participating in the game when she 
VKRXWV ³6WRS WKLHI´ ZKHQ UXQQLQJ DIWHU /XF 6KRXWLQJ LQ WKDW ZD\ LV DQ
exemplification in the game of a kind of pretence, she is pretending of herself 
                                                          
88
 )RU :DOWRQ¶V Yiew on quasi-emotions and psychological participation to game of make-
EHOLHYHVHH³)HDULQJ)LFWLRQV´DQGFKDSWHUVDQGLQ:DOWRQ(1990). 
134 
 
that she shouts those very words while trying to catch a thief. In a similar way, 
DFFRUGLQJ WR :DOWRQ ZH FDQ H[SODLQ /XF¶V H[FODPDWLRQ ³/RRN :RZ 6R
PDQ\VKLSV´ZKLOHORRNLQJDWDSDLQWLQJ SRUWUD\LQJ3RUWRILQR¶VKDUERXU&ODLUH
VD\LQJ ³2K *RVK +HUH KH FRPHV´ ZKLOH ZDWFKLQJ WKH KRUURU PRYLH RU WKH
UHDGHU¶V VDG FRPPHQW ³3RRU $QQD´ ZKLOH DSSUHFLDWLQJ Anna Karenina. 
Appreciators, in the same way as children, participate verbally in games of 
make-believe in which works of art serve as props. They are themselves props 
in those very games, they make-believe that their verbal contributions count as 
actual exclamations or comments in relation to actual facts. According to 
:DOWRQ³XQGHUVWDQGLQJVXch remarks in this way locates the speaker within the 
fictional world (the world of his game) and has him contributing to it. This 
contrasts with the usual assumption that the speaker is making a genuine 
assertion about a fictional world (a work world) from a perspective outside of 
it, that he is saying something about what fictional truths it contains. The 
pretence construal has the appreciator pretending to describe the real world 
UDWKHUWKDQDFWXDOO\GHVFULELQJDILFWLRQDORQH´89  
 
3.4    Pretence Construal and Fictional Names 
Although the above examples of verbal participation can easily be compared to 
FKLOGUHQ¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ JDPHV RI PDNH-believe, many other examples of 
sentences containing fictional names do not immediately look like instances of 
aSSUHFLDWRUV¶YHUEDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQJDPHVRIPDNH-believe. For example, one 
PD\EH UHFRXQWLQJ WKHSORWRI WKHQRYHOZKLOH VD\LQJ³7RP6DZ\HUDWWHQGHG
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 Walton, K. (1990), pg. 392. 
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KLVRZQIXQHUDO´RUGHVFULELQJDFHUWDLQFKDUDFWHUVD\LQJ³6KHUORFN+ROPHVLV
D GHWHFWLYH´ 0RUHRYHU ZH may find in literary theory or criticism many 
sentences containing fictional names that look like genuine assertions. Without 
doubt there is a dual perspective towards works of representational art. 
Appreciators themselves both participate in their game and observe them. As 
:DOWRQQRWHV³WKH\DWWHQGWRWKHSURSRVLWLRQVWKDWDUHILFWLRQDODQGDOVRWRWKH
fact that they are fictional and the means by which their fictionality is 
JHQHUDWHG´90. An even clearer distinction can be delineated between 
appreciation and criticism. It is sometimes difficult to see some remarks or 
statements for example in a lecture of literary criticism, as acts of participation 
in a game of make-believe. For example, reading a passage of GerDUG*HQHWWH¶V
Narrative Discourse, when he is discussing a Santeuil novel:  
³-HDQDIWHUVHYHUDO\HDUVDJDLQILQGVWKHKRWHOZKHUH0DULH.RVVLFKHIZKRP
he once loved, lives, and compares the impressions he has today with those that 
KHRQFHWKRXJKWKHZRXOGEHH[SHULHQFLQJWRGD\´91 
 It is difficult to interpret it as a way of pretending to describe the real world 
rather than as actually describing a fictional one. However, participatory 
appreciation and criticism are intimately intertwined. It is part of the critical 
work to experience and participate in the game in which the work serves as a 
prop in order to be able to describe and observe how a given work prescribes a 
FHUWDLQ LPDJLQDWLYH H[SHULHQFH DQG WKHQ VXJJHVW ZKDW WKH ZRUN¶V DHVWKHWLF
value is in a certain cultural context. According to Walton, there are different 
ways in which we can see the connection between pretending and the 
                                                          
90
 Ib., pp. 49-50. 
91
 Genette, G., Narrative Discourse: An essay in Method (1983), pp.37-38. 
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utterances of serious claims which apparently refer to fictional entities92. 
&RQVLGHUVRPHRI:DOWRQ¶VH[DPSOHV³DFULWLF-appreciator pretending to claim 
(seriously) that there is a country inhabited by six-inch-tall people may be 
pointing out that it is fictional in *XOOLYHU¶V 7UDYHOV that this is so. [...] A 
WHDFKHURIOLWHUDWXUHUHPDUNVRQ:LOO\/RPDQ¶VVDGSOLJKWZLWKDQDLURIJUDYLW\
and an expression of deep coQFHUQ³3RRU:LOO\´KHEHJLQV LQ WKHFRXUVHRI
GLVFXVVLQJWKHDOOHJRULFDORUV\PEROLFVLJQLILFDQFHRIKLVWURXEOH´93  
,Q :DOWRQ¶V YLHZ WKH FULWLF-appreciator may well be engaged in a pretence, 
verbally participating in a game of make-believe, while making a serious claim 
about the novel. In a similar way the teacher of literature is pretending to 
describe a human tragedy, empathising with the circumstances and at the same 
WLPH PDNLQJ VHULRXV REVHUYDWLRQV DERXW WKH SOD\ $OWHUQDWLYHO\ D VSHDNHU¶V
utterances which apparently refer to fictional entities may be made with the 
intention that the hearer make-believe that a certain proposition is expressed in 
UHJDUGWRDFHUWDLQSHUVRQ)RUH[DPSOHRQHPD\FODLP³7RP6DZ\HUDWWHQGHG
KLVRZQIXQHUDO´ZLWKWKHLQWention that her hearer make-believe that there is a 
certain Tom Sawyer and that her utterance express a certain proposition, 
although she herself is not engaged in such a pretence. We can see here a 
parallel with the role of the author in a narrative. The author of the narrative 
intends her reader to make-believe that the story narrated is true.94 A speaker 
may adopt the same communicative intentions but for a different purpose; she 
                                                          
92
 The idea of the exploitation of make-believe for purposes of serious assertion seems to be 
:DOWRQ¶VGHYHORSPHQWRID*DUHWK(YDQV¶LGHD6HH*(YDQVVarieties of Reference, pp. 363-
364.  
93
 K. Walton (1990), pp. 394-395. 
94
 For a complete reading of KRZ WKH DXWKRU¶V LQWHQWLRQV VKDSH WKH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ SURFHVV
RXWOLQHGLQDQDUUDWLYHVHH*&XUULH³)LFWLYHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ´LQThe Nature of Fiction, 1990.   
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is not aiming to entertain her hearer but she may want the hearer to engage in a 
pretence in order to see her serious remark about a work of art. 
7KXV IDU LQ :DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO WKHUH LV QR UHDVRQ WR FRPPLW WR DQ\ ILFWLRQDO
entities or to enter the metaphysical debate. However, the pretence construal 
needs to face the fact that there are genuine assertive utterances of sentences 
containing fictional names, whether or not speakers are employing their 
participation in a pretence for the purposes of making such assertions. Even for 
WKHVHFDVHV WKHQRWLRQVRI µPDNH-EHOLHYH¶DQG WKHµSDrticipation in a game of 
make-EHOLHYH¶ DUH NH\ QRWLRQV ³7KH NH\ WR XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DVVHUWLYH XVHV RI
sentences appearing to make reference to fictional entities is to take as primary 
their use in pretence. What is asserted by means of them is to be understood in 
terms of their role in make-EHOLHYH´95 
 
 3.4.1     Pretence, Thought and Reality 
:DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO IRU WKH DVVHUWLYH XVHV RI VHQWHQFHV FRQWDLQLQJ ILFWLRQDO
names provides a unified treatment and offers the most complete range of 
answers between those views that claim the emptiness of fictional names. 
However, the comprehensiveness of this proposal is counterbalanced by its 
complexity. I will offer a reading of it, building a parallel with the previous 
views discussed in this study. Not only will I discuss similar examples 
discussed in the previous chapters but I will adopt an analogous 
systematisation of the puzzle of fictional names. I have assumed as an 
epistemological starting point that when we think we think of something and 
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 Walton, K. (1990) pg. 396. 
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when we use a name we name something. I have then classified the problems 
raised by the uses of fictional names as pertaining to the connection between 
Language and Thought and Language and Reality. The former concerns which 
thoughts we are grasping in uttering sentences containing fictional names. The 
ODWWHU IRFXVHV RQ ZKLFK IDFWV LI DQ\ DUH EHLQJ DGGUHVVHG E\ VSHDNHUV¶
XWWHUDQFHV )URP D OLQJXLVWLF SRLQW RI YLHZ :DOWRQ¶V DQVZHU LV YHU\
straightforward: fictional names do not bear any reference and sentences 
containing fictional names do not express any propositions. Rather, he suggests 
UHDGLQJ VSHDNHUV¶ XWWHUDQFHV DV DFWV RI SUHWHQFH RU DGRSWLQJ :DOWRQ¶V
terminology, acts of participation in games of make-believe. Still, speakers do 
grasp some thoughts in their imaginative activities and their genuine assertive 
uses of sentences containing fictional names do assess some facts.  
In parallel with the relation between Language and Thought and Language and 
Reality adopted in the previous chapters, I will examine the relations between 
Pretence and Thought and Pretence and Reality. The former relation within 
:DOWRQ¶VIUDPHZRUNSHUWDLQVQRWWRWKHSURSRVLWLRQH[SUHVVHGJLYHQWKDWWKHUH
is not such a proposition, but rather to the thought process which speakers 
undertake when performing a certain act of pretence. Namely, which sort of 
game is implied and is introduced into the conversation by their verbal 
participation in a game of make-believe? In fact, speakers, far from 
communicating only through the literal meaning of their utterances, adopt a 
figurative, metaphorical language and imply that they are participating in a 
pretence. The relation between Pretence and Reality will therefore not pertain 
to the truth or falsehood of a proposition expressed, in fact there is no 
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proposition expressed, but to the fact that it is  appropriate or not, acting as 
they do, within the game of the implied sort. 
 
3.4.2      Pretence and Thought  
Let us start by discussing the relation between Pretence and Thought. Let us 
say that Claire utters (1) and (2) talking about The Adventures of Tom Sawyer 
DQG&RQDQ'R\OH¶VVWRULHVLQGLIIHUHQWFLUFXPVWDQFHV 
1. Tom Sawyer attended his own funeral.  
2. Sherlock Holmes is a detective.  
Claire is verbally participating in a game of make-believe. Her utterances are 
understood to be such that they might naturally be uttered in pretence in the 
course of an authorised game of make-believe for The Adventures of Tom 
Sawyer RU&RQDQ'R\OH¶VVWRULHV:LWKKHUDFWRISUHWHQFHVKHLVLPSO\LQJLQ
the conversation that she is speaking as if the story-world were the real world. 
7KHVSHFLILFLW\RI:DOWRQ¶VYLHZFRQVLVWV LQ WKH IDFW WKDW LQGRLQJ WKLV VKH LV
performing a certain act of pretence and is making a genuine assertion 
LPSO\LQJ WKH SUHIL[ ³,Q The Adventure of Tom Sawyer´ ,n this way, her 
utterance makes sense only if her interlocutor recognises her utterance as a 
form of participation in a game of make-believe and recognises that the 
pretence she is participating in is the one authorised for the game of make-
believe in which The Adventure of Tom Sawyer RU&RQDQ'R\OH¶VVWRULHVVHUYH
as a prop.  Her utterance can be understood then as an extension of such a 
game within the conversation. For (1) and (2) to be part of an extended game 
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they neither require a reference to any fictional entities, nor do they express a 
proposition. According to Walton, they are acts of pretence of a certain kind.   
Statements appearing to make reference to fictional entities are of several 
kinds. Many of them exemplify acts of pretence which are not for an authorised 
game, but rather for unofficial games. In these cases the game of make-believe 
in which the speaker is participating verbally is not identified with the one in 
which a certain work of art serves as a prop. A new kind of game needs to be 
established.  Let us consider some more examples:  
3. Robison Crusoe was more resourceful than Gulliver.  
4. Sherlock Holmes is more famous than any other detective.  
Utterances of (3) and (4) cannot be understood as acts of participation in 
authorised games of make-believe. In fact there is not a unique work of art to 
serve as a prop which represents both Robinson Crusoe and Gulliver in the 
same story. In the same way, there is not a work of art which represents all 
actual or fictional detectives together with Sherlock Holmes and which sets a 
comparison on their degree of fame. Given that the speaker cannot be 
participating in an authorised game of make-believe when uttering (3) and (4), 
given that in a conversation we would look for an alternative before deeming 
an utterance meaningless and given that we are familiar with precedent 
unofficial games, we will look for an interpretation that would involve an 
unofficial game in which these utterances are examples of participation. Again, 
the individuation of what sort of game the speaker is participating in is what I 
take to characterise the relation between Pretence and Thought. In uttering (3), 
the speaker implies a game in which both novels *XOOLYHU¶V 7UDYHOV and 
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Robinson Crusoe serve as a prop. She intends her interlocutor to recognise that 
she is participating verbally in that sort of game, comparing the degree of 
resourcefulness of Gulliver in *XOOLYHU¶V 7UDYHOV to the degree of 
resourcefulness of Robinson Crusoe in Robinson Crusoe. In uttering (4) the 
speaker imSOLHV D JDPH LQ ZKLFK &RQDQ 'R\OH¶V VWRULHV DUH D SURS WRJHWKHU
with all the other detective stories and the speaker's knowledge of any actual 
detective. She intends her interlocutor to recognise that she is participating in 
this sort of game, comparing ShHUORFN +ROPHV¶ IDPH ZLWK WKH IDPH RI RWKHU
detectives to her best knowledge.  
/HW XV FRQVLGHU KRZ :DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO ZRUNV ZLWK VRPH RI WKH H[DPSOHV
submitted to other anti-realistic views discussed in the previous chapters. We 
saw that if fictional names are empty it can be problematic to explain the 
intuition that speakers uttering (5) and (6) are saying something similar in 
contrast to what they say uttering (7):  
5. Superman is in love.  
6. Clark Kent is in love.  
7. Romeo is in love.     
(PSOR\LQJ :DOWRQ¶V SURSRsal, speakers, in uttering (5) and (6), are 
participating verbally in the same game of make-believe in which Superman 
stories serve as a prop. In contrast, speakers participate verbally in a game 
authorised for Romeo and Juliet in uttering (7). A similar interpretation can be 
given for (8):  
8. Superman is Clark Kent.  
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,I³6XSHUPDQ´DQG³&ODUN.HQW´DUHHPSW\QDPHVKRZGRZHDFFRXQWIRUWKH
PHDQLQJIXOQHVV RI " ,Q :DOWRQ¶V YLHZ WKH XWWHUDQFH RI  LV D YHUEDO
participation in an authorised game for Superman stories and, in accordance to 
the mechanisms of generation operating in those stories, (8) makes perfect 
sense within the pretence.  
A slightly more articulated account can be provided for (9):  
9. Claire believes that Superman is Clark Kent.  
As we saw, if fictional names are empty names it becomes problematic to 
DFFRXQWIRU&ODLUH¶VEHOLHI,QIDFWJLYHQWKDWWKHHPEHGGHGVHQWHQFHGRHVQRW
express any proposition, neither does $GRSWLQJ:DOWRQ¶VDFFRXQWZHZLOO
exploit the pretence to account for the utterance of (9). However, (9) can be 
interpreted in two ways, which would imply different kinds of pretence:  
9a.  In the pretence, Claire believes that Superman is Clark Kent.  
9b.  Claire believes that, in the pretence Superman is Clark Kent.  
Speakers uttering (9a) would be participating verbally in an unofficial game of 
make-EHOLHYH LQZKLFK&ODLUH¶V ³ZRUOGRI WKH JDPH´ VHUYHV DV DSURS - what 
Walton loosely calls the ³ZRUOGRI WKHJDPH´ZRXOGEHLQ WKLVFDVHWKHJDPH
FRPSULVLQJERWK&ODLUH¶VSDUWLFLpation and the work of art as props. Speakers 
intend their interlocutor to imagine Claire¶V statement uttered in pretence as a 
state of belief. Speakers uttering (9b) are participating verbally in an unofficial 
game according to which speaking of fictional truths is tantamount to speaking 
of actual facts. Speakers intend their interlocutor to imagine Claire's attitude 
towards a fictional truth to be equivalent to her attitude towards actual facts.  
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,Q WKLV ZD\ :DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO LV DEOH WR DYRLG DQ\ FRPPLWPHnt to fictional 
entities. However, if fictional names are empty names and if utterances 
appearing to make reference to fictional characters do not express any 
proposition, but are rather to be understood as acts of pretence, how do we 
H[SODLQWKDW&ODLUH¶V XWWHUDQFH³7RP6DZ\HUDWWHQGHGKLVRZQIXQHUDO´VHHPV
WREH WDQWDPRXQW WR&ODUD¶VXWWHUDQFH LQ)UHQFK³7RP6DZ\HU a assisté à ses 
propres obsèquHV´ EXW QRW WR $ULHOOD¶V XWWHUDQFH ³6XSHUPDQ SXHGH YRODU´ LQ
6SDQLVK" &ODLUH¶V &ODUD¶V DQG $ULHOOD¶V XWWHUDQFes do not express any 
proposition, so how do we account for the apparent equivalence between what 
is said by Claire and Clara and the differences to what is said by Ariella, given 
that their utterances do not express a proposition? Surely, saying that Claire 
and Clara pretend to assert the proposition that Tom Sawyer attended his own 
funeral is not a solution given that there is no such proposition. According to 
Walton, Claire's and Clara's utterances are about the same kind of pretence, one 
that, following Walton, may be dubbed kind K. Claire specifies the kind K by 
performing or displaying a single instance of it. The same can be said for Clara, 
who specifies the kind of her act of pretence by displaying it; however, if we 
do not know how to relate these two acts of pretence as acts of pretence of the 
VDPHNLQGZHZLOOQRWDEOHWRGLVWLQJXLVKWKHPDVGLIIHUHQWIURP$ULHOOD¶VRQH
0HWDSKRULFDOO\ WKH VDPH VLWXDWLRQ RFFXUV ZKHQ ³RQH FDQ VSHFLI\ D VKDGH RI
color by pointing to a single instance, but only if it is understood that the kind 
LQGLFDWHGLVDVKDGHRIFRORURQHZKRVHLQVWDQFHVDUHH[DFWO\DOLNHLQFRORU´96   
                                                          
96
 :DOWRQ.SJ:DOWRQLVUHO\LQJKHUHRQ.ULSNH¶VDFFRunt of natural kind terms, 
according to which the reference to a natural kind is fixed via ostension to one of its samples. 
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$FFRUGLQJ WR :DOWRQ QHLWKHU LV WKH PHDQLQJ RI ³.´ WLHG WR DQ\ SDUWLFXODU
instance, nor do we need to abstract a crucial non-relational property from the 
sample which we can look for in other samples. For what concerns the relation 
EHWZHHQ &ODLUH¶V DQG &ODUD¶V DFWV RI SUHWHQFH ZH FDQ UHFRJQLVH WKDW ERWK
ILFWLRQDOO\ DWWULEXWH WKH SURSHUW\ RI KDYLQJ DWWHQGHG RQH¶V RZQ IXQHUDO WR
someone; and fictionally there is a single person to whom both attribute this 
SURSHUW\,WKDSSHQVWKDWILFWLRQDOO\WKH\XVHWKHVDPHQDPH³7RP6DZ\HU´WR
refer to the person to whom they attribute the property. If fictionally Tom 
Sawyer had a nickQDPH VXFK DV ³7RPP\´ DQG if Claire would have used 
³7RPP\´ ZKLOVW &ODUD would have used ³7RP´ ILFWLRQDOO\ WKH\ ZRXOG KDYH
referred to the same person and their act of pretence would have been of the 
same kind. Ultimately, the kind to which an act of pretence belongs finds its 
juVWLILFDWLRQ QRW LQ WKH FRQWHQW H[SUHVVHG E\ VSHDNHU¶V XWWHUDQFHV JLYHQ WKDW
WKHUHLVQRWVXFKDFRQWHQWEXWLQWKHZD\WKHVSHDNHU¶VSDUWLFLSDWLRQLQDJDPH
of make-believe takes form, according to the mechanisms of generation 
operative in the work of art. 
In conclusion, we can note that there is a very important PRYH LQ :DOWRQ¶V
account, froPWKHQRWLRQRIµSURSRVLWLRQV¶WRWKHQRWLRQRIµDFWVRISUHWHQFHRID
FHUWDLQNLQG¶ 
 
3.4.3      Pretence and Reality  
6SHDNHUV¶ DFWVRISUHWHQFHFRQWULEXWH WR WKH Whought process developed in the 
conversation. I have delineated this contribution in the above section, 
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characterising the relation between Pretence and Thought. In this section I will 
instead focus on the relation between Pretence and Reality.   
Thus far, DGRSWLQJ :DOWRQ¶V YLHZ , KDYH DVVXPHG WKDW VWDWHPHQWV ZKLFK
apparently make reference to fictional entities can be understood as acts of 
participation in a game of make-believe. However, speakers' assertive uses of 
those very statements raise the problem of what has been asserted participating 
in such acts of pretence. In other words, which facts in the actual world are 
speakers assessing by displaying their acts of pretence? Let us recall some of 
the examples discussed above:  
1. Tom Sawyer attended his own funeral.  
It may be said that speakers, in uttering (1), are asserting that fictionally Tom 
Sawyer attended his own funeral. However, this first answer is easily refutable 
given that (1) does not express any proposition97, therefore speakers cannot 
assert the fictionality of such a proposition.   
:DOWRQ¶VSURSRVDOLQIDFWIROORZVDFRPSOHWHO\GLIIHUHQWOLQH,QDSSUHFLDWLQJ
his proposal it is important to note that some statements uttered in verbal 
participation in a game of make-believe are appropriate or acceptable while 
others are not. For example, participating verbally in a game authorised for 
&RQDQ 'R\OH¶V VWRULHV by VD\LQJ WKDW ³6KHUORFN +ROPHV VPRNHV WKH SLSH´ LV
MXVWLILHG LQDZD\ WKDW VD\LQJ³6KHUORFN+ROPHVZURWHDGLDU\ UHFRXQWLQJKLV
own detecWLYH HQWHUSULVH´ LV QRW $FFRUGLQJ WR :DOWRQ WKLV DFFHSWDELOLW\ RU
unacceptability easily passes as truth or falsehood, hence the common 
intuitions that the former statement is true and the latter is false. However, in 
                                                          
97
 $WOHDVWWKHOLWHUDOFRQVWUXFWLRQRIGRHVQRWJLYHIRUPWRDFRQWHQWJLYHQWKDWLQ:DOWRQ¶V
view, fictional names are empty.  
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:DOWRQ¶V YLHZ WKHVH LQWXLWLRQV DUH ZUong. Statements such as (1) are acts of 
participation in a game of make-believe. Speakers in uttering (1) are 
participating verbally in an authorised game for The Adventures of Tom 
Sawyer - they are making it fictional of themselves that they speak truths rather 
than falsehoods. In this way their act of pretence is appropriate. In explaining 
the acceptability or unacceptability of an utterance of (1) there is no need to 
assume that engaging in an act of pretence of this kind is genuinely asserting 
something true or false. Yet, according to Walton, the fact that acts of pretence 
are appropriate or inappropriate creates an opportunity for making assertions. 
By displaying a certain act of pretence, speakers claim that it is proper and 
acceptable to participate in a certain pretence in the way that they are doing. 
&RQVLGHU&ODLUH¶VXWWHUDQFHRILQDFRQYHUVDWLRQ/RRVHO\&ODLUH
VXWWHUDQFH
introduces into the conversation an act of pretence - she is suggesting or 
implying a certain game of make-believe, the one authorised for The 
Adventures of Tom Sawyer; she does so by displaying her participation in such 
a game. Moreover, when pretending to assert (1), Claire is making the genuine 
assertion according to which in a game of make-believe, in which The 
Adventure of Tom Sawyer serves as a prop, she speaks truly. The genuine 
assertion Claire is making is about the game she is participating in, she makes 
an assertion by displaying her participation in the game of make-believe and by 
implying that the game authorises the kind of participation she is engaged in.    
 ³,Q JHQHUDO ZKHQ D SDUWLFLSDQW LQ D JDPH RI PDNH-believe authorized by a 
given representation fictionally asserts something by uttering an ordinary 
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statement and in doing so makes a genuine assertion, what she genuinely 
DVVHUWVLVWUXHLIDQGRQO\LILWLVILFWLRQDOLQWKHJDPHWKDWVKHVSHDNVWUXO\´98 
Walton offers a unified treatment of assertive uses of statements that imply 
both an authorised and unofficial game of make-believe. Let us recall an 
example employed in the previous section:  
3. Robison Crusoe was more resourceful than Gulliver.  
The speaker in uttering (3) is asserting something true if and only if it is 
fictional in the unofficial game - in which both novels *XOOLYHU¶V7UDYHOV and 
Robinson Crusoe serve as a prop - that she speaks truly. As we noticed, 
discussing the difference between participation and criticism, in uttering (3) the 
speaker may not be engaged in pretence. In this case, what she asserts is true if 
and only if it would be fictional in the unofficial game implied that she speaks 
truly were she playing one.   
So far, I considered cases in which a speaker's assertions are about the game of 
make-believe she is participating in. However, there are assertive uses of 
statements that do not seem to be inherent to a game of make-believe. Consider 
the following examples:  
10.  Frankenstein was created by Mary Shelley.  
11.  Sherlock Holmes does not exist. 
Utterances of (10) or (11) seem to be about fictional entities and not a game of 
make-believe, even if in the case of (11) the commitment to fictional entities is 
TXLWH SDUDGR[LFDO :DOWRQ¶V SURSRVDO FRKHUHQWO\ ZLWK WKH DQDO\VLV GHYHORSHG
                                                          
98
 Walton, K. (1990), pg. 399.  
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so far, points to a solution that avoids any ontological commitment to fictional 
entities and gives an account of utterances of (10) and (11) in terms of  
participation in a certain game of make-believe. Speakers, when uttering (10) 
or (11), contribute to the conversation indicating unofficial games of a certain 
sort. For example, in the utterance of (10), speakers imply games in which to 
author a novel means to bring into existence certain entities or, when uttering 
(11), games in which we can distinguish between existent and non-existent 
individuals. As we saw for other authorised and unofficial games, the 
implication that they are participating in a game of make-believe comes quite 
naturally; by displaying their involvement in the pretence, it does not require a 
special or explicit stipulation. Moreover, utterances of (10) or (11) perform an 
additional function in the communicative exchange, apart from asserting that to 
verbally participate as they do in the pretence means speaking the truth in the 
unofficial game implied. To fictionally predicate non-existence or the property 
RI ³EHLQJ FUHDWHG E\ D FHUWDLQ DXWKRU´ LQ WKH VDPH ZD\ DV ILFWLRQDOO\
SUHGLFDWLQJRI ³EHLQJ D ILFWLRQDO FKDUDFWHU´ ³EHLQJ DP\WKLFDO EHDVW´ ³EHLQJ
IHLJQHG´ ³EHLQJFRXQWHUIHLW´ ³EHLQJD FXOWXUDO DUWHIDFW´ ³EHLQJDSURGXFWRI
DQRYHUDFWLYHLPDJLQDWLRQ´³EHLQJDWULFNRIWKHOLJKW´³EHLQJ DIDLOHGSRVLW´
DQG ³EHLQJ DQ HPSW\ FRQFHSW´99 is both participating in a game of make-
believe and claiming that the fictional attempt to refer, acted within the game, 
is unsuccessful.  
/HW XV FUHDWH D SDUDOOHO EHWZHHQ FKLOGUHQ¶V SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ D JDPH Rf make-
EHOLHYHDQGVSHDNHUV¶SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQXQRIILFLDOJDPHVRIPDNH-believe such as 
                                                          
99
 Walton, K. (2000) Existence as Metaphor? Empty names, Fiction and the Puzzles of Non-
Existence. edited by Everett, A. & Hofweber, T., ed. Stanford: CSLI Press, pg. 83. 
149 
 
the ones they engage with when uttering (10) or (11) in order to obtain a better 
LQWXLWLYHJUDVSRIWKHVHVSHDNHUV¶XWWHUDQFHV 
Suppose that Clara is playing a game of make-believe in which her bike is a 
horse and the garage is the stall. Once her game is ended and she is ready to go 
RXWZLWKKHUPXPVKHPLJKWVD\³,DPUHDG\PXP7KHKRUVHLVEDFNLQWKH
VWDOO´&ODUDVHHPVWREHSDUWLFLSDWLQJLQDJDPHRIPDNH-believe; however, in 
this context, she is employing her pretence to reassure her mum that the bike is 
back in the garage. Therefore, she is employing her pretence to claim 
something about the props of her game.  
Let us consider if something analogous may happen in the utterances of (10) or 
(11). Speakers, as we saw in the previous sections, can themselves be props in 
their own imaginative activities and, for the analogy to hold, they should 
employ a pretence to claim something about their own acts of pretence. But 
this requirement does not seem to be different from what we met in cases with 
XWWHUDQFHV VXFK DV ³7RP 6DZ\HU DWWHQGHG KLV RZQ IXQHUDO´ *HQHUDOO\
VSHDNLQJDVZHKDYHVHHQDERYHVSHDNHUV¶DVVHUWLRQVFRQVLVWRIFODLPLQJWKDW
their speaking in a certain way is meant to speak truly within a game of a 
certain sort. However, in the case of utterances of (10) and (11) there is 
something more to say. According to Walton, when uttering (11), speakers not 
only claim that their verbal participation in a pretence in which we imagine that 
there are existent and non-existents objects means fictionally speaking the 
truth, but also convey that their fictional attempt to refer employing the term 
³6KHUORFN+ROPHV´LVXQVXFFHVVIXO,QWKHLUSUHWHQFHWKH\DUHDFWLQJDVLIWhey 
DWWHPSW WR UHIHU WRVRPHRQHHPSOR\LQJ WKH WHUP³6KHUORFN+ROPHV´DQG WKH\
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predicate the non-existence of the potential referent. According to Walton, in 
doing so, they disavow their fictional attempt to refer. Similarly to Clara, they 
are employing a pretence to communicate something about some of the props 
in their game, namely themselves in acting as they do when fictionally 
DWWHPSWLQJ WR UHIHUE\HPSOR\LQJ IRUH[DPSOH WKH WHUP³6KHUORFN+ROPHV´
To reiterate, what they communicate is that the fictional attempt to refer is 
unsuccessful.  
Walton suggests a schematic way of reading these types of utterances, to say 
³6KHUORFN+ROPHVGRHVQRWH[LVW´LVWRVD\ 
11a.  6KHUORFN+ROPHV7KDWGLGQ¶WZRUN 
ZKHUH µWKDW¶ UHIHUV WR WKH NLQG RI DWWHPSWHG UHIHUHQFe illustrated by the 
utterance of the name. 
The same analysis can be provided for (10) and the predicate listed above, 
ZKLFKLQ:DOWRQ¶VYLHZDUHPHDQVVSHDNHUVFDQHPSOR\WRGLVDYRZWKHLURZQ
acts of pretence.  
 
Conclusion 
,Q FRQFOXVLRQ :DOWRQ¶VSURSRVDO is the most satisfactory among all the anti-
UHDOLVWLFYLHZVGLVFXVVHG LQ WKLVVWXG\$GRSWLQJ WKHQRWLRQRI µPDNH-EHOLHYH¶
DQG µSDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ D JDPH RI PDNH-EHOLHYH¶ :DOWRQ RIIHUV D FRKHUHQW
account of the whole range of examples submitted to the different theoretical 
VWDQFHV )XUWKHUPRUH LQ FRQWUDVW WR WKH ³JDSS\ SURSRVLWLRQV´ YLHZ Walton 
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does not employ an ad hoc solution, something which 惇gappy propositions敦 are 
susceptible to being criticised.  
Make-believe is founded on our activities as a species; human beings engage 
themselves in imaginative activities which occupy them from infancy. 
Imagination seems to cover a very important role in our growth, in acquiring 
awareness of the world and objects around us during our first years and then in 
providing us with an insight into psychological relations and value systems in 
our societies during our adulthood. It is not difficult to think how our 
propensity towards engaging in imaginative activities, as human beings, can 
have contributed to our evolutionary process as a species. Moreover, it is not 
difficult to see our propensity towards utilising the imagination reflected in the 
way in which we use the language. Statements in which there is an apparent 
reference to fictional entities are to be understood ZLWKLQ VSHDNHUV¶ DFWV RI
SDUWLFLSDWLRQLQSUHWHQFH:DOWRQ¶VSURSRVDORQWKHSX]]OHVUDLVHGE\VHQWHQFHV
containing fictional names has been fully elaborated in his Mimesis as Make-
Believe. On the Foundation of Representational Arts, in 1990. Since then, this 
part of his work has not been discussed in its entirety and it has been mainly 
avoided as too complicated or implausible from a linguistic point of view100. 
My contribution in this study is not only a clearer delineation of WaltoQ¶V
view, but also a further development of an understanding of how utterances of 
sentences containing fictional names can be read as acts of communication. I 
suggest here that, on the same level as other more ³playful´ uses of language 
                                                          
100
 Mark RicharGLQ³6HPDQWLF3UHWHQFH´ wonders why the module language should be 
VR LQHIILFLHQW IROORZLQJ :DOWRQ¶V DFFRXQW RI VSHDNHUV¶ DVVHUWLYH XVHV HPSOR\LQJ VHQWHQFHV
containing fictional names. 
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such as metaphors and figurative language, acts of pretence in employing 
fictional names can also be understood within our communicative exchange in 
conversations. In this way I attempt to answer the objection of implausibility 
DGYDQFHGDJDLQVW:DOWRQ¶VYLHZ 
Sentences containing fictional names do not express propositions. The 
HTXLYDOHQFHEHWZHHQXWWHUDQFHVRI³7RP6DZ\HUDWWHQGHGKLVRZQIXQHUDO´DQG
XWWHUDQFHV RI WKH VDPH VHQWHQFH LQ ,WDOLDQ ³7RP 6DZ\HU KD DVVLVWLWR DO VXR
VWHVVR IXQHUDOH´ LV QRW EDVHG RQ WKH FRQWHQW H[SUHVVHG E\ WKHVH VHQWHQFHs, 
because there is not such a content, but on the equivalence of the kind to which 
VSHDNHUV¶DFWVRISUHWHQFHEHORQJ6HQWHQFHVFRQWDLQLQJILFWLRQDOQDPHVWDNHQ
literally, do not express a proposition. However, taken as means by which 
speakers display their own acts of pretence, speakers, by employing such 
sentences, do express something. Yet, employing the notion of make-believe 
available, does not give us the opportunity to have a deeper insight on what 
that something is. Although a philosophical analysLV RI µPDNH-EHOLHYH¶ GRHV
not seem essential, there may be more work to do on the psychological account 
RIµPDNH-EHOLHYH¶.  
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